Tackling Unemployment: The Legislative Dynamics of the Employment Act of 1946 by Wasem, Ruth Ellen
Upjohn Press Upjohn Press Collection 
1-1-2013 
Tackling Unemployment: The Legislative Dynamics of the 
Employment Act of 1946 
Ruth Ellen Wasem 
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons 
Citation 
Wasem, Ruth Ellen. 2013. Tackling Unemployment: The Legislative Dynamics of the Employment Act of 
1946. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 

Tackling Unemployment
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Tackling Unemployment
The Legislative Dynamics of the 
Employment Act of 1946
Ruth Ellen Wasem
2013
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Wasem, Ruth Ellen.
 Tackling unemployment : the legislative dynamics of the Employment Act of 1946 / 
Ruth Ellen Wasem.
  pages cm
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-452-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-452-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-453-8 (hardcover : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-453-3 (hardcover : alk. paper)
 1.  Full employment policies—United States. 2.  Employment stabilization—Law 
and legislation—United States. 3.  United States. Employment Act of 1946.  I. Title.
 KF6055.W37 2013
 344.7301'20424—dc23
2013000724
 © 2013
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the author. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
To the memory of 
Jessie McCullough Wasem and Charles Terry Wasem
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
vii
Contents
Acknowledgments xiii
1   The Employment Act in Historical Perspective 1 
  Usage of Unemployment and Full Employment 3
  Historiography of the Employment Act of 1946 4
  Vantage Point of History 8 
 
2   Federal Role in Employment Stimulation 11
  Socioeconomic Transformation 11
  Experiences of the Great Depression 15 
  Legacy of the New Deal 18
  Accomplishments of the War Years 22
  Congress Looks for Alternatives 26
  An American White Paper 29
  Ascendancy of Full Employment 34
3   Press and Public Opinion Diverge 39
  Postwar Employment Worries 40
  Media Treatment of the Postwar Economy 46
  Fortune Magazine’s Executive Forecast 47
  Full Employment Enters the Public Discourse 50
  Mass Marketing of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom 57
  Reaction to the Full Employment Legislation 59
  Relevance of Radio News 66
  Closing Comments 67
4   Senate Passes Full Employment 69
  The Emergence of a Full Employment Bill 69
  Debate within the Executive Branch 74
  Liberal Groups Mobilize for Full Employment 79
  The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency Moves on S. 380 83
  Debate on the Senate Floor 88
 
5  Opponents Take Aim in the House 97
  Committee Assignment Alters the Bill’s Course 97
  Truman Presses for Action 105
  House Members Negotiate a Compromise 107
  The House Moves on the Legislation 113
  S. 380 Comes to the House Floor 115
 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
viii
6   Socioeconomic and Political Forces 125
  Measuring Support for Full Employment 125
  Correlates of Support for the Full Employment Bill 127
7   The Employment Act of 1946 139
  Final Push for Full Employment 139
  Implementing the Employment Act 144
  Early Years of the Employment Act 150
  Vantage Point of the Twenty-First Century 153
Appendix A: Variables and Their Sources 163
  Units of Analysis 163
  “Timeliness” of Data 163
Appendix B: Scores and Indices 167 
  Full Employment Score 167
  Partisanship Score 167
  Ideology Scale 168
  Adjusted Living Level 168
  Indices 169 
 
Appendix C: Profiling Support for S. 380 173 
 
Appendix D: Profiling Support for H.R. 2202 177
  The Final Vote 187
  Closing Observations 190
Appendix E: A Structural Model Approach 193
  Comparing the Models of Full Employment with Ideology 197 
  
Appendix F: Methodology and Research Design 201
  Overview of Statistics Employed 201
  Discussion of Procedures 203 
   
References 209
Author 221
Index 223
About the Institute 241
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
ix
Figures
2.1   Occupational Distribution of the U.S. Labor Force, 1900–1950 13 
2.2   Number and Percentage of Persons Unemployed, 1929–1941 16
3.1   Public Opinion in 1941 on Postwar Employment Prospects 41
3.2  Public Opinion in 1942 on Postwar Prosperity 42
3.3   Public Attitudes in 1944 on Personal Job Prospects 43
3.4   Public Opinion in 1944 on Postwar Employment Prospects by  44
  Gender, Age, and Occupation
3.5   Business Leaders’ Views in 1942 of Postwar Unemployment  48
  Prospects
3.6   Business Leaders’ Views in 1942 on Responsibility for  49
  Alleviating Unemployment
3.7   Business Leaders’ Prognosis in 1945 of Employment in Their  51
  Sectors
3.8   Public Opinion in 1943 on Feasibility of Full Employment 52
3.9   Public Opinion in 1943 on Planning for Full Employment 53
3.10   Business Leaders’ Views in 1944 on Government’s Role in Full  55 
  Employment
3.11   Public Opinion in June 1945 on the Government’s Role in  56
  Ensuring Employment
3.12   Public Opinion in August 1945 on the Capacity of Business to  57
  Provide Employment
3.13   Public Opinion in August 1945 on the Concept of Full  63
  Employment
3.14 Public Opinion in September 1945 on the Government’s Role in  66
  Ensuring Employment
6.1   Legislative Support for Full Employment: Comparison of Senate  126
  and House Scores
7.1   Public Opinion on the Government’s Role in Employment:  141
  February 1946
7.2   Public Attitudes on Personal Job Prospects: 1946 150
7.3   Unemployment Rates and Recessions, 1946–2010 154
7.4   Capital Infrastructure Spending, 1956–2009 (2009 dollars) 157
7.5   GDP, Federal Tax Receipts, and Tax Rates, 1946–2010 158
7.6   Average Personal Income (2005 dollars) and Average Personal  160
  Income Plus Capital Gains of the Bottom 90% and Top 1% 
  (2010 dollars)
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
xE.1   Basic Model of Support for Full Employment: Model A 194
E.2   Support for Full Employment in the House: Model B 196
Tables
2.1   Postwar Employment Study Group Participants 31
3.1   Public Opinion in August 1945 on the Concept of Full 64
  Employment, by Economic Status
3.2   Public Opinion in August 1945 on the Concept of Full  65
  Employment, by Education
6.1   Senators’ Support for Full Employment and Selected Measures:  129
	 	 Simple	Correlation	Coefficients
6.2   Senate Full Employment Score Regressed on Selected Variables 129
6.3   House Full Employment Score upon Party, Electoral, and District  130
	 	 Traits:	Simple	Correlation	Coefficients
6.4   Multiple Regression: House Full Employment Score on Party,  131
  Electoral, and District Traits
6.5   Multiple Regression: Democratic Party on District Traits of  133
  the House
A.1   Variables Used in the Analysis of the House Vote on Full 165
  Employment, and Their Sources
A.2 Variables Used in the Analysis of the Senate Vote on Full 166
  Employment, and Their Sources
B.1   Traditional Grouping of States by Geographic Area, Serving as  171
  the Standard ICPSR Region Variable
C.1   Senate Full Employment Mean Scores by Region and Party 173
C.2   Economic and Demographic Characteristics by Senators’ Party 174
C.3   Economic and Demographic Characteristics by Party and Full  175 
  Employment Score 
D.1   Political Party, by Region 177
D.2   Mean Constituency Traits, by Party and Region 178
D.3   Mean District Economic Traits, by Party and Region 179
D.4   Mean Electoral Traits, by Party and Region 180
D.5   Mean Ideological/Personal Traits, by Party and Region 181
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
xi
D.6   Support for Full Employment, by Regional Delegation 183
D.7   Percentage with Selected Features, by Sponsorship 185
D.8   Percentage with Selected Features, by Sponsorship and Party:  186 
  Democrats
D.9   Percentage with Selected Features, by Sponsorship and Party:   187 
  Republicans
D.10  Percentage with Selected Features, by Final Vote 189
D.11  Percentage with Selected Features, by Final Vote and Party:   190
  Democrats
D.12  Percentage with Selected Features, by Final Vote and Party:   191 
  Republicans
E.1   Modeling Support for Full Employment in the House:  195
  Model A—Direct and Indirect Effects
E.2   Modeling Support for Full Employment in the House:  197
  Model B—Regional Groupings, Direct and Indirect Effects
E.3   Modeling Support For Full Employment in the House:  198
  Model C—A Simpler Model, Direct and Indirect Effects
E.4   Modeling Support for Ideology: Model D—Direct and  198
  Indirect Effects
E.5 Modeling Support for Ideology: Model E—Regional Groupings, 199
  Direct and Indirect Effects
F.1   Models A and B, Estimated Equations for Full Employment  205 
	 	 with	Unstandardized	Coefficients
F.2   Model C, Estimated Equations for Full Employment with  206 
	 	 Unstandardized	Coefficients
F.3   Models D and E, Estimated Equations for Ideology with  207
	 	 Unstandardized	Coefficients
Illustrations
3.1   Panels from the Cartoon Version of The Road to Serfdom,  60
  Published in Look Magazine
7.1 Senators Joseph O’Mahoney and Robert Taft 146
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
xiii
Acknowledgments
Growing up in the Upper Ohio Valley, where the local economy had until 
recent decades depended on mining and steel, provided me with a rough edu-
cation in the vagaries of employment. The boom time of the 1950s and 1960s 
gave way to decades when, for many, unemployment always lurked around the 
corner. The book is dedicated to my parents, Charles Terry Wasem and Jessie 
McCullough Wasem, who lived most of their lives in eastern Ohio. I would 
further acknowledge my brother, Terry Denton Wasem, and my lifelong friend 
Jackie Hawk Dunlap, both of whom live in eastern Ohio today, for their moral 
support as I was writing this book.
The kernel of this book was a dissertation begun during the recession of 
1982,	the	last	time	U.S.	unemployment	had	reached	10	percent	before	it	briefly	
topped out at that number in November 2009. The Institute for Social Research’s 
Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan funded much of my 
graduate studies and enabled me to work with many outstanding researchers. 
The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum also provided research 
funding, and the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies gave tuition 
support. Considerable credit is due to my dissertation chair, Jerome M. Clubb, 
and committee members Maris A. Vinovskis, John E. Jackson, and Terrence J. 
McDonald for holding me to high academic standards while providing the 
encouragement necessary to complete the dissertation in 1989. 
Fast-forward two decades to 2009, when the nation was in the midst of 
the Great Recession. Joyce Vialet and her husband, John Vialet, became the 
catalysts for this book. Joyce had been my mentor in immigration policy at 
the Congressional Research Service and recalled that I was completing a dis-
sertation on employment policy when we began working together in the late 
1980s. Had it not been for the Vialets’ interest in discussing this subject during 
a stormy weekend in 2009 at Newport, Rhode Island, this book may never 
have been written. 
Soon all of my free time was devoted to researching the Employment 
Act of 1946 anew. As we walked our dogs together, neighbors Tad and Susan 
Cantril guided me to the public opinion data from the 1940s that formed the 
basis of Chapter 3. Survey research experts (and former classmates from the 
University of Michigan) Celinda Lake, Barbara Smela, and Fran Featherston 
provided valuable comments on that chapter. Labor economists Linda Levine 
and	Gerry	Mayer,	as	well	as	Joyce,	Barbara,	and	Fran,	reviewed	the	first	draft	
of the manuscript. 
I am grateful to Kevin Hollenbeck of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, who expressed early interest in the book and suggested 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
xiv
key revisions to the manuscript. Benjamin Jones of the Upjohn Institute has 
been an energetic and thoughtful editor of the book. Erika Jackson typeset the 
manuscript,	including	the	tables	and	figures.	Any	flaws	and	shortcomings,	of	
course, are mine.
The	views	and	conclusions	of	this	book	solely	reflect	those	of	the	author	
and not those of the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. Library of Con-
gress, or the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
1 1
The Employment Act in 
Historical Perspective
As the United States approached the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, it was undergoing a considerable change in its conception of the 
role of government and of the government’s responsibility for maintain-
ing the economic well-being of its people. The Great Depression had 
shaken the country’s economic foundation and posed a threat to the 
social stability of the United States. The activist programs of the New 
Deal intervened and, many say, prevented a complete national collapse. 
What the New Deal did not do, ramping up for the nation’s entrance 
into the Second World War did: end the economic depression. Direct 
federal spending for World War II, which stimulated wartime produc-
tion, lifted America out of the Great Depression. 
At the leadership level, many concluded that the wartime spending 
had validated the theories of John Maynard (Lord) Keynes, a British 
economist	who	 advocated,	 among	other	 things,	 deficit	 spending	dur-
ing economic downturns and depressions. Some policymakers further 
argued that it would be reckless if the government did not establish 
Keynesian economics as formal policy. There were quite a few leaders, 
however, who thought the New Deal had gone too far and who certainly 
opposed any effort to further strengthen the federal role in the economy. 
Though the American public knew little of Keynes and his theories 
on compensatory spending, they did know that they wanted no more 
depressions. Many people, idle during the 1930s and working over-
time during the war, were realizing that they were part of a national 
economic	 system	and	 thus	were	vulnerable	 to	 its	fluctuations.	More-
over, the socioeconomic composition of the population was undergoing 
change, and the fact of social and economic interdependence was now 
obvious.	The	 result	was	a	 redefinition	of	 the	 role	of	government	and	
government responsibility.
The push to enact full employment legislation was a pivotal step in 
this process. An examination of the debate on full employment policy 
offers an opportunity to identify the forces in this contest, to see how 
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these forces lined up, and to clarify the issues that distinguished these 
forces from one another. Full employment legislation provides a case 
study that enables us to gain a better, albeit incomplete, understanding 
of	the	dynamics	of	redefining	government’s	tasks.
 As originally introduced, the proposed Full Employment Act of 
1945—hereafter referred to as the full employment bill—mandated a 
dramatically new role for the federal government in the economy. It 
was	 the	first	 piece	of	 seriously	 considered,	 comprehensive	 economic	
legislation from the perspective of the consumer and working person. 
More sweeping than protective labor legislation such as workmen’s 
compensation and minimum-wage laws, the bill stated that all persons 
able and willing to work were entitled to employment—an employ-
ment bill of rights. It also would have established a permanent system 
for national economic planning and would have required compensatory 
federal spending in periods of recession. 
The legislation that was ultimately enacted became the founda-
tion	of	 economic	policy	 for	many	years.	 It	 provided	 the	 justification	
for compensatory spending, tax cuts, job-creation tax credits, and other 
Keynesian tools, which the many subsequent administrations used to 
buoy the U.S. economy. It established the President’s Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers and the congressional Joint Economic Committee—
key structures intended to conduct national economic planning. Indeed, 
it placed the ultimate responsibility for maintaining the nation’s eco-
nomic well-being upon the federal government.
A history of the Employment Act of 1946 is especially pertinent 
today, as many of the world’s developed economies teeter on the verge 
of a major economic recession, perhaps depression. The U.S. Congress 
and the president are again debating the role of the federal government 
in alleviating unemployment and stimulating job creation. Although 
full employment is not a common phrase in the current lexicon, the 
twentieth-century debate over full employment offers lessons for our 
times. The parallels will emerge as the history unfolds.
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USAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND FULL EMPLOYMENT
Unemployment. The term still prompts images of the gaunt faces in 
the breadlines of the 1930s, although today we are more likely to see 
depictions of statistical trends in the graphics shown on the news. To the 
affected individuals and families, it is an ego-shattering experience that 
places the basic requirements of food and shelter at risk. To the society 
as a whole, it is indicative of a troubled economy when it rises above 
the level of frictional unemployment—i.e., unemployment that occurs 
when people are naturally moving between jobs. Some researchers, 
moreover, associate unemployment with increases in personal prob-
lems such as divorce, substance abuse, and mental health problems, as 
well as community-wide problems such as delinquency and violence 
(Strom 2003).
Unemployment is a concept that grew alongside industrialization. 
It is an integral, if unfortunate, aspect of free enterprise capitalism. It 
occurs when an individual’s job depends on persons or forces beyond 
his or her control or when the person lacks the skills needed to perform 
the job at hand. It appears that originally the term “unemployed” was 
used	literally	to	refer	to	those	who	were	not	working.	This	earlier	defini-
tion thus encompassed children as well as elderly persons. Before the 
1850s, the use of “unemployed” to describe adults connoted laziness 
and incompetence (Keyssar 1986, p. 3).
The	 contemporary	 definition	 of	 unemployment	 derives	 directly	
from the idea of involuntary idleness. As the United States was experi-
encing the depression of the 1870s, the word “unemployed” began to be 
limited to those forced out of work. The term “unemployment,” refer-
ring to both the condition of persons and the condition of the economy, 
began appearing in print in the late 1880s. The 1911 edition of the Ency-
clopaedia Britannica	was	the	first	to	include	an	entry	on	unemployment	
(Garraty 1979, pp. 139–140; Keyssar 1986, pp. 3–5).
Full employment, like unemployment, is a modern concept. As 
countries around the world were experiencing the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, full employment became a focal point of policy debates. 
Though Keynes did not originate the term, he certainly fostered its 
discussion. More importantly, Keynes, as well as American economist 
Alvin Hansen, advocated full employment as a policy alternative for 
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free market economies that countered the fascist and socialist remedies 
for unemployment (Klein 1947, pp. 153–159).
Full employment means somewhat different things to different peo-
ple. In his 1944 Report on Full Employment in a Free Society, William 
Henry	 (Lord)	Beveridge	 defined	 full	 employment	 as	 “having	 always	
more vacant jobs than unemployed men” (Beveridge 1944, p. 18). Leon 
Keyserling, an original member of the Council of Economic Advisers, 
said that full employment is simply no unemployment—when everyone 
who wants a job has a job.1 Generally, economists describe full employ-
ment as the condition of the economy when the only unemployment is 
frictional—i.e., the rate of unemployment that normally results from 
people changing jobs. The rate of unemployment that economists have 
considered acceptable in a full employment economy has ranged from 
less than 1 percent to 5 percent (Dornbusch and Fischer 1981, pp. 7–8, 
376; Garraty 1979, p. 229).
This	book	defines	full	employment	as	the	condition	of	the	national	
economy when all who are able and willing to work are employed. This 
definition	is	based	upon	popular	usage	of	the	term	during	the	late	1930s	
and 1940s and is derived from the Keynesian view of full employment 
as a function of national income or the gross national product. This eco-
nomic equilibrium, through forecasting and planning, can be achieved 
with private enterprise and investment; however, the federal govern-
ment	is	expected	to	use	compensatory	spending	and	other	fiscal	tools	
to raise the national income when the private sector falls short of the 
investment	sufficient	for	full	employment.	Thus,	 this	usage	 implies	a	
proactive role for the federal government and a promise of employment 
for the labor force. 
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946
The researchers of postwar domestic policy, as well as the biogra-
phers of Harry S. Truman, almost uniformly agree that the full employ-
ment bill, ultimately enacted as the Employment Act of 1946, is one of 
the major pieces, if not the most important piece, of domestic legisla-
tion during the Truman years. Alan Brinkley (1996, p. 264) character-
izes it as the “last great battle for the New Deal.” Alonzo Hamby (1973, 
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p. 60), in his thorough account of American liberalism following World 
War II, Beyond the New Deal, ranks the legislation’s importance highly: 
“More than any other measure, this bill seemed essential to the future of 
postwar America,” he says. Truman biographer Robert Donovan (1977, 
p. 166) labels the legislation as the “landmark in the Truman admin-
istration.” A retrospective volume edited by Francis H. Heller (1982, 
p.	211)	with	contributions	from	major	figures	in	the	Truman	administra-
tion describes the act as “fundamental.” James Sundquist (1968, p. 54), 
characterizing	it	as	the	“legal	mandate	for	fiscal	activism,”	documents	
its seminal role in policymaking throughout the years from Presidents 
Eisenhower to Johnson. And in Unemployment in History, John Garraty 
(1979, p. 231) concludes, “Its passage was a landmark in the history of 
national economic policy, and also of American political history, for it 
set	up	a	Council	of	Economic	Advisers,	the	influence	of	which	on	pub-
lic policy was to be enormous.” 
Some scholars extend the importance of the Employment Act 
beyond American domestic policy. William Appleman Williams (1972, 
pp. 231–239), for example, considers the fear of economic depressions 
and the desire for full employment as essential aspects of the American 
“open door” view of the world. He presents then–assistant secretary 
of state Dean Acheson’s testimony before Congress in November of 
1944, during which Acheson states, “We cannot have full employment 
and prosperity in the United States without foreign markets” (p. 236). 
Williams links the goal of full employment with expansionist foreign 
policy and the escalation of the Cold War.
Beyond recognizing the importance of the Employment Act, the 
scholarly research conveys a consensus of opinion on the circum-
stances surrounding its enactment. Four common themes emerge from 
the literature.
A major consensus in the literature is that the original full employ-
ment bill clearly grew out of Keynesian economic theory. Margaret 
Weir (1992, pp. 27–58) opens her discussion of employment policy in 
the United States with a discussion of Keynesian principles, such as 
compensatory spending, that were embodied in the full employment 
bill. As Hamby (1973, p. 60) observes, “Fundamentally, the bill was 
an attempt to write into law the economics of Keynes and Hansen by 
requiring enough compensatory government spending to wipe out 
unemployment.” In an edited volume on the policies of the Truman 
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administration, Barton Bernstein and Alan Matusow (1966, p. 47) state, 
“The intellectual origins of the Employment Act of 1946 can easily be 
traced to the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes and the famed 
Beveridge Plan in Britain.” Likewise, Sundquist (1968, p. 61) maintains, 
“The discussions leading to the 1946 Act centered upon Keynesian con-
cepts	and	techniques	for	planning	and	influencing	of	aggregates—the	
‘national production and employment budget,’ the ‘aggregate volume 
of investment and expenditure,’ and so on.” 
The	literature,	second,	offers	a	unified	voice	on	the	importance	of	
the bill to the liberal community, largely because liberals saw Keynes-
ian policies as the solution to unemployment and its ensuing problems. 
Brinkley (1996, p. 260) describes how progressives in the labor move-
ment as well as those from the National Farmers Union and the Union 
for Democratic Action “lobbied vigorously and effectively” for full 
employment legislation. “Their long-range hopes for stability focused 
upon a daring new piece of legislation, the full employment bill,” he 
writes. Hamby (1973, pp. 60–64) says, “It demonstrated the way in 
which Keynesian economics had captured the allegiance of liberals 
during the war.” The full employment bill became the centerpiece of 
the liberals’ postwar agenda and the focal point of legislative lobbying 
efforts. Donovan (1977) characterizes the bill as “the liberals’ dream” 
(p. 122) and recounts their aggravation with compromise versions 
(p.	169).	The	dismayed	reaction	of	the	liberals	to	the	modifications	of	
the “crucial full employment bill” is more fully described by Hamby.
A third point of consensus among scholars is that President Harry 
S. Truman offered weak support for the original bill and was partly 
responsible for its dilution. The only notable exceptions to this view are 
those expressed by people who were part of the Truman administration. 
Bernstein and Matusow (1966, p. 47) present Franklin Roosevelt as the 
champion of full employment in his 1944 campaign and characterize 
his successor as giving only a formal blessing: “Despite Truman’s open 
endorsement, the bill received wavering support from the administra-
tion.” Hamby (1973, pp. 63–64) argues that the White House acqui-
esced to compromises that weakened the bill. Donovan (1977, p. 122) 
describes negotiations between the House committee responsible for 
the legislation and the administration, portraying Truman as willing to 
water down the measure so that it would be reported out of committee. 
Weir (1992, pp. 52–53) credits Truman as a supporter of the legislation 
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but concludes he was unable to command party loyalty or generate pub-
lic pressure for the legislation.
Fourth	and	finally,	consensus	exists	on	the	congressional	treatment	
of the bill. Throughout the debate on full employment, the liberal Sen-
ate leaders are seen as pushing the original bill only to be stymied by 
the conservative House, particularly the Southern leadership. Donovan 
(1977,	pp.	122–123)	explains	how	the	bill	“floundered”	in	the	House	
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, a com-
mittee he describes as being dominated by ideological conservatives, 
especially committee chairman Carter Manasco (D-AL). Hamby (1973, 
p. 64) quips that this committee rewrote the original bill to offer a “ver-
sion so weak that Washington wits said it had been ‘Manascolated.’” 
Brinkley (1996, pp. 263–264) describes the “evisceration” of the leg-
islation by the coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats.
A consensus in the literature on these four themes surrounding 
the Employment Act of 1946 is not surprising, because the legislation 
became the textbook case for a generation of college and university 
courses on the U.S. Congress—literally. In 1950, Stephen Kemp Bailey 
wrote an award-winning book on congressional behavior. Innovative 
for its time, Congress Makes a Law: The Employment Act of 1946 was 
a study of legislative policy formation that highlighted the importance 
of congressional staff and interest groups. Bailey analyzed the support 
for the legislation by looking at the biographical characteristics of the 
members of Congress and at the socioeconomic traits of their districts. 
His method is unsophisticated by current standards but was a major step 
toward the systematic analysis of legislative behavior. Bailey (1964, 
Vintage paperback edition) concluded by advancing the theory that 
the House of Representatives was more conservative than the Senate 
because it consisted of a more rural, provincial group of people, and 
that this provincialism led to policies less supportive of a strong federal 
government.
The four common themes of the literature discussed in the preced-
ing paragraphs all emerged in Bailey’s work. The book opens with the 
Keynesian origins of the legislation. Bailey proceeds with a discussion 
of how the liberal community championed the idea of full employment 
and placed it at the fore of its agenda. He describes key senators who 
advocated the bill and the instrumental role their staffs played in craft-
ing the legislation. On the other side of the aisle, Bailey delineates the 
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conservative House members who obstructed the legislation. Bailey 
portrays Truman as weak, ineffective, and offering support that was too 
little, too late. His implicit conclusion is that a critically important piece 
of legislation was diluted by players who behaved less than responsi-
bly in the political process. Most scholars who have come after Bailey 
share his affection for the original full employment bill and echo his 
theme that the Employment Act of 1946, albeit a landmark, fell far short 
of what was called for at that time.
VANTAGE POINT OF HISTORY 
This book concurs with many of the interpretations of the full 
employment bill presented in the literature. In fact, this research rein-
forces the picture of a dramatic departure from previous policies that 
the initial legislation offered and the importance of this bill to the liberal 
community. The Keynesian underpinnings of the proposal and the view 
that wartime spending validated the buoyant effect of compensatory 
spending are also accepted without dispute. The important role of the 
economic planning apparatus that resulted from the Employment Act, 
notably the Council of Economic Advisers, is implicit in this research 
as well.
The points of departure with the current historiography, however, 
are considerable. Foremost, this research does not agree with the pre-
vailing interpretation of congressional behavior on the full employment 
bill.	 Specifically,	 it	 challenges	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 proposal	 split	
members of Congress along North-South and urban-rural lines and that 
opponents were “provincial” in their thinking. Instead, it offers a more 
nuanced analysis of the economic, demographic, and political factors 
that drove support for and opposition to full employment, drawing par-
allels to the populist and Federalist-versus-Anti-Federalist traditions in 
American politics.
This research, moreover, counters the conclusion that Truman 
responded limply on the full employment bill. It refutes arguments 
about his alleged willingness to compromise the “full employment” 
language, and it challenges the view that Truman was detached from 
the negotiations. As it turns out, Truman was more engaged in the leg-
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islation than President Franklin Roosevelt had been before his death in 
1945.	A	significantly	different	interpretation	of	the	Truman	administra-
tion’s strategy emerges.
Finally, this research does not treat the full employment bill as a sin-
gle	proposal	that,	when	modified,	proved	ineffective.	The	bill,	rather,	is	
presented as a package of legislative proposals offered as a comprehen-
sive strategy for achieving full employment. By studying the various 
elements that made up the full employment bill, one can observe that, 
just as some elements were diluted by the legislative process, others 
were strengthened. The legislative dynamics of the Employment Act 
of 1946 are considered within the broader tensions over the role of the 
federal government in the American economy. 
There are four central elements of the full employment bill to exam-
ine as we track its course through the legislative process. First and fore-
most is the stated responsibility of the federal government to ensure 
full employment when the private sector falls short, primarily through 
compensatory spending. A second key element is the apparatus or struc-
ture to implement that responsibility. Third is the concept of national 
economic planning, which likewise forms a core element of such a pro-
posal. And the fourth feature, equally as important as the previous three, 
is the strength of the commitment—the guarantee of employment—that 
the federal government is making to the American people in this pro-
posed policy.
Whenever	Congress	debates	legislative	proposals,	it	is	difficult	to	
foresee the long-term importance of the action. Grandiose claims about 
the far-reaching effects—both positive and negative—are all too fre-
quently made during the process. From the vantage point of history it 
is	often	easier	to	appraise	the	significance	of	what	came	to	be	and	what	
might	have	been.	The	 long-term	significance	of	 the	 full	 employment	
bill lies directly in what it proposed to achieve and how members of 
Congress responded to its purpose and plan of action. This book stud-
ies anew the full employment bill and the resulting Employment Act 
to explore how the government’s response to high levels of unemploy-
ment	redefined	the	federal	role	in	job	creation.	
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Note
 1. Leon Keyserling, oral history interview by the author, August 11, 1982.
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Federal Role in 
Employment Stimulation 
The ideas that the federal government should engage in employ-
ment stimulation and should ensure full employment are rooted in the 
experiences of the Great Depression. During the Depression, people 
were searching for solutions to the hard times that were occurring in 
America and elsewhere. The New Deal set the stage for the debate 
because it established the precedent for an activist federal government. 
But whereas many of the ingredients for a federal role in job creation 
were	formulated	during	the	New	Deal,	confidence	in	the	federal	govern-
ment’s capacity to achieve full employment grew out of the war mobi-
lization efforts of World War II. Indeed, the performance of the U.S. 
economy during the war validated the idea of compensatory spending 
and made full employment a realizable objective.
SOCIOECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
The economic and demographic changes that America experienced 
during	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 are	well	 known,	 as	 the	
nation became more urban and industrial, better educated, and ethni-
cally more diverse. Scholars have theorized about—and in many cases 
documented—the social and political consequences of these changes. 
This socioeconomic transformation did much to shape the debate on the 
federal role in job creation as America approached midcentury.
America was growing. The U.S. economy had grown from a gross 
national product (GNP) per capita of $1,001 in 1900 to a GNP per cap-
ita of $2,342 in 1950. The Great Depression affected economies world-
wide, and America’s GNP growth rate exceeded those of other industri-
alized Western nations such as Germany, England, Italy, and Canada for 
the same period. Disposable personal income in the United States grew 
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dramatically, from $71.5 billion in 1920 to $206.9 billion in 1950 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 1975, p. 224).1 
The population was growing as well: in one decade alone, it grew 
from 76 million in 1900 to 92 million in 1910. Half of the 16-million-
person increase during this decade, an estimated eight million, came 
from	a	continuing	flow	of	immigrants.	By	1950,	the	population	of	the	
United States had reached 151.7 million people; that is, in 50 years’ 
time it had doubled (U.S. Census Bureau 1975, p. 11).
As the population grew, areas that had once been rural became more 
densely populated. Towns evolved into midsized cities, and suburbs 
formed around major cities. Many people left rural areas to live in met-
ropolitan centers, and most of the new immigrants settled in cities as 
well. The result was that the nation shifted from being predominantly 
rural in its residential characteristics to being urban. The percentage 
of people living in urban areas rose from 39.7 percent in 1900 to 59.0 
percent	in	1950.	The	pivotal	year	was	1920,	when,	for	the	first	time,	just	
over half of Americans were living in urban areas (U.S. Census Bureau 
1975, p. 11). 
During this same period, the educational attainment of Americans 
was rising. In 1900, only 6.3 percent of the population over 17 years old 
had graduated from high school. By 1925, this percentage had risen to 
24.4 percent, and by 1950, some 57.4 percent of the population over 17 
years of age had a high school diploma. The percentage of those aged 5 
to 17 years who were enrolled in school, moreover, increased from 78.3 
percent in 1900 to 92.3 percent in 1950. Conversely, the percentage of 
the population that was illiterate dropped from 10.7 percent in 1900 to 
3.2 percent in 1950 (U.S. Census Bureau 1975, pp. 380–382).
This period also witnessed a steady change in the composition of 
the workforce, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. This change is most evident 
in those occupations considered working class. In this instance, “work-
ing class” refers generically to those people that are employed in blue-
collar or low-paying white-collar occupations, such as clerks, laborers, 
skilled production workers, and those employed in low-paying service 
jobs. The manual and service occupations, always a major portion of 
the labor force, grew from 44.9 percent of the workforce in 1900 to 
51.6 percent in 1950. Even more striking than the growth in blue-collar 
employment was the increase in low-paying white-collar employment. 
The number of persons employed in clerical and sales jobs expanded 
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from 7.5 percent of the labor force in 1900 to 19.3 percent in 1950, 
for an overall growth rate of 157 percent. Meanwhile, the portion of 
people engaged in agricultural labor shifted from 7.1 percent in 1900 to 
1.6	percent	in	1950.	These	figures	display	an	important	change	in	the	
socioeconomic composition of the United States, as the proportion of 
working-class Americans grew from just over half (52.4 percent) of the 
population in 1900 to well over two-thirds (70.9 percent) by 1950 (U.S. 
Census Bureau 1975, pp. 139–145).
This change in the socioeconomic mix of the United States did 
not produce a uniform result across the nation. Some areas experi-
enced considerable population growth, while others did not. In 1940, 
the percentage of the population living in urbanized areas ranged from 
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Figure 2.1  Occupational Distribution of the U.S. Labor Force, 
1900–1950
NOTE: The 12 occupational categories listed in the legend are represented by four 
shades (black, dark gray, white, and light gray) repeated three times from top to bot-
tom.	These	bands	are	identified	in	the	small	squares	next	to	the	category	names.
SOURCE: U.S.Census Bureau (1975).
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89 percent in Massachusetts to 20 percent in Mississippi. New Mex-
ico, Florida, and Nevada had experienced the highest rates of growth 
in urbanization, ranging from 15 to 20 percent increases from 1920 to 
1940. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island had the largest 
proportion of their populations in working class occupations in 1940, 
each with greater than 85 percent. On the other hand, North and South 
Dakota and Mississippi had less than 60 percent of their populations in 
working class jobs, the lowest rates in the nation (U.S. Census Bureau 
1975, pp. 25–39).
The Great Depression affected the income levels of almost all 
Americans, but not necessarily equitably. State unemployment statis-
tics in 1939 ranged from a high of 14.4 percent in Pennsylvania to a low 
of 4.0 percent in South Carolina. In that year, 4.0 percent of the fami-
lies	in	the	United	States	reported	that	they	had	no	income	or	financial	
resources. The rates of those who fell under this destitute status ranged 
from lows of 2.0 percent in Delaware, Rhode Island, and Utah to highs 
of 6.4 percent in New Mexico, 6.8 percent in North Carolina, and 7.2 
percent in Mississippi (U.S. Census Bureau 1975, pp. 25–39).
The partisan composition of the electorate was shifting as well, 
manifested most clearly in the political realignment that took place dur-
ing the Great Depression. In 1900, the Republican presidential candi-
date received 51.7 percent of the popular vote. In the early elections 
of the twentieth century, the Democratic presidential candidate never 
obtained 50 percent or more of the popular vote until 1932, when the 
New Deal realignment forged a Democratic majority that brought the 
working class, ethnic, and urban voters into the political mainstream 
(Austin 1986; Lubell 1965, pp. 43–68). The Democratic coalition 
gained its strength, in part, through the changing socioeconomic com-
position of America.
On the whole, the American public was well educated, ethnically 
diverse, and predominantly working class. The socioeconomic mix of 
the population was changing in ways that accentuated the intercon-
nection of economic and social phenomena and the dependence of the 
individual on national and sometimes international forces. Although 
the American people had faced upheavals, they managed to preserve 
America’s culture, political institutions, and economic system in the 
face of awesome challenges presented by the Great Depression and 
World War II.
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EXPERIENCES OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION
Prior to the Great Depression, unemployment and the hardships that 
ensued were seen as local rather than federal problems. “Poor farms” 
existed for the disabled and the feebleminded, and unsupported women 
and children were often at the mercy of local charities and orphanages. 
In those days, unemployment compensation for the able-bodied man 
frequently was a night in jail and a train ticket out of town.
Following the stock market crash of 1929, the number of Ameri-
cans who were unemployed grew at an alarming rate. In New York 
City, for example, 60,000 people had registered with the municipal 
Free Employment Bureau by the beginning of 1931. Though the actual 
figures	 of	 unemployed	 defied	 enumeration,	 the	 phrase	 “twelve	 mil-
lion unemployed” echoed the despair of the 1930s. In 1932, Fortune 
magazine estimated that more than one out of every four Americans 
was a member of a family that lacked a regular, full-time breadwinner. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimated that 1933 was the peak 
year for joblessness, with unemployment levels reaching 24.9 percent 
(Bernstein 1985, pp. 276–277; Bird 1966, pp. 22–51; Blumberg 1979, 
p. 22; Degler 1970, pp. 383–384). Figure 2.2 presents the percentage 
and number of persons unemployed over the Depression years.
Many people who remained employed nonetheless experienced 
a decline in salary, a reduction in hours, or employment in jobs well 
beneath their skill levels. By the end of 1932, the hourly wage rate for 
industrial workers ranged from an average high of 30 cents to an aver-
age	low	of	20	cents.	Women	fortunate	enough	to	find	jobs	often	faced	
pitifully low wages, as evidenced by Chicago data indicating that one-
fourth of women working in that city earned less than 10 cents an hour. 
Findings from a longitudinal study in Oakland, California, reveal that 
a majority of families averaged more than a 50 percent loss in income 
between 1929 and 1934 (Elder 1974, p. 61; Freidel 1965, pp. 1–20).
The Great Depression severely affected rural America, particularly 
since the agricultural economy already had been turbulent through 
the 1920s. During the Depression, an estimated one-fourth of all fam-
ily farms were lost to drought and foreclosure. As a result, many for-
mer farmers became homeless migratory workers in search of gainful 
employment. The Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migra-
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tion of Destitute Citizens estimated that in one year alone—1937—one 
million people connected with farming and four million nonagricultural 
persons were migrants. John Steinbeck’s Pulitzer Prize–winning novel 
The Grapes of Wrath	conveyed	elements	of	truth	in	its	fictional	account	
of the Joad family’s desperate struggle as Okies migrating to California 
in search of a sustainable life during the Dust Bowl drought of the 1930s 
(Bernstein 1985, pp. 1–15; Freidel 1965, pp. 2–6; Steinbeck 1939).2
Those who were industrial workers living in rural areas were acutely 
hard	hit	by	 the	Great	Depression.	The	conditions	 in	 the	coalfields	of	
Harlan County, Kentucky, became well known, as First Lady Eleanor 
Roosevelt visited the area. There were entire towns in Harlan County 
where no one had income, and people reportedly lived on dandelions 
and berries. When journalist Martha Gellhorn went to a rural industrial 
region in South Carolina, she compared the work of federal relief to 
the	desperate	job	of	removing	the	wounded	from	the	battlefield	so	they	
could die quietly in the hospital (Gellhorn had covered war, including 
the D-day landings). Yet she marveled at the resilience of the people. 
Figure 2.2  Number and Percentage of Persons Unemployed, 1929–1941
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“If anything, these people are a sad grey,” Gellhorn wrote, “waiting, 
hoping, trusting” (Bernstein 1985, pp. 306–307; Bird 1966, pp. 26–27).
The institution of the family also faced crises during the Great 
Depression. Legal claims of wives who had been abandoned rose 134 
percent from 1928 to 1932 in New York municipal courts, and there was 
reason to assume that embarrassment and lack of resources prevented 
many more desertion claims from being brought forward. Hospitals 
and agencies that served infants and children reported notable increases 
in the number of abandoned babies. Even among those families that 
stayed together, there was evidence of considerable stress. Glen Elder’s 
research disclosed that the psychic costs of status loss included such 
effects as restricted social activities outside the home and heavy alcohol 
consumption by the father (Blumberg 1979, pp. 22–23; Elder 1974, pp. 
60–63).
There were other casualties of the Great Depression. Suicides rose 
dramatically from 1930 to 1933. Despite President Herbert Hoover’s 
insistence that “No one has yet starved,” deaths from starvation were 
reported in the rural backlands of America as well as in major metro-
politan areas. The New York City Welfare Council listed 29 deaths from 
starvation and an additional 110 from malnutrition in 1933. Authorities 
in	Los	Angeles,	referring	specifically	to	young	men	and	boys	who	had	
“hit the road” from communities across the country and had wound 
up in Los Angeles, estimated that at least 25 percent of them needed 
medical care when they arrived in the city. When sociologists Helen 
and	Robert	 Lynd	 returned	 to	 “Middletown”	 (their	 fictional	 name	 for	
Muncie, Indiana, in their published studies) during the depths of the 
Depression	after	having	first	studied	it	in	the	1920s,	they	were	struck	by	
how the Depression had almost universally affected rich and poor alike, 
concluding that “it has approached in its elemental shock the primary 
experiences of birth and death” (Bird 1966, pp. 22–51; Degler 1970; 
pp. 383–384).
As late as 1931, Hoover disagreed with those people who thought 
that the government could legislate policies to pull the nation out of 
the Depression. “Such views,” quipped Hoover, “are as accurate as 
the belief that we can exorcise a Caribbean hurricane.” Hoover instead 
emphasized that voluntarism was the best solution to the woes of the 
Depression, though he supported self-liquidating public works projects. 
He engaged in highly visible campaigns to help charities and private 
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philanthropic groups raise money for the needy (Degler 1970, p. 391; 
Leuchtenberg 1963, p. 335; McElvaine 1983, pp. 72–94). 
In 1931, Sen. Robert Wagner (D-NY) introduced the Employment 
Stabilization Act, which proposed a board for planning public works, a 
system for collecting unemployment statistics, a federal employment 
service, and an unemployment insurance program.3 Hoover vetoed this 
public works bill following the bitterly cold winter of 1932. He only 
reluctantly signed a diluted version of the legislation, the Emergency 
Relief and Construction Act (known popularly as the Garner-Wagner 
Bill), in July 1932. This law was a meager response to a major prob-
lem, yet it signaled the growing support for federal intervention (Degler 
1970, p. 391; McElvaine 1983, pp. 72–94; Time 1932).
Although Hoover’s ineffective responses to the worsening econ-
omy resulted in his overwhelming defeat in his 1932 reelection bid, the 
assessment of his presidency today is less harsh than public opinion of 
him was in 1932. Some historians credit Hoover with rejecting poli-
cies that would have given unprecedented power to business, thus pre-
venting the formation of an oligarchy. Barton Bernstein maintains that 
Hoover	was	the	first	of	the	“new”	presidents	and	argues	that,	although	
he was restricted by his constitutional scruples, he did more than any 
previous president had done to combat a depression. Robert McElvaine 
characterizes Hoover as a transitional president who rejected the “old 
economic fatalism” and used governmental power to urge business 
to act cooperatively to stimulate recovery. In any event, the failure of 
Hoover’s voluntary approach opened the door for Franklin Roosevelt 
and his package of federal programs known as the New Deal (Bernstein 
1968, pp. 265–267; McElvaine 1983, p. 69; Williams 1961, p. 428).
LEGACY OF THE NEW DEAL
The U.S. economy had collapsed by the time Franklin Delano Roo-
sevelt	 took	 office	 in	 1933.	Under	 his	 leadership,	 the	 federal	 govern-
ment almost immediately offered a variety of programs, some at odds 
with others, to deal with the severe economic situation. The New Deal 
programs addressed problems in all sectors of the economy, including 
industry, agriculture, banking, and investments. And, most importantly 
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for the discussion at hand, the federal government under the New Deal 
formally assumed responsibility for relieving the unemployed.
The Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA) of 1933 removed pub-
lic assistance from local jurisdiction because state and municipal gov-
ernments were unable to deal with the magnitude of unemployment 
brought about by the Great Depression. This act, along with public 
works programs such as the Civil Works Administration (CWA) and 
the Public Works Administration (PWA), both enacted in 1933, and the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA), enacted in 1935, placed the 
federal government in charge of alleviating unemployment. Through-
out the New Deal, the emphasis was to create work and only provide 
relief as an emergency measure of last resort.
Another major piece of employment-related New Deal legislation 
was the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, which established the 
first	federal	minimum	wage	level.	Roosevelt	had	championed	the	call	
for minimum wages, maximum hours, and restrictions on child labor 
during the 1936 campaign. Most proponents offered the humanitarian 
argument that these provisions were aimed at reducing poverty rather 
than the Keynesian argument that the FLSA would lead to increased 
purchasing	power.	The	FLSA	set	a	wage	floor	of	25	cents	per	hour	and	
a workweek ceiling of 44 hours. Under the law, over a two-year period 
wages would rise to 40 cents an hour and the workweek ceiling would 
fall to 40 hours. The law also banned child labor. In order to garner 
enough votes in Congress to pass the legislation over conservative 
opposition, however, major portions of the labor force were exempted 
from the law. 
The New Deal showed innovation in its efforts to solve the eco-
nomic problems of the Depression. One interesting example is the 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which was administered by 
the National Recovery Administration (NRA). This program merged 
three concepts: 1) fostering cartelization and self-help among industries, 
2) expanding public works activities, and 3) increasing the employment 
and purchasing power of workers by shortening the workweek without 
reducing pay. NIRA, ultimately declared unconstitutional, was generally 
probusiness—with one important exception: section 7a, which asserted 
the rights of employees to bargain collectively, with representatives of 
their own choosing and without interference from management.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
20   Wasem
The New Deal’s vehicle for economic planning, however, was not 
the NRA, but rather the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB). 
Established in 1933 as the National Resources Board, it was transferred 
to	 the	Executive	Office	of	 the	President	 in	1939	and	became	the	hub	
of long-term economic planning. The administrative structure of the 
NRPB	 facilitated	 the	 flow	 of	 ideas	 among	 government,	 the	 business	
community, and academia because it made extensive use of committees 
organized by subject matter and staffed by bureaucratic and nongov-
ernmental experts. The NRPB brought in many specialists as part-time 
consultants and thus reduced the lag that often exists between the devel-
opment of an idea within the intellectual community and the consider-
ation of the idea by the government bureaucracy.
The NRPB became the center of Keynesian policy analysis within 
the government. The major work of Keynes, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money, was published in the United States 
in 1936. It provided the intellectual framework for the government to 
control unemployment as it managed a free economy. “After Keynes,” 
John Garraty points out, “full employment seemed a realizable goal of 
public policy.” However, the initial reaction of most economists and 
policymakers in America was skeptical at best. Advocacy of long-range 
economic	 planning,	Keynesian	 fiscal	 practices,	 and	 full	 employment	
policy increased the NRPB’s visibility as well as heightened the contro-
versies surrounding it (Garraty 1979, p. 221; Warken 1979).
Roosevelt and his New Deal team subsequently have been criticized 
for not embracing Keynesian economics. James MacGregor Burns 
(1956, pp. 400–404) concluded that Keynesian economics offered the 
perfect middle solution between individualistic capitalism and social-
ism.	Roosevelt’s	reluctance	to	commit	wholeheartedly	to	deficit	spend-
ing, Burns argued, prevented the New Deal from ending the Depression.
The Roosevelt administration never fully embraced Keynesian eco-
nomics, writes Ellis Hawley, because the administration was caught in 
a	dilemma	between	the	benefits	and	practical	necessities	of	large	cor-
porations and the simplicity and opportunity of competitive individual-
ism. Hawley (1966, pp. 276–280) sees a shift in emphasis from central 
planning and corporate cooperation in the early years of the New Deal 
to an antitrust phase in the later years. Hawley notes that the recession 
of 1937 was pivotal in terms of the growing acceptance of Keynesian 
economics within the Roosevelt administration.
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In 1938, President Roosevelt did express several ideas in his annual 
message to Congress that corresponded with Keynesian concepts about 
employment and the economy. At one point Roosevelt discussed the 
importance of increasing the purchasing power of the farmers and the 
industrial workers; he held that this increase would stimulate the pur-
chasing power of the remainder of the workforce and that, as a result, 
the national income would be raised. He also addressed the matter of a 
balanced budget, making it clear that while he wanted a balanced bud-
get,	there	were	certain	conditions	that	must	be	met.	“The	first	condition	
is that we continue the policy of not permitting any needy American 
who can and is willing to work to starve because the federal govern-
ment does not provide work,” he said (Roosevelt 1941a, p. 8).
Congress gave a lukewarm reception to Keynesian economics and 
its component of full employment. This reception was due, in part, to 
the growth of the conservative coalition in Congress. Having gained 
strength in the election of 1936, this alliance of conservative Democrats 
and Republicans, though not always voting as a solid bloc, effectively 
stymied many of Roosevelt’s later New Deal programs. The congres-
sional conservatives’ hostility to those who advocated full employment 
led	 them	 to	muster	 sufficient	 support	 to	 suspend	 the	NRPB’s	 appro-
priations in 1943, and thus to let the NRPB expire (Patterson 1967, pp. 
325–337; Warken 1979, pp. 228–245). 
It is impossible to know whether the Depression would have lasted 
longer without the onset of the war, but William Leuchtenberg (1963, p. 
347) notices marked gains in the economy before the wartime spending 
had any appreciable effect. “It is conceivable,” he argues, “that New 
Deal measures would have led the country into a new cycle of prosper-
ity even if there had been no war.” Leuchtenberg further points out that 
one of the major unsolved issues of the Great Depression—whether to 
establish	federal	safeguards	against	inflation	and	unemployment—was	
addressed following the war by the enactment of the Employment Act 
of 1946.4 
More recent economic analysis of the Great Depression points 
to several positive factors that were fostering an economic recovery 
before the onset of World War II. Current Federal Reserve chairman Ben 
Bernanke	 observed	 that	 the	 public	 had	 lost	 confidence	 in	 the	 “self- 
correcting	 powers”	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 in	 1931–1932.	 Bernanke	
(2000, pp. 41–65) concluded that extensive government involvement in 
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the	financial	system	was	the	major	New	Deal	program	that	succeeded	
in promoting the economic recovery: “Only with the New Deal’s reha-
bilitation	of	the	financial	system	in	1933–35	did	the	economy	begin	its	
slow emergence from the Great Depression,” he wrote.5
Christina Romer, former chair of the Council of Economic Advis-
ers, analyzes the business cycles and the GNP during the Great Depres-
sion	and	finds	that	monetary	policy	was	“crucial”	in	the	recovery.	She	
further	offers	that	fiscal	policy	was	of	little	consequence	in	the	recovery	
until 1942. Instead, her analysis suggests that the trend toward recovery 
was	in	motion	before	fiscal	spending	for	the	war	began	in	earnest.	She	
concludes “that aggregate demand-stimulus was the main source of the 
recovery from the Great Depression” (Romer 1992, p. 783).
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE WAR YEARS
In the minds of most Americans, World War II brought America out 
of the Great Depression. Many previously idle persons were put to work 
in war production or enlisted in military service. Necessity forced the 
government	into	deficit	financing	of	the	war,	and	the	resulting	effects	
on the American economy validated the idea of public investment and 
compensatory spending. Many economists and policymakers converted 
to Keynesian thinking in response to the performance of the wartime 
economy.
The NRPB in 1941 circulated a draft of a proposal for postwar 
planning that proved to be seminal. This report, published as After the 
War—Full Employment in January 1942, was written by Alvin H. Han-
sen. Hansen had received his doctorate in economics from the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin in 1918 and was critical of Keynes during his early 
academic career. But by the time he became president of the American 
Economic Association in 1938, Hansen had embraced Keynes’ analy-
sis of the Great Depression and compensatory spending. Hansen now 
wholeheartedly advocated the vital role of the federal government in 
the maintenance of full employment (Barber 1987). 
In After the War—Full Employment, Hansen (1942, pp. 1–7) voices 
fears	of	a	postwar	depression	or	inflationary	boom,	yet	is	optimistic	that	
the nation can maintain business prosperity and full employment by 
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means of an expansionist economic program. “Private business can and 
will do the job of production. It is the responsibility of Government to 
do its part to insure a sustained demand,” he writes (p. 3). He dismisses 
the	opinion	that	 the	United	States	cannot	finance	its	own	production:	
“Costs and income are just opposite sides of the same shield. We can 
afford as high a standard of living as we are able to produce . . . But we 
cannot afford idleness” (p. 5). 
Hansen describes how the public debt differs from an individual’s 
personal	debt	and	how	retiring	 the	public	debt	could	cause	deflation,	
depression, and unemployment by lowering the national income. He 
adds, however, that it would be likewise irresponsible to raise expen-
ditures, lower taxes, and increase the public debt if there is a ten-
dency	 toward	an	 inflationary	boom.	Hansen	(1942,	p.	7)	summarizes	
his thoughts by saying that the public debt is an “instrument of public 
policy” because it is a “means to control the magnitude of the national 
income and, in conjunction with the tax structure, to affect income 
distribution.”
Hansen (1942, pp. 15–19) goes beyond a discussion of economic 
theory to offer pragmatic policy options. He outlines a model of output 
potential to deal with the expected postwar gap between potential and 
performance and, in turn, proposes six wartime measures to narrow this 
gap:
1) High	corporate-income	and	excess-profits	taxes
2) Sharply progressive estate taxes
3) Broadening the individual income-tax base together with 
steeply graduated surtax rates
4) Sharp increases in excise taxes on commodities competing with 
the war program
5) Partial payment of wages and salaries in defense bonds
6) Qualitative shifts in the components of consumption
Recognizing that the postwar economy would function differently 
from the wartime economy, Hansen (1942, pp. 18–19) also proposes 
six policy measures to ensure full employment during the reconversion. 
The suggestions can be summarized as follows:
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1) Retention of a progressive (graduated) tax structure and a 
broadened tax base, with a major emphasis on the individual 
income tax and less reliance on the corporate income tax
2) A sharp reduction in defense consumption taxes
3) Adequate plans by private enterprise for private investment 
projects in manufacturing plants and equipment, in railroads, 
and in public utilities and housing
4) Adequate programs of public improvement projects, including 
nationwide development of national resources, express high-
ways, urban redevelopment (involving, among other things, 
outlays in terminal facilities and reorganization of urban trans-
portation), and a reorganized public housing program (includ-
ing the setting up of a housing research laboratory designed to 
reduce construction costs and thus enlarge the scope of private 
housing construction)
5) Expansion of public welfare expenditures such as federal aid to 
education, public health, old-age pensions, and family allow-
ances (This proposal would expand federal social service pro-
grams and, in turn, provide a means of reducing state and local 
property and consumption taxes, thereby stimulating private 
consumption expenditures.)
6) International collaboration to pursue internal policies designed 
to promote active employment, to explore developmental 
projects in backward countries, and to implement ways and 
means of opening outlets for foreign investment, of promoting 
world trade, and for the effective worldwide use of productive 
resources 
With this report, Hansen had spelled out the economic elements and 
programmatic features of full employment policy. Some of Hansen’s 
ideas, most notably on tax policy, were woven into President Roos-
evelt’s 1944 State of the Union address. 
The president delivered the speech in a live radio broadcast to the 
nation, as well as in a written message to Congress, and in doing so 
introduced what was to become the most contentious element in the 
debate over full employment—the right to employment. Roosevelt’s 
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“Second Bill of Rights,” later called the “Economic Bill of Rights,” 
contained the following (Roosevelt 1950):
• The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or 
shops or farms or mines of the nation
• The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing 
and recreation
• The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a 
return which will give him and his family a decent living
• The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an 
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domina-
tion by monopolies at home or abroad
• The right of every family to a decent home
• The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to 
achieve and enjoy good health
• The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old 
age, sickness, accident, and unemployment
• The right to a good education
Before he concluded, Roosevelt drew a patriotic illustration to 
emphasize	these	rights.	“Our	fighting	men	abroad—and	their	families	
at home—expect such a program and have the right to insist upon it. It 
is to their demands that this Government should pay heed rather than 
to	the	whining	demands	of	selfish	pressure	groups	who	seek	to	feather	
their nests while young Americans are dying.” President Roosevelt 
chose to read the Economic Bill of Rights as the excerpt of his speech 
filmed	for	the	newsreels	that	were	shown	in	movie	theaters	across	the	
country.6 
The President echoed this famous Economic Bill of Rights speech as 
he campaigned for reelection in 1944, making the right to employment 
an integral part of the rhetoric of the postwar employment policy. Roos-
evelt’s Economic Bill of Rights offered an antidote to the disgust many 
Americans felt over charges that the “dollar-a-year” executives—who 
were volunteering for government service in a show of patriotism—
were	also	ensuring	 that	 their	businesses	were	profiting	 from	 the	war.	
Some of these businessmen who were volunteering as executives to 
oversee war mobilization were accused of redirecting scarce commodi-
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ties to their civilian industries.7 With this emphasis on working people, 
Roosevelt was returning to the roots that fed his early campaigns.
CONGRESS LOOKS FOR ALTERNATIVES 
In 1943, Senate Resolution 102 established the Special Commit-
tee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, chaired by Sen. Wal-
ter George (D-GA). The senator’s opposition to the New Deal had 
prompted President Roosevelt to back an unsuccessful challenger to 
George in the 1938 Democratic primary. Some observers of the day 
credited George with engineering the demise of the NRPB. The Sen-
ate’s Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning 
also included Alben Barkley (D-KY), Arthur Vandenburg (R-MI), Carl 
Hayden (D-AZ), Warren Austin (R-VT), Joseph O’Mahoney (D-WY), 
Robert Taft (R-OH), Claude Pepper (D-FL), Albert Hawkes (R-NJ), 
and Scott Lucas (D-IL).8	They	held	hearings,	conducted	 fact-finding,	
and issued a series of reports. Senator George made it clear that this 
committee, often referred to as the George Committee, intended to take 
the lead in setting reconversion policy.9
The fourth in the series of George Committee reports was particu-
larly noteworthy because it focused on the role of Congress in dealing 
with the problems of postwar employment. The report clearly stated 
that the goal must be full employment, because full employment played 
the central role in ensuring prosperity. The committee, however, was 
explicit in stating that “full employment does not and cannot mean that 
everyone willing and able to work is gainfully employed at all times.” 
The committee also strongly opposed the use of public works merely 
to provide jobs for the unemployed. Most importantly, the committee 
argued in the report that Congress’s role in achieving full employment 
was	to	stimulate	confidence	in	business	(U.S.	Senate	1944).10
In June 1944, the George Committee concluded its report with the 
following four recommendations to Congress (U.S. Senate 1944)11:
1) Establish	an	Office	of	Demobilization	to	coordinate	reconver-
sion of the economy to peacetime. 
2) Terminate war contracts expeditiously.
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3) Sell surplus war property promptly.
4) Start public construction—e.g., roads and dams—as soon as 
possible.
It is interesting to note that the only federal spending that the 
George Committee recommended was for public works—i.e., projects 
perceived as popular in the home state but viewed as “pork barrel” by 
cynical observers.
The committee also recommended that Congress study revisions in 
unemployment compensation, problems of workers who migrated to 
“war boom” areas, and ways for the prevention of monopolies and trade 
barriers. The topics of price controls, rationing, taxation, investment, 
the budget, and foreign trade also made the list of areas that the commit-
tee thought warranted further attention (U.S. Senate 1944).12
The	George	Committee	attempted	 to	redefine	full	employment	 in	
classic economic terms that were decidedly probusiness. This semantic 
game suggested that the committee recognized the potential popularity 
of the phrase “full employment” and sought to capitalize on it. Thus, the 
George Committee was seizing on the term “full employment,” but not 
on the Keynesian approach to achieving it. 
Meanwhile, the House of Representatives established its own Spe-
cial Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning in January 
1944.13 Congressman William M. Colmer (D-MS) chaired the commit-
tee, and Congressman Hamilton Fish (R-NY) was the ranking member.14 
Unlike Senator George, Congressman Colmer had been a congressional 
ally of Roosevelt and supported the New Deal agenda after his election 
in 1932. A rising star, Colmer had gotten a spot on the House Commit-
tee on Rules in 1939.
In	 a	 significant	move,	Colmer	 selected	Marion	Folsom	 to	 be	 the	
staff director of the House Special Committee on Post-War Economic 
Policy and Planning. Folsom was an executive of the Eastman Kodak 
Company who had been involved in drafting the national Social Secu-
rity Act when he served on the President’s Advisory Council to the 
Committee on Economic Security in 1934. Folsom became a member 
of the Department of Commerce’s Business Advisory Council in 1936. 
Before becoming staff director, Folsom was instrumental in establish-
ing the Committee for Economic Development (CED) in 1942.15 Along 
with Paul G. Hoffman, president of the Studebaker Corporation, and 
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William	Benton,	cofounder	of	the	Benton	&	Bowles	advertising	firm,	
Folsom formed the CED as a group of business leaders who recognized 
a	 role	 for	 government	 in	 stabilizing	 the	 economy	 through	 fiscal	 and	
monetary policy. Folsom’s view of the proper federal role, however, 
did not extend to full employment. He reportedly said, “A job for every 
person willing and able to work is absolutely incompatible with the free 
enterprise system” (Flamm 1994, p. 72).
As did its Senate counterpart, the House Special Committee on 
Post-War Economic Policy and Planning held hearings, conducted fact-
finding,	and	issued	a	series	of	reports.	In	addition	to	testimony	from	key	
officials	in	the	administration,	such	as	Bernard	M.	Baruch	of	the	Office	
of War Mobilization and Harold Smith of the Bureau of the Budget, 
the committee heard from a variety of business leaders. These corpo-
rate leaders included General Motors’ Charles E. Wilson, Dodge Cor-
poration’s Thomas S. Holden, First Boston Corporation’s Col. Allan 
M. Pope, Studebaker Corporation’s Hoffman (representing the CED), 
the National Association of Manufacturers’ Frederick C. Crawford, and 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Eric A. Johnson. William Batts from 
the National Planning Association also was called to testify. William 
Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, was the only 
labor	union	leader	who	testified	(U.S.	Congress	1944b).
Although the House Special Committee on Post-War Economic 
Policy and Planning did not garner the media attention that the George 
Committee had, its fourth report on the economic problems of recon-
version	gained	sufficient	interest	that	it	was	reprinted	several	times	that	
autumn. Among other key issues, the report focused on unemployment 
and reemployment issues, education and job training, public works and 
private construction, and tax policy. The committee opposed the use of 
continued war production or public works as “made work.” Similar to 
the George Committee, the House report maintained that government’s 
role was to stimulate business. The fourth report discussed the reem-
ployment challenges posed by the returning veterans as well as by the 
18 million workers directly involved in war production. It estimated 
that between six and seven million more civilian jobs than existed in 
1940 would need to be created after the war (U.S. Congress 1944a). A 
resumption of high levels of unemployment seemed inevitable.
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AN AMERICAN WHITE PAPER
The Keynesian approach to full employment was, nonetheless, gain-
ing support around the world. British prime minister Winston Churchill 
had already made his countryman, Keynes, an economic adviser in 
1940; however, it was the publication of William Beveridge’s Full 
Employment in a Free Society, followed closely by the British govern-
ment’s White Paper on Employment Policy, in 1944 that demonstrated 
the dominance of Keynesian economics in Great Britain. Also in 1944, 
Sweden’s ruling Social Democrats adopted full employment as one of 
that party’s three major goals for the postwar period. Canada and Aus-
tralia followed with similar statements (Furniss and Tilton 1977, pp. 
125–126; Garraty 1979, pp. 228–230).
Observers and subsequent scholars assumed that, after the disman-
tling of the NRPB, the administration’s postwar economic planning 
was fragmented and virtually nonexistent. Accounts of the day as well 
as historical reviews make no mention of the executive branch’s role 
in developing a full employment policy. Yet a group of people from 
various executive departments began meeting in mid-1944 to discuss 
and draft a proposal for postwar employment. Many of the issues they 
debated and the compromises they made foreshadowed the legislative 
debate on the full employment bill. 
Alvin Hansen, who joined the Federal Reserve Board as a con-
sultant after leaving the NRPB, believed that full employment would 
become a partisan political issue in the 1944 election. In July 1944, he 
confided	to	Gerhard	Colm,	a	German-born	economist	who	worked	in	
the Bureau of the Budget, that he had had a conversation with Federal 
Reserve chairman Marriner Eccles regarding the importance of prepar-
ing an American “White Paper on Employment Policy.” This paper 
primarily was to be used for the Democratic platform and Roosevelt’s 
acceptance speech. Hansen and Eccles both feared that Dewey would 
follow up the reference to full employment in his presidential nomina-
tion	acceptance	speech	with	a	statement	on	fiscal	policy	similar	to	the	
British government’s Keynesian White Paper on Employment Policy. 
Hansen suggested that Colm begin to draft a paper making a clear dec-
laration that the government should accept the primary responsibility 
for maintaining full employment.16
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Colm had led the research division of the Institute of World Eco-
nomics at the University of Kiel until the Nazi Gleichschaltung, or 
process of bringing the country under totalitarian control, in 1933. He 
fled	Germany	and	became	a	founder	of	the	University	in	Exile	at	the	
New School for Social Research in New York. Secretary of Commerce 
Harry L. Hopkins selected Colm in 1939 for a key role in Commerce’s 
industrial economics division to develop national income estimates for 
economic planning. Colm then went to the Bureau of the Budget as a 
principal	fiscal	analyst.
After Hansen contacted him, Colm immediately discussed the 
American “White Paper on Employment Policy” with Harold Smith, 
director of the Bureau of the Budget, and J. Weldon Jones, also at the 
Bureau of the Budget. Smith thought it was too late to have such a pro-
posal included in the Democratic Party platform. However, Smith said 
he was very sympathetic to the idea and acknowledged that consider-
able spade work had been done already. Colm then replied to Hansen 
that he would begin working on the project while Smith discussed the 
matter with Marriner Eccles.17
Within a few weeks, Hansen, in collaboration with Eccles and Smith, 
had called together a group of men that included Colm, Richard Gilbert 
(from the Federal Reserve) and Emile Despres (formerly at the Fed and 
now in the State Department) to discuss a paper on full employment. 
Soon the study group added Richard Musgrave and Kenneth Williams 
(both from the Federal Reserve), Harvard economist Walter Salant, 
University of Chicago economist Jacob Mosak, University of Wis-
consin	economist	Jim	Earley	(all	from	the	Office	of	Price	Administra-
tion), and Harvard economist Arthur Smithies (from the Bureau of the 
Budget).18 This group, hereafter referred to as the postwar employment 
study group (Table 2.1), formed the core unit of full employment plan-
ners within the executive branch. The participants reported to Budget 
Director Harold Smith and Federal Reserve Chairman Marriner Eccles.
The	first	major	issue	of	debate	was	the	role	of	government	spend-
ing. Gilbert thought the report should begin with the statement, “Gov-
ernment would take all action necessary to assure full employment and 
a high level of consumption.” Colm, Salant, Musgrave, and Williams 
expressed the view that it was unwise to emphasize government spend-
ing, noting that the public mind often perceives it as boondoggling. 
Colm suggested that there should be two phases of expansion in the 
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postwar	 period:	 first,	 one	 of	 business	 expansion;	 and	 second,	 one	 of	
expansion of consumption. When Smith commented on the minutes of 
this meeting, he agreed that more attention should be placed on the 
expansion of business.19
Recognizing the postwar employment study group’s need for more 
explicit guidance, Smith and Eccles met with Hansen, Musgrave, Wil-
liams, and Colm to provide more direction on the full employment 
policy paper. Smith emphasized the reasons for a consistent program 
and planning and thus the development of administrative machinery to 
handle	what	he	identified	as	the	most	critical	concern:	unemployment	
when war production ended. Eccles agreed with Smith’s ideas for eco-
nomic planning to avert postwar unemployment, but he elaborated on 
the political aspects, such as states’ rights versus national planning and 
the relationship between a national policy and an international program. 
They	all	acknowledged	that	the	difficulty	of	defining	full	employment	
posed political problems. The meeting resulted in two directives: a draft 
of a presidential message and a more detailed, technical document for 
background.20 Thus, the postwar employment study group was charged 
with the task of preparing the American white paper.
As the momentum to develop a postwar full-employment policy 
increased, so too did tension over who should administer such a pro-
gram. Eccles thought the president should appoint a committee for the 
development of this economic program, but Smith doubted whether the 
president would want a formal structure. Rather than that, Smith said he 
would request an informal assignment from Roosevelt.21 This disagree-
ment	marked	the	first	sign	of	the	struggle	within	the	administration	over	
whether the Bureau of the Budget or a specially designated committee 
Table 2.1  Postwar Employment Study Group Participants
Bureau of the Budget Federal Reserve
Office	of	Price	
Administration
Gerhard Colm Alvin Hansen Walter Salant
J. Weldon Jones
Arthur Smithies
Emile Despres
(moved to State)
Jim Earley
Jacob Mosak
Richard Gilbert
Richard Musgrave
Kenneth Williams
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should control the direction of postwar economic planning, an issue that 
would	prove	significant	later.
Subsequently,	J.	Weldon	Jones	sent	a	confidential	memo	to	Bureau	
of the Budget colleagues Julius Wendzel, Louis Bean, and Paul David 
discussing the outline of what was jokingly referred to as an American 
“pink” paper on a postwar employment program, because critics on the 
right were likely to label it “socialistic,” in disregard of its actual objec-
tives. Jones made clear that the project was being kept “within the fam-
ily,” but that contributions were truly to be a joint effort. He outlined the 
various sections of the report and indicated who had primary responsi-
bility and oversight. These participants extended beyond the Bureau of 
the Budget to include other interested parties.22
The postwar employment study group, meanwhile, became con-
cerned about the lack of coordination on demobilization legislation that 
was	pending	in	late	August	1944.	Specifically,	the	study	group	feared	
that its proposal might not be fully consistent with what President Roo-
sevelt was discussing with congressional leaders regarding the legisla-
tion proposed by Senator George, chairman of the Special Committee 
on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning. Given that George had 
positioned his committee as the authority on postwar planning and had 
made recommendations at odds with Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of 
Rights, their concerns were not unfounded. They acknowledged that 
any	document	written	at	that	time	might	be	in	conflict	with	agreements	
other members of the Roosevelt administration might have been mak-
ing with congressional leaders.23
The postwar employment study group continued, though the presi-
dent did not know of its existence. At the beginning of October 1944, 
Jones prepared a draft of the white paper along with a proposed cover 
letter addressed to the president from Smith. The accompanying memo 
to Smith queried whether it was time to inform Roosevelt of the docu-
ment. At this point, they assumed that it would not be used until after 
the election, which was only a month away.24
As	he	appraised	the	final	draft,	Jones	concluded	to	Smith	that	“some	
will think that the document, as it now stands, is too bold; some will 
think it is not bold enough. As a product of a high-grade group of gradu-
ate students in economics, or of a private organization, it can be criti-
cized as being a timid compromise; as a State Paper it is probably more 
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outspoken than the White House, and if issued by the President would 
be a landmark.”25
The	confidential	document	was	titled	“Postwar	Employment”	and	
set forth the following goals (Colm 1944):
• To maintain full and stable national production, income, and 
employment to the maximum possible extent through encour-
aging the expansion of private enterprise
• To assure minimum standards of health, education, and per-
sonal security for all members of the community
• To promote a steadily rising standard of living for the nation as 
a whole by developing our economic resources and improving 
the	efficiency	with	which	they	are	used
• To support a high level of world prosperity and world trade in 
cooperation with other nations
The report provided a transition from the “Economic Bill of Rights” 
Roosevelt had championed in January 1944 to a plan of action for post-
war full employment.
Several critical factors and assumptions constituted the framework 
of the report. The economic achievements during the war had demon-
strated the United States’ capacity to produce, and the country would 
not have tolerated a return to the prewar production levels and accom-
panying unemployment. Although it gave primary emphasis to policies 
that directly encouraged private business investments and consumer 
demand,	 the	 report	 stated	 that	 government	 fiscal	 policy,	 on	 both	 the	
revenue and expenditure sides, must be the ultimate stabilizing factor. 
Some	uses	of	the	federal	budget	and	fiscal	policies	were	indicated.	The	
report,	furthermore,	discussed	the	need	for	sufficient	flexibility	in	the	
administration of the economic program to allow for adequate legisla-
tive supervision and control as well as for coordinated action by federal, 
state, and local governments (Colm 1944).
The document presented a package of postwar programs to achieve 
long-term economic stability and full employment. The report encour-
aged measures to promote competition, risk-taking, capital facilities, 
and industrial research for both large and small businesses. It recom-
mended income support and the principle of the ever-normal granary 
for agriculture (i.e., storage of overproduced agricultural yields for 
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sale later in order to stabilize prices). The report outlined a plan for 
the development of river valleys, agricultural resources, transporta-
tion facilities, and the redevelopment of urban areas. It sketched the 
minimum-standard requirements for programs in health, education, 
social security, and labor. The document extended its recommendations 
by stating the importance of handling the American postwar economy 
within a full international context so that American unemployment was 
not merely exported abroad (Colm 1944).
“Postwar Employment” addressed three of the four central elements 
of what soon became the full employment bill. First, it stressed national 
planning and gave examples of the kinds of planning that should occur. 
Second, although it did not propose a new federal structure to handle 
this planning, it was implicit from the report and evident from the dis-
cussions that the Bureau of the Budget would have assumed the major 
responsibility for that under this plan. Third, the report acknowledged 
the	option	of	federal	monetary	and	fiscal	policies—for	example,	com-
pensatory spending—as a tool to stabilize the economy. On the fourth 
element—the federal government’s guarantee of employment—the 
report was silent. It offered no right to employment as Roosevelt had in 
his Economic Bill of Rights. 
ASCENDANCY OF FULL EMPLOYMENT
Concern with the possibility of a postwar resumption of unemploy-
ment coupled with the growing acceptance of Keynesian economics 
sparked the drive for America to implement a full employment policy. 
Lessons from the New Deal as well as war mobilization fueled this 
effort. The extent to which full employment represented a continuation 
of the New Deal deserves discussion.
The policy of full employment as the postwar employment study 
group articulated it was harmonious with the New Deal. The report 
retained the value that the New Deal placed on the practicality and 
flexibility	of	federal	economic	policy	as	well	as	on	the	importance	of	
having public needs drive public works. It also carried on the spirit of 
compassion and commitment to improving the health and welfare of the 
American people. 
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The proposal for postwar employment, however, went well beyond 
the New Deal. It offered a set of rather tightly woven policies that were 
grounded in theoretical principles and economic assumptions. It saw 
compensatory	spending	as	a	tool	of	the	federal	government.	Its	flexibil-
ity was bounded by the limits of Keynesian thinking—a kind of restric-
tion uncharacteristic of the prewar period. Full employment necessi-
tated long-term economic planning, which was a practice the New Deal 
did not implement fully. 
The working person, who had made gains during the New Deal, 
especially	in	terms	of	collective	bargaining,	was	a	natural	beneficiary	of	
this postwar employment program. Maintaining high levels of employ-
ment and stimulating job creation were at the crux of the proposal. It 
appeared that the priorities for economic planning were shifting from 
the perspective of the businessman to the perspective of the working 
person—who also happened to be the consumer.
Aggregate demand clearly was to be the driving force of the econ-
omy.	The	emphasis	on	consumer	demand	definitely	moved	beyond	the	
New Deal. With so many people destitute during the Great Depression, 
it	was	quite	difficult	 for	 those	New	Dealers	not	ascribing	 to	Keynes-
ian economics to have argued that encouraging consumption of goods 
might have sparked production and employment. Now members of the 
administration were offering a serious policy proposal that placed the 
consumer as the keystone in the national economy.
The government has had a long history of being involved in the 
economy. The nature of this involvement has been debated since the 
days of Hamilton and Monroe, between the Federalists and the Anti-
Federalists (Cornell 1999). The federal government, for example, dur-
ing the nineteenth century gave subsidies in the form of land and cash to 
foster economic expansion. At some times the government intervened to 
break up monopolies, and at other times it encouraged industrial cartels.
The proposal for full employment in the postwar period concluded 
that the federal government had the ultimate responsibility for the econ-
omy when and if private enterprise and consumer demand fell short. 
This aspect grew out of lessons from the New Deal and the wartime 
economy. The federal government was no longer to be the reluctant 
player. Now, it was the locus of national economic planning and, when 
necessary, employment stimulation.
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Notes
 1.  Dollars are based on 1958 prices.
 2. Steinbeck’s landmark novel was made into an Academy Award–winning motion 
picture in 1940.
 3. Fourteen years later Wagner compared this bill to the full employment bill and 
concluded that public works planning, in and of itself, is not enough to maintain 
full employment and that federal action must be fully integrated and have wide-
spread support. See Wagner (1945). 
 4. The immense literature on the Great Depression and the New Deal yields a variety 
of perspectives on the period, several of which are sharply divergent. Carl Degler 
(1970, pp. 384–391) once labeled the New Deal as the third American Revolu-
tion because it altered the responsibilities of the federal government, signaled the 
end of laissez-faire, legitimized the role of organized labor, and brought groups 
that had previously been excluded into participatory politics. Degler’s initial view 
was consistent with the impressionistic interpretation that Richard Hofstadter pre-
sented. Hofstadter (1955, pp. 302–316) argues that the New Deal was a “new 
departure” from previous reform traditions because, among other things, it was 
pragmatic rather than moralistic and welfare-oriented rather than entrepreneurial. 
Howard Zinn (1966, pp. 244–259) and Barton Bernstein (1968, pp. 263–282), 
on the other hand, view the New Deal as conservative, stopping far short of its 
possibilities and neglecting many Americans. “Though vigorous in its rhetoric 
and experimental in tone,” Bernstein concludes, “the New Deal was narrow in its 
goals and wary of bold economic reform.” Such interpretations point to the situa-
tion of blacks and those who were caught in structural poverty and conclude that 
the New Deal contributed very little to improving their plight. Balanced between 
these two extremes is William Leuchtenberg (1963, pp. 335–348), who argues 
that the New Deal was a “halfway revolution.” Leuchtenberg details the many 
social, economic, and political accomplishments of the New Deal and discusses 
those areas unresolved by the New Deal. Also expressing a moderate view, Eric 
Goldman (1952, pp. 269–289) concludes it was a synthesis and culmination of 
previous reform movements in America.
  5. This piece was originally published as “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial 
Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,” American Economic Review 
73, no. 3 (1983): 257–276.
  6. Television and cable news as we know it today did not exist, but newsreels were 
an integral part of the movie theater experience. Moreover, movie theaters were 
commonplace and inexpensive. According to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presiden-
tial Library in Hyde Park, N.Y., the major motion picture companies, such as Uni-
versal, Paramount, and Fox Movietone News, were invited into the White House 
to	film	parts	of	Roosevelt’s	speeches,	which	then	appeared	in	movie	theaters	for	
several days afterwards to reinforce the President’s most important points (Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum 2012).
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  7. Sen. Harry Truman chaired the Special Committee to Investigate the National 
Defense Program, which issued a report that supported some of the accusations. 
According to Brinkley (1996, pp. 190–192), even BusinessWeek acknowledged 
the	conflict	of	interest.	
  8. George won a special election in 1922 to succeed Thomas Watson. George was a 
Democrat who opposed the New Deal and supported racial segregation. He served 
in the Senate until 1957. Barkley came to Washington as a congressman from 
Kentucky in 1913. He was elected to the Senate in 1926 and became majority 
leader in 1937. Truman chose him as his running mate in 1948. Vandenburg was 
appointed to the Senate in 1928 and was reelected several times until his death in 
1951.	He	was	a	leading	opponent	of	the	New	Deal.	Hayden	was	Arizona’s	first	
congressman, winning election in 1911 as Arizona was becoming a state. He was 
elected to the Senate in 1926 and served until 1969. Only Senator Robert Byrd 
(D-WV)	 served	 longer	 than	Hayden.	Austin	was	first	 elected	 in	 a	 special	 elec-
tion in 1931 and served from Vermont until 1946, when he resigned to become 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. O’Mahoney served from 1934 to 1953. 
Although	defeated	in	1952,	he	was	reelected	in	1954	to	fill	 the	seat	vacated	by	
the death of Senator Lester Hunt. O’Mahoney served until 1961. Taft, the son 
of the president and Supreme Court justice William Howard Taft, was elected 
to the Senate in 1938 and served until his death in 1953. His son Robert later 
represented Ohio in the U.S. Senate, and his grandson Robert served as Ohio’s 
governor. Pepper was elected to the Senate in 1936 as a strong supporter of the 
New Deal, and he was reelected in 1942. His leftist views led to his being painted 
with the nickname “Red Pepper” and to his defeat in 1950. In 1962 he was elected 
to Congress from Miami and served until his death in 1989. Hawkes was president 
of	Congoleum-Nairn	vinyl	flooring	company	and	served	as	president	of	the	U.S.	
Chamber of Commerce in 1941–1942. He was elected to the Senate in 1942 and 
served one term. Lucas was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1934 
and to the Senate in 1938. He was reelected in 1944 and became the Senate major-
ity leader in 1949. Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy actively campaigned in 
Illinois against Lucas in 1950, claiming he was sympathetic to communism, and 
Lucas lost the race.
		9.			“Post	War	Economic	Planning—1944”	file,	Papers	of	Sen.	Robert	Taft	Sr.,	Library	
of Congress, Washington, DC.
10.  Taft Papers.
11.  Ibid.
12.  Ibid.
 13.  House Resolution 408 created this committee on January 26, 1944.
 14.   Colmer served from 1933 to 1973. Although he remained a Democrat, Colmer even-
tually broke with his party on the issue of civil rights in the 1960s. When he retired, 
he endorsed his administrative assistant, Trent Lott, who ran as a Republican for his 
old seat. Fish served in Congress from 1920 to 1946. He was part of the Stuyvesant-
Fish political dynasty from New York, which could trace its family roots back to Peter 
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Stuyvesant, the governor of New York when it was New Amsterdam, a Dutch 
colony, in the seventeenth century. His grandfather, Hamilton Fish, was governor 
and a senator from New York as well as secretary of state under President Ulysses 
S. Grant. His father, Hamilton Fish II, was also a congressman, as was his son, 
Hamilton Fish IV.
 15. When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in 1953, he appointed Folsom as 
under secretary of the treasury. Eisenhower then selected him to be the secretary 
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1955.
 16. Alvin Hansen to Gerhard Colm, 11 July 1944, Gerhard Colm Papers, Harry S. 
Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO.
 17. Colm to Hansen, 15 July 1944, Colm Papers.
 18. Colm to J. Weldon Jones, memoranda, 5 and 11 August 1944, Colm Papers.
 19. Ibid.
 20. Colm to Jones, memorandum, 15 August 1944, Colm Papers.
 21. Ibid.
 22. Jones to Wendzel, Bean, and David, 19 August 1944 memorandum, Colm Papers.
 23. Jones to Harold Smith, 25 August 1944 memorandum, Colm Papers.
 24. Ibid., 4 October 1944.
 25.  Ibid., 10 October 1944.
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Press and Public Opinion Diverge
 
In 1943, while President Roosevelt was meeting with Joseph Stalin 
and Winston Churchill in Tehran, pollster George Gallup asked a sample 
of the American people what they thought would be the greatest prob-
lem facing the country from 1945 to 1949. The second most common 
answer was “peace,” offered by 13 percent of the respondents. Outdis-
tancing all the other possible answers was “jobs and economic read-
justment.”	In	the	midst	of	a	fierce	world	war,	58	percent	of	Americans	
stated that employment would be the greatest problem in the immediate 
future (Gallup 1972, Survey No. 301, p. 410).
Obviously, no one wanted a resumption of the high levels of 
unemployment experienced during the Great Depression, and many 
expressed the belief that the government should act to alleviate unem-
ployment. It was apparent that people in the Roosevelt administration 
were seriously considering a full employment policy. The electoral suc-
cess of the Democratic Party with its New Deal platform implied that a 
majority favored a strengthened federal role in the economy. At issue, 
however,	was	whether	there	was	popular	support	to	redefine	that	role	
to encompass economic planning, compensatory spending, guaranteed 
employment for everyone who sought it, and the federal structure to 
accomplish these responsibilities.
In addition to drawing on coverage by the national print media,1 
this chapter uses public opinion polls to explore how the government’s 
role in job creation was perceived and to what extent full employment 
was supported. Public opinion research was maturing as a social sci-
ence by the 1940s. The methodologies had become much more rigor-
ous than the mass mailing techniques that had led to the demise of the 
Literary Digest in 1936.2 The public opinion researchers of the 1940s 
placed strict demographic controls on their samples to achieve what 
they hoped were representative microcosms of the nation.3 There were 
two	noteworthy	commercial	polling	firms,	one	headed	by	Elmo	Roper	
and the other by George Gallup. Additionally, there were two major 
university-based	survey	research	centers	by	the	early	1940s:	the	Office	
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of Public Opinion Research (OPOR) at Princeton University, and the 
National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chi-
cago (Converse 1987).
Fortune magazine published many of Roper’s poll results, present-
ing	 the	findings	as	human	 interest	 rather	 than	breaking	news.	Gallup	
issued press releases on a regular basis, but the poll results were not 
typically	front	page	news.	The	research	findings	of	OPOR	and	NORC	
were disseminated in the academic community as scholarly articles that 
were not time-sensitive.4 
POSTWAR EMPLOYMENT WORRIES
The popular press rarely featured stories on public attitudes toward 
employment problems in the early 1940s. The news of the day centered 
on war coverage and the response of the home front. War production 
was the main theme of articles on the domestic economy. Stories on 
rationing were the only features that touched on personal economic 
concerns. Given the economic worries that Gallup found, this lack 
of news coverage on employment issues is perplexing. Perhaps those 
within the media who set editorial policy might have thought that sto-
ries on employment fears were no longer newsworthy, given the high 
employment levels of wartime, or that accounts of economic pessimism 
would have undercut the war effort. Regardless of its reasons, the popu-
lar press had decided at this point not to be a forum for discussion on the 
prospects of employment following the war. 
When the war began, most people thought there would be high 
unemployment after the war, as Figure 3.1 makes clear. According to 
an opinion survey conducted by Elmo Roper for Fortune magazine in 
December 1941, just over 60 percent responded that there would be 
“lots of unemployment” after the war. Indeed, only a few (11.3 percent) 
predicted there would be jobs for everyone after the war ended (Cantril 
1951, p. 898). As discussed in the previous chapter, in 1938 the number 
of unemployed workers surpassed 10 million, which was 18.9 percent 
of the labor force. Given that American industries had not fully geared 
up for war production at the time of the survey, this grim assessment 
seemed credible.
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Five months later, in May 1942, George Gallup found that 43 per-
cent of those polled thought the country would experience an economic 
depression	for	the	first	few	years	after	the	war.	Figure	3.2	provides	a	
breakdown of this Gallup poll by broad occupational groupings and 
shows that business and professional people were the most optimis-
tic—57 percent predicting prosperity. White-collar workers were the 
only other occupational group in which at least half thought there would 
be prosperity in the immediate postwar years. Farmers were the most 
pessimistic group, with 51 percent predicting a postwar depression 
(Gallup 1972, Survey No. 268, p. 336).5
In July 1944, Gallup asked a sample of the civilian adult popula-
tion whether they thought they would have a job following the war 
(Figure 3.3). While 40 percent were “very certain” and 25 percent were 
Figure 3.1  Public Opinion in 1941 on Postwar Employment Prospects 
After the war, do you think there will be jobs for everybody, some 
unemployment, or lots of unemployment?
SOURCE: Poll conducted by Elmo Roper for the December 1941 issue of Fortune 
magazine (Cantril 1951, p. 898).
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Figure 3.2  Public Opinion in 1942 on Postwar Prosperity
Which do you think the United States will have for the first two or three years 
after the war—depression or prosperity?
SOURCE: Gallup poll, May 23–28, 1942 (Gallup 1972, p. 336).
“fairly certain” that they would, 35 percent of the respondents reported 
that they were “not at all certain” they would have a job after the war. 
Memories of high joblessness before the war, perhaps of their own 
unemployment experience, limited the hopes of over one-third of adults 
sampled (Gallup 1972, Survey No. 322, p. 455). 
Though a majority of people thought they would have a job, few 
thought everyone else would, as Figure 3.4 presents. “After the war,” 
asked	Gallup	during	the	first	week	of	December	1944,	“do	you	think	
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that everyone who wants a job will be able to get one?” (Gallup 1972, 
Survey	No.	336,	pp.	478–479).	Only	25	percent	responded	with	an	affir-
mative answer. Three weeks later, on December 27, the Washington 
Post ran George Gallup’s analysis of this poll; the results are detailed 
over the following three paragraphs (Gallup 1944). These results sug-
gest	 that	while	 people	were	 confident	 in	 1944	 that	 the	 nation	would	
achieve a military victory, they were not optimistic that the country 
would stave off a resumption of unemployment after the war. 
Women appeared to be more pessimistic than men, as Figure 3.4 
indicates,	but	more	than	70	percent	of	men	also	were	not	confident	in	
the	employment	outlook.	The	significant	numbers	of	women	workers	
brought into the labor force during the war who, as evidenced by other 
Gallup survey data, wanted to continue working in peacetime might 
Figure 3.3  Public Attitudes in 1944 on Personal Job Prospects
Very certain
40%
Fairly certain
25%
Not at all certain
35%
Asked of persons in the civilian adult population who said they planned 
to work after the war: How certain are you that you will have a job after 
the war?
SOURCE: Gallup poll, July 8–13, 1944 (Gallup 1972, p. 455).
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have	influenced	this	modest	gender	difference.	Women	workers	clearly	
were more vulnerable to dislocation by returning veterans than male 
workers. 
When the question responses were broken down by age groups, 
those 21 to 29 years old appeared to be the most discouraged, though the 
differences	are	small	and	may	not	be	statistically	significant.	The	oldest	
age group, 50 years and above, seemed the most optimistic; nonethe-
less, their replies were a gloomy 26 percent “yes” and 66 percent “no.” 
(Eight percent had no opinion.) That the youngest appeared to be the 
most discouraged probably stemmed from the fact that the last period 
of prosperity had occurred when they were children. They had come of 
Figure 3.4  Public Opinion in 1944 on Postwar Employment Prospects by 
Gender, Age, and Occupation
After the war, do you think that everyone who wants a job will be able to 
get one? 
SOURCE: Gallup poll, December 1–6, 1944 (Gallup 1972, pp. 478–479).
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age during the Great Depression. That a sense of optimism appeared to 
increase, albeit slightly, with age could have been due to older people 
having experienced prosperity as well as hardship and thus having wit-
nessed	a	wider	sweep	of	fluctuations	in	the	American	economy.	
Gallup also reported occupational breakdowns in response to the 
question of whether everyone who wanted a job after the war would 
find	 one,	 with	 a	 rather	 surprising	 outcome.	 It	 is	 fascinating	 that	 the	
occupational group most affected by the Depression and most likely to 
have been hurt by postwar unemployment—manual labor—appeared 
to be the least pessimistic group, though again the differences are small 
and	may	not	be	statistically	significant.	Conversely,	the	group	arguably	
the least vulnerable to unemployment—business and professional—
was reportedly the most pessimistic. The 1944 data differed from the 
results Gallup had found in 1942, which are depicted in Figure 3.2. In 
1942, those grouped into the business and professional category were 
the most optimistic. Perhaps because business and professional people 
were more often in the position of hiring people, they were more likely 
to answer from the perspective of whether they would have job open-
ings proportionate to the number of job seekers. These results resemble 
research by Donald Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet that differentiate 
between “personal economic discontents” and “collective economic 
judgments” and conclude that the two are surprisingly independent 
(Kinder and Kiewiet 1979).
It	is	difficult	to	know	whether	these	data	should	be	interpreted	as	
economic forecasts or as more general worldviews. That is, a person 
might well have thought it an economic truth that there are always 
people	who	want	 to	be	employed	but	cannot	find	jobs.	Conversely,	a	
person might have believed that unemployed people are those unwill-
ing	to	accept	menial	jobs	or	unfit	to	perform	at	minimum	standards,	and	
thus anyone who sincerely wants a job can obtain one. Gallup, how-
ever, phrased the question less as a philosophical issue and more as an 
economic forecast by beginning it with the phrase, “After the war . . .” 
Given the skewed results, it is apparent that people were pessimistic 
regardless of worldview or personal speculation.6
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MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE POSTWAR ECONOMY
Much of the national media chose to set the context of the postwar 
economy solely from the point of view of business. The president of 
the National Association of Manufacturers, Frederick C. Crawford, told 
the New York Times in the summer of 1943 that private industry was 
up	to	the	task	of	finding	jobs	for	all	returning	servicemen	after	the	war.	
However, Crawford emphasized, cutting the taxes of businesses and 
restricting the power of organized labor were necessary prerequisites 
to private-sector job creation. He went on to say that the private sec-
tor did not want to compete with government enterprises and called 
government-“made” work undesirable (New York Times 1943).
An editorial in the Chicago Daily Tribune asserted that the way to pro-
vide jobs after the war was to end the New Deal programs and planning. 
The Tribune piece argued that Roosevelt had prevented private enterprise 
from creating employment before the war. “The true alternatives are not 
Rooseveltian fascism or depression,” the editorial concluded. “There is a 
far better way. It is individualism and free government” (Chicago Daily 
Tribune 1943). Some in the business world, however, were not so critical 
of President Roosevelt; indeed, the business-oriented Kiplinger Wash-
ington Letter observed that Roosevelt’s establishment of the War Pro-
ductions Board (WPB) in 1942 had preserved private enterprise (Perrett 
1985, p. 262). 
Optimism was apparently running full throttle at the 150th annual 
dinner of the Economic Club of New York in December of 1944. The 
featured speaker, Irving S. Olds, chairman of U.S. Steel, expressed 
assurance that industry would be able to reconvert quickly to peacetime 
production.	“It	would	be	difficult	to	conceive	of	any	time	in	our	past	
when the American people as a whole had been in a better condition 
to face a temporary reduction in production and employment,” Olds 
opined. “Incomes throughout the nation have been high. Savings are at 
a peak level.” Olds echoed the argument that taxes were impeding busi-
ness from taking risks on new production (Wall Street Journal 1944).
The	print	media	consistently	exuded	 the	confidence	promoted	by	
business leaders. (Newsweek, for example, featured an article under 
the section heading “Postwar Horizons” carrying the title “Business 
Planners Concentrate on Free Enterprise and Turn Deaf Ear to Cries 
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for ‘Normalcy’” [Newsweek 1943].) The stories conveyed an upbeat 
tone	and	highlighted	the	speeches	of	corporate	figures	such	as	Alfred	
P. Sloan, chairman of General Motors, who would grace the cover of 
Time in the autumn of 1945. “Enlightened management,” predicted 
Sloan, “with cooperative labor, given intelligent government coopera-
tion	and	freedom	from	repressive	government	controls	such	as	stifling	
free	enterprise	with	unnecessary	regulations	and	confiscatory	taxes,	can	
and will bring about a full economy” (Time 1943). 
Indeed, most articles reported that business was emphasizing free 
enterprise as the driving force of postwar prosperity. When George 
Gallup	queried	a	sample	of	the	general	public	in	1943	on	the	definition	
of free enterprise, however, he obtained results that would have sur-
prised the champions of free enterprise. “The great majority of Ameri-
cans,” reported Gallup, “are either without any idea of the term free 
enterprise or hold an erroneous one” (Gallup 1972, Survey No. 304, 
p. 416). The pollster did not say whether people, regardless of incorrect 
definitions,	viewed	the	term	positively.	It	was,	most	probably,	a	concept	
many people valued even if they did not fully understand it. 
Fortune MAGAzINE’S EXECUTIVE FORECAST 
Although newspaper accounts presented business leaders as more 
optimistic than the average American appeared to be, a sizable major-
ity of business leaders in 1942 predicted that unemployment would be 
great or fairly large after the war. Fortune magazine conducted a series 
of surveys of business leaders and often focused on their economic 
prognoses during the war. The magazine invited over 10,000 business 
leaders to participate in its Fortune Forum of Executive Opinion, and 
the survey results are based upon at least 4,000 responses (Cantril 1951, 
pp. viii–ix). As Figure 3.5 indicates, Fortune	found	that	only	one-fifth	
of the cross section of executives surveyed thought that unemployment 
would be small following the postwar adjustment and reconversion. 
Fortune followed up with those business leaders who had responded 
that unemployment would be great or fairly large after the war (79.4 
percent of the cross section sampled) with two additional questions: 
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1) Should businesses get together and assume major responsibil-
ity for eliminating unemployment, or should business rely on 
government to do so?
2) What do you think will actually occur?
While 90.5 (Figure 3.6) percent of these business leaders thought 
that business should coordinate its efforts and assume responsibility for 
eliminating unemployment, only 15.7 percent actually thought business 
would assume that responsibility.
The	findings	depicted	in	Figure	3.6	raise	further	questions.	Did	the	
81.2 percent who thought government would assume responsibility for 
eliminating unemployment after the war reach that conclusion because 
they thought business would not be willing to coordinate its efforts? 
Figure 3.5  Business Leaders’ Views in 1942 of Postwar Unemployment 
Prospects
Great
20.8%
Fairly large
58.6%
Small
20.6%
Asked of a cross section of business executives: After the immediate postwar 
adjustment and conversion, do you think unemployment in the United States 
will be small, fairly large, or great?
SOURCE: Forum of Executive Opinion, Fortune, September 1942 (Cantril 1951, p. 898).
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Did they think that government would usurp business’s role in job cre-
ation? Or, did they think that the levels of unemployment after the war 
might be too large for business to be able to handle? 
Only very small percentages of the business leaders who responded 
to the survey thought that business and government should jointly 
assume responsibility (2.0 percent) and actually would work together 
(3.1 percent) to alleviate unemployment. Given that business and gov-
ernment were ostensibly working together to mobilize war production, 
this small percentage is intriguing. A closer look at the record of busi-
ness and government actually working together for war mobilization, 
however, provides reasons for this cynicism.
The domination by business of the WPB resulted in widespread 
criticism despite its accomplishments in mobilizing wartime produc-
Figure 3.6  Business Leaders’ Views in 1942 on Responsibility for 
Alleviating Unemployment
Asked of the 79.4% of business executives in Figure 3.5 who thought 
unemployment in the United States would be fairly large or great: Do you 
think business should get together and assume major responsibility for 
eliminating unemployment, or should business rely upon the government to 
do so by large-scale expenditures? Which do you think actually will occur?
         Should assume responsibility                    Will assume responsibility
Business
90.5%
Government
7.5%
Both
2.0%
SOURCE: Forum of Executive Opinion, Fortune, September 1942 (Cantril 1951, p. 898).
Business
15.7%
Government
81.2%
Both
3.1%
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tion. Roosevelt had established the WPB in January 1942 after the lack 
of success by several agencies that had been formed to coordinate war 
mobilization efforts. The WPB was a federal agency largely staffed 
with business executives. Some of the business executives became fed-
eral employees (with a resulting reduction in pay), some volunteered 
without	taking	any	salary,	and	some	held	official	appointments	but	con-
tinued to receive their corporate salaries. By mid-1942, over 10,000 
businessmen had reportedly moved into the government’s war agencies 
(Brinkley 1996, pp. 182–192). The Nation and the New Republic fea-
tured exposés on the “dollar-a-year” corporate leaders who were work-
ing in the government war agencies and funneling lucrative contracts 
to their companies (Atleson 1998, pp. 21–22). Allegations of business-
men in the WPB diverting scarce commodities needed for the war effort 
to their own civilian industries triggered broader press coverage and 
prompted a congressional investigation led by Missouri senator Harry 
Truman (Brinkley 1996, p. 191). 
As the war was winding down in 1945, Fortune again queried busi-
ness leaders on their postwar employment prognosis—this time asking 
about their own industrial sector (Figure 3.7). Some leaders appeared 
more optimistic than in 1942, with 29.1 percent predicting unemployment 
levels that were “no more than [what would be expected] due to shifts of 
jobs.” However, one-third of those surveyed thought that unemployment 
in their sector would be worse than during the 1937–1940 period. 
FULL EMPLOYMENT ENTERS THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
The National Resources Planning Board’s (NRPB) 1942 report 
After the War—Full Employment received a remarkable amount of pub-
lic attention for a government report. The Wall Street Journal (1942a) 
article on the NRPB report carried the headline “Heavy Government 
Spending, Taxes Seen in Post-War Economy.” Over one-third of those 
responding to a Gallup survey in 1943 said they knew about the NRPB 
report on full employment. (As previously discussed, the report was 
seminal in the development of the full employment legislation. The 
author, Hansen [1942], offered policy options aimed at increasing con-
sumption to stimulate full employment.)
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Specifically,	when	George	Gallup	(1972,	Survey	No.	292,	p.	380),	
in a March 1943 poll, queried a sample of Americans regarding the 
NRPB report, 34 percent indicated they had heard of it, and 13 percent 
of the sample stated they were familiar with its content. Of those who 
knew about the report, 69 percent said they viewed it favorably. No one 
probed further to ascertain whether self-selection drove the results—
i.e., whether those who were sympathetic to full employment were 
more likely to learn about the NRPB report. 
An astounding 99 percent of those surveyed in January 1943 by the 
National Opinion Research Center (NORC) thought that full employ-
ment should be a postwar aim. The NORC had become part of the Uni-
versity of Chicago in 1942 and at that time used a hard quota sampling 
Figure 3.7  Business Leaders’ Prognosis in 1945 of Employment in Their 
Sectors
Asked of a national cross section of executives: Do you expect serious 
unemployment in your industrial community during reconversion?
NOTE: Percentages add to more than 100 because some respondents gave more than one 
answer.
SOURCE: Forum of Executive Opinion, Fortune, February 1945 (Cantril 1951, p. 902).
Worse than 
1937–1940
33.6%
Not so serious 
as 1937–1940
38.6%
No more than that 
due to shifts of jobs 
29.1%
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frame based upon gender, age, and four categories of economic class 
(Berinsky 2006, pp. 499–529). Of the 99 percent who thought that full 
employment should be a postwar aim, over two-thirds (68.7 percent) 
stated that full employment could actually be achieved (Figure 3.8). 
Some newspapers were critical of the administration’s attention to 
postwar planning, arguing that it should be focusing all of its attention 
on the war effort. Of those publications in the print media that were 
opposed to government postwar economic planning, the Wall Street 
Journal was perhaps the most visible (e.g., Moley [1942]; Wall Street 
Journal [1942c]). The Journal made clear, however, that it was not 
opposed to planning per se, but maintained that it was private industry 
that should do the planning (Wall Street Journal 1942b). 
As the NORC survey data presented in Figure 3.9 make clear, most 
Americans	(specifically,	72.7	percent	of	the	99	percent	who	thought	full	
Figure 3.8  Public Opinion in 1943 on Feasibility of Full Employment
Do you think that this [full employment] can actually be done?
NOTE: This question was asked of the 99 percent of the sample who thought that full 
employment should be a postwar aim.
SOURCE: National Opinion Research Center, January 11, 1943 (Cantril 1951, p. 898).
Yes
68.7%
No
18.2%
Don't know
13.1%
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employment should be a postwar aim) thought the government should 
be planning for full employment in 1943. Just under a quarter (23.2 per-
cent) thought the government should wait until later to plan for postwar 
employment (Cantril 1951, p. 898). As the NORC data shows, the pub-
lic overwhelmingly preferred that the government begin planning right 
away to achieve full employment following the war. This was hardly 
surprising, since other polling data had documented the public’s broad-
based fears of postwar unemployment. Perhaps full employment had 
become a concept much like Gallup had found free enterprise to be: 
that is, an idea held dear by many people, but not clearly understood by 
most people. 
Figure 3.9  Public Opinion in 1943 on Planning for Full Employment
Do you think we should start to make plans for this [full employment] right 
now, or do you think this ought to wait till later?
NOTE: This question was asked of the 99 percent of the sample who thought that full 
employment should be a postwar aim.
SOURCE: National Opinion Research Center, January 11, 1943 (Cantril 1951, p. 898).
Now
72.7%
Later
23.2%
Don't know
4.1%
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Not all corporate executives opposed economic planning, and there 
was press coverage of the speeches of business leaders who thought 
planning for the postwar economy was necessary and desirable. The 
Committee for Economic Development (CED) was formed in 1942 
by business leaders as a planning organization, and it gained coverage 
in the press (Collins 1982). CED Chairman Paul Hoffman, who also 
was president of the Studebaker Corporation, stressed the importance 
of business planning in a 1943 speech before the Union League Club 
of Chicago. “In making these plans we must assume an attitude by the 
government that is cordial and encouraging to private business,” he 
stated, “a climate favoring business expansion.” Hoffman posited that 
gainful employment would be needed for a labor force of 58 million 
people after the war (Los Angeles Times 1943).7 
When Fortune asked its cross section of business leaders in 1944 
whether it was a function of the government to maintain full employ-
ment, a somewhat surprising 29.4 percent responded “Yes.” The ques-
tion’s wording differed somewhat from that of a question Fortune 
had asked in 1942: “Should business get together and assume major 
responsibility for eliminating unemployment, or should business rely 
on government to do so?” In 1942, only 7.5 percent of business lead-
ers thought the government should assume responsibility for alleviating 
unemployment, compared with 29.4 of business leaders who thought it 
was a function of the government to maintain full employment in 1944.
	The	data	depicted	in	Figure	3.10	might	have	been	reflecting	a	shift	
in the views of business leaders on the role of government; however, 
the data also might have captured the idea that full employment policies 
had a broader base of support than programs to alleviate unemploy-
ment. As was discussed more fully in Chapter 1, federal full employ-
ment policies encompass tax incentives for business, infrastructure 
spending that bolsters some business sectors, and other tools aimed at 
stimulating consumption. Business leaders’ views of policies to alle-
viate	unemployment	might	have	been	 limited	 to	 specific	government	
employment programs, such as the Public Works Administration and 
the Civilian Conservation Corps.
A nationwide public opinion survey conducted in June 1945 found 
that three-fourths of those surveyed thought the government should do 
something	if	workers	lost	 their	 jobs	and	could	not	find	work	because	
other jobs were not available (Figure 3.11). The questionnaire did not 
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ask those who thought the government should act to elaborate on what 
programs or policies the government should implement. Although 
George Gallup’s polling results usually garnered attention from the 
print media, these survey results apparently received little or no news-
paper coverage. 
A few months later, the Los Angeles Times featured an article by 
Gallup (1945) under the headline “Poll shows public split on employ-
ment issue: Half of those with opinions think business can attain high 
levels without federal aid.” The text went on to link these divided opin-
ions with public attitudes on the full employment bill. Analysis of the 
question’s wording indicates, however, that Gallup did not include a 
policy of full employment as an option in the question asked. Rather, 
Figure 3.10  Business Leaders’ Views in 1944 on Government’s Role in 
Full Employment
Asked of a national cross section of executives: Do you think it is a function 
of government today to see to it that substantially full employment is 
maintained?
SOURCE: Forum of Executive Opinion, Fortune, May 1944 (Cantril 1951, p. 900).
Yes
29.4%
No
66.2%
Don't know
4.4%
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the question offered as alternatives two New Deal programs: the Works 
Progress Administration (WPA) or the Public Works Administration 
(PWA). Figure 3.12 presents the actual wording of the question and the 
results of the survey cited in that article. The Los Angeles Times article 
was noteworthy, given that Gallup in June had found that 76 percent of 
the public supported a government role to ensure employment (Figure 
3.11).
Notwithstanding the Los Angeles Times article, Figure 3.12 reveals a 
split in public opinion that mirrors the Gallup data depicted in Figure 3.2, 
from May 1942. In that earlier poll, Gallup had found that 43 percent of 
those polled thought the country would experience an economic depres-
sion for the first few years after the war. Three years later, a comparable 
portion—42 percent—thought that “the government [would] have to 
step in and provide work like the W.P.A. or P.W.A.,” two of the major 
Figure 3.11  Public Opinion in June 1945 on the Government’s Role in 
Ensuring Employment
Do you think the government should do anything about workers who lose 
their jobs and are unable to find work because there are not enough jobs?
SOURCE: Gallup poll, June 12, 1945 (Gallup 1972).
Yes
76%
No
15%
No opinion
9%
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programs to combat the Great Depression. A quarter of those inter-
viewed by Gallup thought that the government would have to provide 
work part of the time, while 13 percent thought the government would 
have to provide work steadily.
MASS MARKETING OF HAYEK’S road to SerFdom 
An economic treatise written by an Austrian scholar proved funda-
mental to the debate on full employment. When New York Times busi-
ness writer Henry Hazlitt reviewed The Road to Serfdom, by Friedrich 
August Hayek, in 1944, he described it as “one of the most important 
Figure 3.12  Public Opinion in August 1945 on the Capacity of Business 
to Provide Employment
Government 
42%
Business 
42%
Don't know
16%
Do you think that business firms in this country will be able to provide 
enough jobs for nearly everyone in the next five years, or will the Government 
have to step in and provide work like the W.P.A. or P.W.A.? Do you think the 
Government will have to provide work steadily during the next five years, or 
only part of the time?
SOURCE: Gallup, August 24–29, 1945 (Gallup 1972, Survey No. 354, p. 526).
25% 
Part of 
the time
4% Don’t know
13% Steadily
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books of our generation,” and the book soon made it onto the New York 
Times	nonfiction	best-seller	list.	One	of	book’s	central	arguments	was	
that fascism and socialism had common roots in central economic plan-
ning as well as the power of the state over the individual. He argued that 
the abandonment of individualism, liberalism, and freedom inevitably 
leads to socialist or fascist oppression and the “serfdom” of the indi-
vidual. Hayek’s thesis quickly became the counterargument to Keynes-
ian economics in general and the government’s commitment to full 
employment in particular (Hazlitt 1944, p. BR1). 
Soon newspapers across the country were featuring reviews of The 
Road to Serfdom, and references to Hayek’s book began appearing on 
their editorial pages. The Baltimore Sun began publishing excerpts 
from The Road to Serfdom as the featured “Thought for Today” on 
a regular basis in the fall of 1944. Individual liberty and free choice 
were	frequent	themes	of	these	excerpts,	as	exemplified	by	the	following	
“Thought” from November 9, 1944, which ran on page 16 of the paper: 
“Our freedom of choice in a competitive society rests on the fact that 
if one person refuses to satisfy our wishes, we can turn to another. But 
if we face a monopolist we are at his mercy. And an authority directing 
the whole economic system would be the most powerful monopolist 
conceivable.”
Hayek had been the director of the Austrian Institute for Economic 
Research in Vienna until 1931, when he moved to the London School of 
Economics. He drew on his vantage point in Vienna on the rise of Hitler 
to assert that fascism or National Socialism resulted from the liberal and 
progressive traditions and not from conservative roots. Hayek’s argu-
ment was embraced by American conservatives, who wanted to disas-
sociate themselves from any intellectual links to fascism. Thus Hayek 
became the intellectual voice for free-market societies and argued 
against the idea that governments could engineer prosperity (Ebenstein 
2001, pp. 128–139).8
Hayek’s views reached an even wider audience in April 1945, when 
Reader’s Digest published a 20-page condensed version of The Road 
to Serfdom. At that time, Reader’s Digest had an estimated readership 
of 8.7 million. It was reported that there were an additional one mil-
lion requests for reprints of the condensed version of The Road to Serf-
dom (Caldwell 2007). In major national newspapers, letters to the edi-
tor began citing the Reader’s Digest condensed version rather than the 
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book itself. One such letter to the Wall Street Journal likened postwar 
economic planning to fascism: “Powerful minorities, which seem to be 
modeled along lines strikingly similar in many respects to those thriv-
ing in Germany, Italy, and Russia, have arisen in this country under the 
aegis of our so-called ‘public servants’ in Washington. We are being 
planned into a lower standard of living which is exactly what happened 
on the other side of the Atlantic” (Neary 1945).
In making these observations, the author of the letter referenced the 
Reader’s Digest condensed version of Hayek’s book.
The zenith of the mass marketing of The Road to Serfdom was the 
cartoon version that Look magazine published in February 1945. At 
the time, Look’s circulation was estimated at about 2.9 million. The 
illustrated version made such an impression on executives at General 
Motors that the company made it into a pamphlet that GM distributed. 
Three of the 18 cartoon panels from the pamphlet are presented on the 
next	page	(Illustration	3.1)	and	show	how	Hayek’s	thesis	was	simplified	
to illustrate that “planning” evolves into “fascism.” Electronic versions 
as well as hard copies of the cartoon adaptation of The Road to Serfdom 
remain available today (General Motors 1945).
Buoyed by the popular response, in the spring of 1945 Hayek went 
on a speaking tour in the eastern as well as midwestern parts of the 
United States to promote The Road to Serfdom. He drew audiences 
much larger than expected for an academician. Radio stations often 
broadcast his talks. In May 1945, the Saturday Review of Literature 
observed,	“Seldom	have	an	economist	and	a	nonfiction	book	reached	
such popularity in so short a time” (Ebenstein 2001, pp. 128–139). 
REACTION TO THE FULL EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION
One week after the Full Employment Act of 1945 was introduced on 
January 22, 1945, the New Republic featured an editorial written by one 
of the country’s leading advocates of full employment—former vice 
president and soon-to-be-named secretary of commerce Henry Wallace. 
Wallace emphasized the international importance of full employment 
and stated that “Jobs for all!” should be the battle cry for all the peoples 
of the world for the next few decades. He praised the ideas on federal 
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NOTE: Electronic versions as well as hard copies of the cartoon adaptation of The Road to Serfdom remain available today. Here are three 
sample panels chosen from among the 18 pictured in the original booklet.
SOURCE: Originally published in the February 1945 issue of Look magazine and subsequently reproduced in a booklet by General Motors 
as No. 118 in its Thought Starter Series (General Motors 1945).
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spending expressed by James Patton of the National Farmers Union, 
the legislative proposal of Sen. James Murray (D-MT), and the report 
of Lord William Beveridge (1944) in Great Britain. He asserted that “in 
the	economy	of	the	future,	the	only	true	national	deficit	will	be	labor	
unemployed.” In summary, he concluded that “the essential idea is that 
the federal government is ultimately responsible for full employment” 
(Wallace 1945, p. 140). 
Vice President Harry Truman emphasized full employment a few 
days later in a radio program that was broadcast nationwide by the 
National Broadcasting Company. “As long as we Americans work 
together and utilize wisely our great wealth of manpower, techni-
cal skills, and natural resources,” Truman stated, “we can expect full 
employment in our peacetime economy in a reasonably short time after 
hostilities end.” Truman was joined on the radio broadcast by American 
Federation of Labor president William Green, U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce president Eric Johnson, and National Farmers Union president 
James Patton. During that broadcast, both Green and Patton endorsed 
the full employment legislation that had been introduced in the Senate 
(Washington Post 1945). 
An indication of the importance that Truman gave to full employ-
ment	is	that	in	his	first	speech	after	Japan	surrendered	in	August	1945,	
a nationwide radio broadcast, he labeled full employment “must-pass” 
legislation. The Senate had held extensive hearings on the full employ-
ment	bill	over	 the	summer	of	1945	and	began	 its	floor	debate	shortly	
after Labor Day 1945. Political scientist Stephen Bailey reviewed a sam-
ple of local newspapers across the United States during that time and 
reported that an overwhelming majority of these local papers ran editori-
als against full employment legislation while Congress was debating it. 
Bailey also noted many editorials against the full employment bill in the 
major metropolitan papers and from a number of syndicated columnists, 
such as Paul Mallon and Raymond Moley, who wrote columns hostile to 
the full employment bill (Bailey 1964, pp. 96–97, 186–187).
Illustrative of the intensity of the media critics of the full employ-
ment bill was Newsweek’s Ralph Robey. Robey devoted four columns 
from July through September of 1945 to expressing his opposition to the 
legislation. In one column, he labeled the Senate bill as a costly gamble 
and attacked the economic forecasting component. Robey asserted that 
every error of 1 percent that economists made in calculating the gross 
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national	product	would	cost	the	average	American	family	$600	(a	figure	
he later retracted). In another column, he equated federal spending to 
head off predicted unemployment with having your appendix removed 
because a “bureaucrat thinks you’re likely to have appendicitis some 
time next year.” Full employment was, concluded Robey, “one of the 
most outlandish proposals ever offered to the American public” (Robey 
1945b). 
Publications such as the Chicago Sun, the New York Post, the 
Nation, and The New Republic were notable for being rare voices 
among the media that spoke favorably of full employment legislation 
(Bailey 1964, pp. 96–97, 186–187). The circulations of the Nation and 
the New Republic reportedly averaged 100,000 each during the 1940s. 
The New Republic went so far as to champion full employment. Hardly 
a week went by in 1945 that this magazine did not have an article on 
economic planning, reconversion, or full employment. 
When Elmo Roper surveyed a cross section of the American public 
in August 1945, he found that only 6.6 percent thought that full employ-
ment	was	a	bad	idea.	Less	than	one-fifth	(18.9	percent)	thought	it	was	
a good idea only if handled by industry. As Figure 3.13 shows, 55.3 
percent of those Roper interviewed thought that “full employment is 
something we should try to get, and it will require government action 
as well as planning by industry to get it.” Only 10.4 percent agreed that 
it was “something we have got to have, even if it means government 
ownership of business” (Cantril 1951, p. 903).
Full employment was supported by a majority of Americans across 
the broad income categories that Roper used, as shown in Table 3.1 
(Cantril 1951, p. 903). There was little difference across income levels 
among those who thought it was a bad idea, with percentages ranging 
from 5.8 to 6.8. The opinion that full employment was “something we 
have got to have, even if it means government ownership of business” 
was inversely related to economic status, as the percentage of those 
expressing it decreased as their economic status increased. A striking 
difference was that the proportion of those whom Roper grouped as 
“poor” choosing this option totaled 17.7 percent, compared with 0.8 
percent of those whom Roper labeled “prosperous,” 5.6 percent of 
those labeled “upper middle class,” and 9.3 percent of those labeled 
“lower middle class.” 
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There was an 11-point difference between those who were grouped 
as “prosperous” and those who were grouped as “poor” on the concept 
that full employment was “a good idea if it can be handled by industry 
alone, but it’s not government’s job to try to bring it about.” Support for 
this choice increased with economic status. Among those whom Roper 
labeled	“prosperous,”	26.7	percent	identified	with	this	view.	The	per-
centage of those responding “don’t know” decreased as income levels 
rose, but among those grouped as “poor” this category constituted 17.2 
percent. 
Roper found that college-educated respondents most frequently 
agreed with the statement that “full employment is something we 
should try to get, and it will require government action as well as plan-
Figure 3.13  Public Opinion in August 1945 on the Concept of Full 
Employment
Full employment is . . .
SOURCE: Elmo Roper, Fortune, August 1945 (from Cantril 1951, p. 903).
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ning by industry to get it.” As Table 3.2 shows, 69.5 percent of the 
college-educated people expressed that opinion (Cantril 1951, p. 903).9 
Support for the position that full employment was “something we have 
got to have, even if it means government ownership of business” was 
inversely related to education levels. Those with grade-school educa-
tions reported opinions on this question in a pattern quite similar to 
those whom Roper grouped as “poor.”
In September 1945, NORC found overwhelming support—79 per-
cent—for the view that it should be the “government’s job to see to it 
that there are enough jobs in this country for everybody who wants to 
work.” The survey was taken at the same time the Senate was debating 
full	employment	legislation	on	the	floor	and	was	the	last	public	opin-
Table 3.1  Public Opinion in August 1945 on the Concept of Full 
Employment, by Economic Status
Full employment . . . 
Economic status
Prosperous
Upper- 
middle
Lower- 
middle Poor Total
is something we have got 
to have, even if it means 
government ownership of  
all business.
0.8 5.6 9.3 17.7 10.4
is something we should try 
to get, and it will require 
government action as well as 
planning by industry to get it.
64.1 61.3 59.0 43.0 55.3
is a good idea if it can be 
handled by industry alone, 
but it’s not government’s job 
to try to bring it about.
26.7 23.1 19.8 15.3 18.9
may sound good, but it is 
actually a bad situation, 
because people then won’t 
work hard in order to keep 
their jobs.
6.4 6.8 5.8 6.8 6.6
Don’t know. 2.0 3.2 6.1 17.2 8.8
SOURCE: Elmo Roper, Fortune, August 1945 (from Cantril 1951, p. 903).
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ion data available on the topic in 1945. These data exhibited compa-
rable levels of support for the federal role as Gallup had found in June 
1945 (Figure 3.11): NORC at 79.0 percent and Gallup at 76.0 percent. 
A review of the major newspapers found no coverage of these NORC 
results, which are depicted in Figure 3.14.
NORC further probed those who expressed the view that the gov-
ernment should not ensure employment and found that 5.4 percent vol-
unteered that it “kills initiative of individuals” or “makes people lazy.” 
Another 4.5 percent expressed the belief that the government “had 
enough to do” or “should stick to politics.” Those who stated that “busi-
ness can provide more jobs” or “it kills efforts of business” totaled 3.6 
percent. Despite the mass marketing of The Road to Serfdom, only 1.8 
percent expressed concerns that government should not ensure employ-
Table 3.2  Public Opinion in August 1945 on the Concept of Full 
Employment, by Education
Full employment . . .
Education
Grade 
school
High 
school College Total
is something we have got to have, 
even if it means government 
ownership of all business.
14.7 10.1 2.9 10.4
is something we should try to get, 
and it will require government action 
as well as planning by industry to 
get it.
43.4 59.0 69.5 55.3
is a good idea if it can be handled 
by industry alone, but it’s not 
government’s job to try to bring it 
about.
17.4 19.5 20.6 18.9
may sound good, but it is actually a 
bad situation, because people then 
won’t work hard in order to keep 
their jobs.
5.7 7.9 5.5 6.6
Don’t know. 18.8 3.5 1.5 8.8
SOURCE: Elmo Roper, Fortune, August 1945 (from Cantril 1951, p. 903).
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ment because it would lead to “loss of freedom,” “too much dictator-
ship,” or “communism.” 
RELEVANCE OF RADIO NEWS
Unlike the print media, whose publications remain for historians to 
study, much of the radio news was broadcast live and did not become 
part of the historical record. Program schedules were regularly pub-
lished in local newspapers, but recordings of most broadcasts elude 
those who wish to research their content. For that reason, this chapter 
does not provide a systematic analysis of radio coverage of the debate 
on job creation and employment policies. Nonetheless, radio news was 
quite relevant in this era. According to data collected in the 1940 cen-
sus, 82.8 percent of American households had radio receivers. By 1945, 
the National Association of Broadcasters estimated that 90 percent of 
households had radios. Radio broadcasts were largely for the purpose of 
Figure 3.14  Public Opinion in September 1945 on the Government’s 
Role in Ensuring Employment
Do you think it should or should not be up to the government to see to it that 
there are enough jobs in this country for everybody who wants to work? If 
not, why do you think that it should not be up to the government?
SOURCE: National Opinion Research Center, September 1945 (Cantril 1951, p. 904).
Should not
Should 
Don't know
18%
Should not
3%
Don’t know
79%
Should
loss of freedom
makes people lazy
kills business effort
not government's job
not necessary 
other 
5% 
Not necessary 10%
Other
25% 
Not 
government’s 
job
20%
Kills business 
effort
30%
Makes people 
lazy
10%
Loss of 
freedom
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entertainment in the 1940s, with 70 to 75 percent of the programming 
hours allocated to music, drama, comedy, sports, and variety shows. For 
a week in October 1943, the National Broadcasting Company reported 
that 19.6 percent of its program time was spent on news and another 3.2 
percent on “talks and discussion”; the other 77.2 percent fell into one 
entertainment category or another (Ackerman 1945, pp. 1–18).
The foreign correspondents who brought live coverage of the war 
into homes and workplaces across America played a major role in radio 
broadcasts surpassing newspapers as the leading medium for news. By 
1945, an estimated 61 percent of Americans reported that radio was 
their primary source of daily news. Most Americans expressed the 
opinion that radio stations were fair in their coverage of controversial 
issues, especially in contrast to newspapers. Noted social scientists Paul 
Lazarsfeld and Patricia Kendall asked a sample of Americans in 1945 
how “fair” they thought radio broadcasts and newspapers were. They 
found that 81 percent of those interviewed thought radio stations were 
generally fair in giving both sides of the issue; only 39 percent of those 
interviewed thought newspapers were fair in their coverage (Lazarsfeld 
and Kendall 1948, pp. 18–58).
CLOSING COMMENTS
The stage was set for the legislative debate on the full employment 
bill. The limited polling data from the period indicated that a substan-
tial majority of the American public wanted the federal government to 
strive	to	ensure	that	everyone	looking	for	work	would	be	able	to	find	
a job after the war. The views of many business leaders, as well as the 
views expressed in the press, however, evidenced that the opposition 
to such a federal policy was quite strong, despite being the minority opinion. 
As we turn our focus to Congress and the White House in the fol-
lowing	chapters,	it	is	important	to	note	that	elected	officials	of	the	1940s	
were not enamored of, nor beholden to, public opinion polls.10 Indeed, 
many of them expressed distrust of public opinion polls as unreliable 
and as a challenge to, in the words of Martin Kriesberg (1945, p. 337), 
“their	prerogative	of	interpreting	the	public	will.”	Most	elected	officials	
maintained that they knew their constituents well and did not need pub-
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lic opinion polls—or the press for that matter—to tell them what was in 
the best interests of their constituents. 
Notes
 1. Daily newspapers accessed for this chapter include the following: the Atlanta 
Constitution, Baltimore Sun, Chicago Daily Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, 
Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. 
  2. On October 31, 1936, the Literary Digest predicted that Republican presidential 
nominee Alfred Landon would win 57 percent of the popular vote and 370 elec-
toral votes. President Roosevelt, however, won 60.8 percent of the popular vote 
and 523 electoral votes. The Literary Digest had sent a mass mailing to 10 million 
people, who were mostly made up of the magazine’s subscribers, people who 
owned cars, and people who had telephones. The resulting projection was based 
upon 2.3 million people who returned the postcards.
  3. This quota-controlled approach distinguishes these polls from contemporary pub-
lic opinion research based upon random samples (Berinsky 2006, pp. 499–529). 
  4. This muted coverage contrasts sharply to the coverage of the contemporary media, 
which treats polling data as political news.
		5.	 Gallup	reports	that	prior	to	1950,	his	polling	firm	used	a	sampling	approach	that	
combined two methods: a purposive design for the selection of cities, towns, and 
rural areas; and a quota method for the selection of individuals within chosen 
areas. First, a national sample was drawn of places—i.e., cities, towns, and rural 
areas. These places were then distributed by strata according to region and city 
size. Additional places were selected within each region to ensure that, within 
each state, the vote cast by these places in the last three elections matched the 
percentage distributions of the actual statewide vote. Finally, within each place 
sampled, the interviewers were given considerable latitude in selecting the respon-
dents	so	 long	as	 they	fit	 the	age,	sex,	and	socioeconomic	quotas	established	by	
Gallup (Berinsky 2006, pp. 499–529).
 6. There are several caveats to bear in mind when interpreting these Gallup data. 
Foremost,	the	statistical	significance	of	the	differences	noted	above	are	not	avail-
able. Since the subgroup differences are rather small, one should not assume 
they	are	significant.	It	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	total	distributions	of	those	
answering	“Yes”	and	“No,”	however,	are	significant	because	of	the	sheer	size	of	
the differences.
  7. As a basis of comparison, the actual U.S. labor force was 57 million in 1950.
  8. Hayek would go on to win the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1974.
	 9.	 Roper	did	not	indicate	whether	these	differences	were	statistically	significant.
 10. President Roosevelt, however, did utilize public opinion polls and relied on Had-
ley Cantril of Princeton University to analyze attitudes on a range of topics for 
him.	Roosevelt	may	well	have	been	the	first	U.S.	leader	to	tap	into	public	opinion	
on a systematic basis (Converse 1987). 
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Senate Passes Full Employment
The U.S. Senate took the lead on full employment legislation dur-
ing the 79th Congress. The full employment bill that was introduced as 
Senate Bill 380 had its genesis not in the Special Committee on Post-
War Economic Policy and Planning, but rather in a subcommittee of the 
Military	Affairs	Committee.	Senate	Bill	380	embodied	for	the	first	time	
the	four	elements	of	full	employment	identified	in	the	introduction:	1)	
national planning, 2) employment stimulation tools (e.g., compensatory 
spending), 3) guarantee of employment, and 4) a federal structure to 
implement it. 
The	 executive	 branch	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 the	 arguments	
in support of S. 380, despite some internal disagreements within the 
administration. Liberal and labor groups embarked on a national cam-
paign advocating for the legislation. While many in the print media con-
tinued to criticize the bill, the political and business interests opposed 
to the legislation were unprepared to stem the tide of support for full 
employment in the Senate. 
THE EMERGENCE OF A FULL EMPLOYMENT BILL 
The most logical center of legislative activity on full employment 
should have been the Senate Special Committee on Post-War Economic 
Policy and Planning. This committee, however, had as its chair Senator 
Walter F. George (D-GA), who clearly had different ideas about post-
war economic planning. As Chapter 1 discussed, the George Committee 
did	not	embrace	Keynesian	economics.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	legislation	
for full employment did not emerge from Senator George’s committee. 
The antecedents to the full employment bill in the Senate can be 
traced to bills that originated in the House of Representatives. In 1943, 
Rep. John Dingell Sr. (D-MI) sponsored a comprehensive bill that 
would have established a United States Employment Service, compul-
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sory national health insurance, extensive national unemployment insur-
ance, expansion of old-age and survivors insurance, and a new program 
of	 temporary	and	permanent	disability	benefits.	This	 sweeping	 legis-
lation, which Senators James E. Murray (D-MT) and Robert Wagner 
(D-NY) introduced in the Senate, expanded upon New Deal ideas and 
offered an American version of Britain’s Beveridge Plan (Hamby 1973, 
p. 8).1 It carried a largely symbolic value, as it did not capture many 
supporters in Congress.
During the summer of 1944, the Senate considered several legisla-
tive proposals regarding postwar economic planning. One originated 
with Sen. Harley Kilgore (D-WV) and had Senator Truman (D-MO) as 
the chief cosponsor in the Senate.2 The Kilgore-Truman bill was broad 
in scope and innovative in approach. The other proposal, sponsored by 
Senator George, was rather modest in scope and traditional in approach. 
Murray was quite active in the legislative maneuvering on both the 
George and the Kilgore-Truman bills.
In the Kilgore-Truman bill, full employment was explicitly stated 
as a goal, though it was nestled in the preamble. The bill contained a 
section that would have entitled returning veterans “to placement in 
suitable employment,” a limited but patriotic precursor to the right-to-
employment idea. It also included a provision for a National Production- 
Employment Board with a Bureau of Programs that would have been 
responsible for permanent economic planning.3
National Farmers Union (NFU) president James Patton and NFU 
legislative secretary Russell Smith advocated the concept of a Bureau 
of Programs when they proposed a plan for full employment during tes-
timony before the War Contracts Subcommittee of the Senate Military 
Affairs Committee in April 1944.4 Patton also argued before this sub-
committee (which included both Murray and Truman) that the govern-
ment should guarantee a $40 billion level of capital investment every 
year. The assumptions were that this level of capital investment would 
provide for a full employment economy and that the federal govern-
ment should intervene when investment by private enterprise fell short 
of that level (Bailey 1964, pp. 22–23).
The	George	bill	reflected	the	recommendations	of	the	Senate	Spe-
cial Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning. Foremost, 
the	bill	would	have	created	an	Office	of	Demobilization	to	coordinate	
postwar economic activities. It emphasized postwar contract settlement 
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to hasten reconversion as well as the prompt disposal of surplus govern-
ment property. It did not advocate full employment.5 George redrafted 
his bill to incorporate compromises with conservatives but lost Mur-
ray’s sponsorship in the process. 
The senator from Montana instead shifted his support to a compro-
mise Kilgore-Truman-Murray bill. Murray added to that bill the elements 
of the NFU proposal that required public investment if private invest-
ment fell short of the amount needed to maintain full employment levels. 
In a complex series of moves that offered a rewritten George-Murray 
demobilization bill and the Kilgore-Truman-Murray bill as amendments 
and secondary amendments, the Senate passed the War Mobilization and 
Reconversion Act of 1944 without any of the provisions for economic 
planning and full employment (Bailey 1964, pp. 33–35; Flamm 1994, 
pp. 74–75).6  
Despite the failure of the Kilgore-Truman-Murray bill, Murray had 
framed the debate so that he had one advantage remaining: he had suc-
cessfully recast the question of postwar economic planning in terms of 
military contracts and conversion. Partly as a result of his maneuvering 
and partly because the George Committee had expired, the subcom-
mittee Murray chaired on war contracts was now positioned to set the 
agenda for postwar economic planning.
The War Contracts Subcommittee circulated the proposal that 
Patton of the NFU had made for postwar planning to other members of 
Congress and to various executive agencies and departments. Murray 
tasked Bertram Gross, staff director of the subcommittee, with adapt-
ing the NFU proposal that Patton had presented into legislative lan-
guage. Gross proved to be the key congressional staff person involved 
in the development of the full employment bill. Gross met with Gerhard 
Colm, V.O. Key, Louis Bean, Walter Salant, and several others involved 
in the executive branch’s study group on postwar employment as he 
drafted the senator’s proposal. The War Contracts Subcommittee pre-
sented this legislative proposal for reconversion and full employment as 
part of its Year-End Report. Senator Truman joined Murray in signing 
the subcommittee document.7  
The centerpiece of the Year-End Report was the legislative proposal 
confidently	titled	the	Full	Employment	Act	of	1945.	The	assumptions	
and goals of the Year-End Report	and	the	executive	branch’s	confiden-
tial Postwar Employment report (Colm 1944) were very similar. Both 
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acknowledged that government spending had transformed the economy 
from one of depression to one of unprecedented production. Both con-
veyed a sincere fear that high levels of unemployment would resume 
when the economy reconverted from wartime to peacetime. Both reaf-
firmed	that	the	government	should	maintain	national	policies	to	stimu-
late private enterprise, but that if the private sector could not achieve 
full employment it was the responsibility of the federal government 
to assure that a postwar economic depression would not occur (U.S. 
Congress 1944c).
The perspective, nevertheless, had shifted in the second report, for 
now the economic role of the working person was merged even more 
tightly with the implicit concept of aggregate demand. Domestic pro-
grams	that	addressed	needs	of	constituents,	rather	than	fiscal	machina-
tions, were the primary devices that would achieve the desired results, 
according to the congressional architects. This difference in the points 
of view of the two reports is conveyed aptly by this excerpt from the 
subcommittee’s Year-End Report: “Statisticians may debate among 
themselves as to whether the precise goal should be a little more or 
a	 little	 less	 than	 the	President’s	60,000,000	figure.	But	no	 thoughtful	
American—no matter what his creed or station in life—would deny that 
every man or woman in the country who is willing to work and capable 
of working has the right to a job” (U.S. Congress 1944c, p. 11).
Indeed, the proposal asserted the right of all Americans able and 
seeking	 work,	 who	 had	 finished	 school	 and	 did	 not	 have	 full-time	
housekeeping responsibilities, to useful, remunerative, regular and full-
time employment. The right-to-employment concept now was formally 
incorporated into a full employment proposal as a feature on a parity 
with national planning, compensatory spending, and a responsible fed-
eral apparatus. 
After	some	modifications	and	revisions,	the	full	employment	bill	was	
introduced as S. 380 by Senators Murray, Wagner, Joseph O’Mahoney 
(D-WY),	and	Elbert	Thomas	(D-UT)	during	the	first	session	of	the	79th	
Congress.8 Many other liberal legislators joined in sponsoring this inno-
vative bill, which stated as its purpose “to establish a national policy 
and program for assuring continuing full employment in a free com-
petitive economy, through the concerted efforts of industry, agriculture, 
labor, state and local governments and the federal government” (Con-
gressional Record 1945a, p. 377).
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The declaration of policy promised that the bill would accomplish 
nine things: 1) promote the general welfare of the nation; 2) foster and 
protect the American home and family as the American way of life; 
3) raise the standard of living; 4) provide employment for veterans; 5) con-
tribute to the full utilization of national resources; 6) develop commerce 
among states and with foreign nations; 7) preserve and strengthen com-
petitive private enterprise, particularly small businesses; 8) strengthen 
national defense and security; and, 9) contribute to the establishment and 
maintenance of lasting peace (Congressional Record 1945a, p. 377).
The National Production and Employment Budget was the center-
piece of the legislation. At the beginning of each session of Congress, 
the	president	was	to	submit	a	detailed	budget	for	the	fiscal	year	or	lon-
ger. The budget was to perform several important functions. It would 
estimate the size of the labor force and estimate the aggregate volume 
of prospective investment and expenditure by private enterprise, con-
sumers, and all levels of government necessary to achieve full employ-
ment of the labor force—i.e., the volume of the gross national prod-
uct (GNP) that would accomplish full employment. The budget would 
estimate whether the aggregate volume of prospective investment and 
expenditure	was	sufficient	to	assure	full	employment.	In	the	case	of	a	
prospective	deficiency,	the	bill	required	the	president	to	propose	a	gen-
eral program for nonfederal investment by private enterprise to prevent 
the	deficiency.	If	full	employment	otherwise	could	not	be	achieved,	it	
was the responsibility of the federal government to provide the nec-
essary volume of investment and expenditure (Congressional Record 
1945a, pp. 377–378).
The original bill also proposed a Joint Committee on the National 
Budget, composed of ranking members of the Senate committees on 
Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Education and Labor, and 
Finance as well as seven additional members of the Senate. The House 
designees on this committee included the ranking members of the 
House committees on Appropriations, Banking and Currency, Labor, 
Ways and Means, and seven additional members of the House of Rep-
resentatives. The responsibilities of the Joint Committee included an 
annual study of the proposed national budget and a report to both cham-
bers setting forth a general policy to serve as a guide for committees 
dealing with legislation relevant to the national budget (Congressional 
Record 1945a, pp. 379–380).
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The bill posed a dramatic departure from existing policy, for several 
reasons.	Foremost,	it	marked	the	first	legislative	embodiment	of	com-
prehensive economic planning and the use of Keynesian economics to 
achieve a full employment economy. It was more sweeping in scope 
than the Kilgore-Truman-Murray bill and more grounded in Keynesian 
theory than the Dingell bill. It asserted, moreover, the federal responsi-
bility to stabilize the economy and maintain full employment levels and 
recognized compensatory spending as a tool to do so. The principle of a 
“right to employment”—i.e., guaranteeing the right to employment for 
all those seeking work—emerged as the most controversial factor in the 
postwar economic policy debates. The proposed legislation offered a 
fundamental change in economic policy because its reference point was 
the working person rather than the business community.
DEBATE WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Although previous studies have assumed that the administration was 
not particularly involved in the progress of the full employment bill, it is 
evident that some senators made a point of including the administration. 
When senators sought the judgments of economists in the executive 
branch, the discussions on full employment broadened well beyond the 
ad hoc study group. Almost every department and agency speculated on 
how S. 380 might affect their operations, and they frequently engaged 
in lively debates on how best to implement S. 380.
One of the most important of these debates occurred when Murray 
asked about the possibility of developing a comprehensive system of 
estimating future expenditures. This particular debate within the exec-
utive	 branch	 boiled	 down	 to	 two	 themes.	 The	 official	 position	 was	
expressed in the Bureau of the Budget memorandum sent to Murray, 
but	 it	was	 the	unofficial	 response	 that	proved	 to	be	more	 influential.	
The debate surrounding this memorandum uncovered a fundamental 
difference of opinion within the administration over the feasibility of 
economic forecasting.
The Bureau of the Budget responded to Murray with a 16-page staff 
memorandum titled “The Problem of Estimating Future Expenditures 
by Consumers, Business, and State and Local Governments.” This 
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document reviewed all of the available sources of economic data that 
were necessitated by the full employment bill. The report was matter-
of-fact and concluded, “In spite of the sparsity of direct forecasts of 
individual expenditure items of consumers, business, and government, 
projections of the totals by major groupings are being made on the basis 
of current trends and past relationships. These projections are useful 
as approximations of general orders of magnitude. But a considerable 
improvement of statistical information is needed if these projections are 
to become reliable with regard to the details” (Colm 1945). The report 
did not advocate the proposed legislation, nor did it present economic 
forecasting as a panacea.
The	interpretation	that	countered	the	official	response	of	the	execu-
tive branch was one of optimism toward economic forecasting and advo-
cacy of full employment. Walter Salant, head economist at the Research 
Division	of	the	Office	of	Price	Administration,	as	well	as	a	study	group	
participant, most succinctly articulated this position. While a graduate 
student in economics, Salant had spent a year at Harvard studying with 
Hansen and became a sophisticated exponent of Keynesian economics. 
Salant	confided	to	Bertram	Gross,	the	Senate	staff	person	responsible	
for drafting S. 380, that the Bureau of the Budget response was too cau-
tious because it emphasized the limitations rather than the possibilities 
of economic forecasting. Salant pointed out that economists had made 
great strides in statistics in the previous decade and had discovered 
certain stable relationships and theoretic principles that increased the 
understanding of economic relationships.9
As one might expect, Gross preferred Salant’s approach and indi-
cated to Gerhard Colm that he wanted a memorandum from Salant’s 
perspective that addressed possible objections to the feasibility of eco-
nomic forecasting. Colm and J. Weldon Jones knew that Bureau of the 
Budget director Harold Smith would never sign a memo such as Salant 
had written. Instead, they suggested that Gross incorporate Salant’s 
ideas into a memorandum written under the auspices of the Senate com-
mittee and use the Bureau of the Budget report as background material.10
Senator Wagner, chairman of the Committee on Currency and 
Banking and of the Subcommittee on Full Employment, expanded the 
discussants well beyond the postwar employment study group when he 
sent	a	letter	to	approximately	40	federal	agencies	and	offices	request-
ing preliminary comments on four questions. To each agency, he asked 
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what the effect of full employment after the war would be on the sec-
tors of the economy with which that agency was concerned. He queried 
each agency about the role it would play if S. 380 were enacted. Wagner 
also wanted to know what assumptions, if any, the agency had made 
about postwar levels of the GNP, the national income, and employ-
ment. Finally, the senator solicited any improvements in S. 380 that the 
agency might have to offer.11
The Bureau of the Budget, no doubt, wished to avoid respond-
ing to Wagner with divided opinions like those that had reached Sen. 
Murray just a few weeks earlier. Thus, the Bureau of the Budget infor-
mally called a meeting of interested parties from all of the pertinent 
agencies of the federal government. Those persons that attended rep-
resented the following: the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 
Interior,	Labor,	Treasury,	and	State,	as	well	as	the	Office	of	Economic	
Stabilization, Federal Loan Agency, Federal Reserve Board, Federal 
Security Agency, Federal Works Agency, National Housing Agency, 
Office	of	Price	Administration,	War	Department,	War	Manpower	Com-
mission,	Office	of	War	Mobilization	and	Reconversion,	and	War	Pro-
ductions Board.12
At the outset of this meeting, it became clear that many important 
people within the administration were poorly informed about the pro-
gress that had been made by the executive branch’s postwar employ-
ment study group on formulating a full employment policy. Many of the 
issues that the postwar employment study group had addressed months 
before were being rehashed again by this larger set of interested parties. 
The participants discussed such topics as the problems with statistics 
and what agency would be the focal point for administering the full 
employment proposal. Wilbur Cohen questioned whether the Roosevelt 
administration supported this bill or whether it recommended an alter-
native approach. Jones and Colm both assured Cohen that the adminis-
tration had given clear indications of support.
Several people present questioned the idea that the replies to Sena-
tor Wagner should be coordinated. They maintained that the Senate 
wanted as much information as it could get from these agencies and that 
the usefulness of the information would depend on its diversity. Others 
feared that a plethora of different responses would create the worst pos-
sible impression and provide ammunition for those opposed to the bill. 
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The participants were also undecided as to whether their responses 
should discuss programs the agencies were already administering that 
would relate to full employment or whether they should discuss poten-
tial programs of their agencies that would result from passage of the 
bill. Colm emphasized that no one had suggested that a “canned” letter 
be used for the reply, but that the agencies could write better responses 
if they had an idea of how the other agencies were responding. Meeting 
chairman Jones closed the session by offering the bureau’s assistance to 
any agency that might need it.
Of all the questions that S. 380 raised, the organizational con-
trol issue provoked the sharpest difference of opinion. When George 
Graham, a staff member under Bureau of the Budget Director Smith, 
circulated a memorandum on the mechanics of administering the policy 
laid out in S. 380, he discovered that there was not even a consensus 
within the Bureau of the Budget. Graham questioned what the functions 
of the central administering agency would be and what mechanisms 
could be used to meet the objectives of the full employment bill.13 In 
answering Graham’s questions, a division of opinion emerged.
Should full employment policy be administered by the Bureau of 
the Budget or by a specially designated agency? V.O. Key argued that 
the bureau would have to be radically strengthened and reorganized if 
it assumed responsibility for full employment.14 Key also observed that 
“the administration of a new function can often be best undertaken by 
the creation of a new organization . . . (otherwise) we would run the 
danger	of	molding	the	job	to	fit	our	past	habits	and	the	program	might	
turn out to be just about what we have been doing all along.” Colm 
highlighted	the	advantages	of	a	new	agency,	specifically	that	its	creation	
would dramatize the importance of full employment and that it might 
obtain the authority which the bureau lacked to iron out cabinet-level 
differences. Colm pointed out that the bureau was an unpopular agency 
with a conservative reputation, largely because it acted as a watchdog 
to keep down expenditures.15
This difference of opinion stayed within the administration, and all 
who participated in Graham’s circular, including Colm, ultimately went 
on record that the bureau should be vested with the responsibility of 
full employment policy. Arthur Smithies summarized their views, say-
ing	that	the	fiscal	policy	entailed	by	the	full	employment	bill	probably	
would not bring major additional tasks to the bureau because it was 
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already involved in this same kind of estimation and planning.16 It was 
becoming clear, nonetheless, that the Bureau of the Budget, as it was 
then	configured,	was	not	well-suited	to	manage	a	national	program	for	
full employment. 
Senate staff did not appear to have concerns regarding the Bureau 
of the Budget’s ability to implement S. 380. Samuel Thompson, a staff 
member	for	the	Banking	and	Currency	Committee,	expressed	a	definite	
preference for the bureau to act as the hub of the administration’s prep-
aration. When Gross and Thompson began to pull materials together 
for the hearings, they met with Jones, Bean, Colm, and William Leon-
ard, all of the Bureau of the Budget. They formed teams of two—one 
from the committee, one from the bureau—to draft letters requesting 
information from the appropriate government agencies.17 The commit-
tee consequently published a summary of the responses of the various 
agencies. This collaborative effort allowed the bureau to play a pivotal 
role in the legislative development of S. 380.
 The death of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in April of 1945 
leveled both a psychological and a strategic blow to the efforts for a 
full employment policy. Roosevelt’s eloquent emphasis of the right to 
employment during his Economic Bill of Rights speech in 1944 had set 
the bar high for the federal role in employment stimulation. Roosevelt, 
however, had not endorsed full employment legislation, nor had he been 
particularly engaged in the development of the policy. Consequently, 
his death had little effect on the day-to-day work the administration did 
in developing the full employment bill. 
In contrast to Roosevelt, his former vice president, Henry Wallace, 
had played a much more visible role as a champion of full employment. 
Wallace often made it a central theme of his wartime speeches and 
was	the	first	prominent	member	of	the	cabinet	to	endorse	full	employ-
ment legislation (Markowitz 1973, pp. 135–146). Many advocates of 
full employment were disappointed that Senator Truman had replaced 
Wallace as Roosevelt’s vice president and was assuming the presidency 
upon Roosevelt’s death.
Regardless of liberals’ qualms about President Truman’s convic-
tions and abilities, he brought a promising record on full employment 
to the presidency. Truman had served as federal reemployment director 
for Missouri during the early years of the Depression. He established 
himself	in	the	field	of	planning,	organizing	the	Regional	Planning	Asso-
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ciation of Greater Kansas City, and eventually became a director of the 
National Conference of City Planning (Hamby 1973, pp. 41–43). As 
a senator he consistently supported New Deal legislation and cospon-
sored bills for postwar economic planning and full employment. Just 
before leaving the Senate, he had signed onto the 1944 Year-End Report 
of the War Contracts Subcommittee that unveiled the original proposal 
for the full employment bill.18
Some were concerned that confusion might create discord on full 
employment during the presidential transition. Staff from the bureau 
and	from	the	Office	of	War	Mobilization	and	Reconversion	expressed	
a desire to brief Truman on the background work done regarding full 
employment so he could issue presidential guidance. These staffers were 
particularly worried about coordinating the testimonies of the various 
administration	officials	invited	to	participate	in	the	Senate	hearings.19
As a result, Bureau of the Budget Director Smith had a long talk 
with Commerce Secretary Wallace. Though Wallace was a champion 
of full employment and Smith was more cautious in his embrace of 
the concept, they shared the view that a “confusion of tongues” would 
result if there was not some degree of coordination. Wallace agreed to 
take the lead in talking to the president and said he would recommend 
that Truman appoint a cabinet-level committee to handle the situation.
LIBERAL GROUPS MOBILIzE FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT
Many in the print media were presenting a critical view of full 
employment to the American public, and to counteract this, liberal inter-
est groups began a large-scale information campaign advocating full 
employment. Several liberal interest groups loosely coalesced around 
a strategy to mobilize support by explaining full employment in terms 
that were simple, straightforward, and consistent with a free economy. 
These interest groups represented rather diverse sets of people, includ-
ing small-scale farmers, blue-collar workers, middle-class intellectuals, 
racial minorities, and women.
 The National Farmers Union had a seminal role in the development 
of legislation for full employment. Of the major liberal organizations of 
the day, the NFU was the oldest, having been founded in Point, Texas, 
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in 1902. Unlike its conservative counterparts in the agricultural com-
munity, the National Grange and the American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion, the NFU was grounded in a neopopulist ideology that celebrated 
the small family farmer and found most of its membership in the Rocky 
Mountain and Plains states. Its energetic president, James G. Patton, 
articulated the thinking that rural prosperity was dependent on a healthy 
urban	economy	because	urban	workers	would	pass	on	the	benefits	of	
their wages through increased consumption of agricultural products. A 
farm worker as a youth, Patton had worked his way through college 
and was only 38 years old when he was elected president of the NFU in 
1940. Working closely with the American Federation of Labor (AFL) as 
well as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), he articulated a 
vision of a union of the producing classes (Flamm 1994; Hamby 1973, 
pp. 33–34; Time 1942).
Patton, along with his NFU colleague Russell Smith, was an early 
advocate of some kind of a full employment policy, notably the Kilgore-
Truman-Murray bill for postwar economic planning proposed in 1944. 
They were involved from the outset in the nuts and bolts of drafting leg-
islation for full employment, and they followed through, both by lobby-
ing congressional leaders and by mobilizing their members to support 
full employment (Bailey 1964, pp. 21–25, 37–60).
In	addition	to	their	pragmatic	efforts,	they	bore	a	significant	sym-
bolic role. They were, in many ways, the contemporary manifestation 
of Jefferson’s agrarian vision as well as the spirit of liberal populism. 
Their merger of rural and urban working people under the banner of a 
full employment economy created potent imagery that was distinctively 
American. This basis of support for full employment was an effective 
shield against subsequent charges of socialism and communism.
Although not involved in drafting the policy, the Union for Dem-
ocratic Action (UDA) almost immediately seized upon the issue of 
full employment and became a lead group in mobilizing support. In 
1944, the UDA was the smallest and weakest of the major liberal orga-
nizations.20 Despite its prestigious leaders, James Loeb and Reinhold 
Niebuhr, and having Eleanor Roosevelt on its membership rolls, the 
UDA	had	a	difficult	time	making	ends	meet.	Its	strong	anticommunist	
stance and its frequent contributions to the New Republic kept it at the 
liberal fore; however, it was the full employment debate that breathed 
life into the UDA (Hamby 1973, pp. 36–37).
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The UDA constructed an impressive effort for that time to mobilize 
support for full employment. Foremost, it mounted a public information 
campaign to counter the opposition of most local newspapers to full 
employment. It disseminated material—largely written by Paul Sifton, 
who was on loan from the NFU—by means of a mailing list of an esti-
mated 10,000 to 15,000 “public opinion formers”—groups that Stephen 
Bailey	identified	as	union	locals,	liberal	associations,	farm	groups,	busi-
ness groups, professional societies, and newspaper columnists (Bailey 
1964, pp. 83–84).
In	March	 of	 1945,	 the	UDA	 compiled	 an	 official	 “Full	 Employ-
ment Kit” which encouraged people to write their senators and con-
gressmen and talk to their friends. The reoccurring emphasis of the kit 
was to stimulate informed discussions of full employment. The readers 
were advised to talk about the bill at every opportunity, both informally 
and within the context of organizations to which they belonged. The 
UDA even offered to help arrange panels of senators and congressmen 
to come to meetings on full employment and to provide other kinds of 
follow-up support to local groups interested in full employment. The 
kit was mailed to all individuals and groups on the UDA’s mailing list, 
a list two to three times the organization’s estimated membership of 
4,000 people (Bailey 1964, pp. 83–85).
Most of the major labor unions also engaged in educating their 
membership on full employment and in advocating its enactment into 
public policy. In general, organized labor did not see full employment 
as a panacea nor a single solution, but as an integral part of a compre-
hensive legislative program. While the various unions differed on many 
components of such a comprehensive program, they did agree on full 
employment.
The CIO was the dominant group representing organized labor that 
was pushing for full employment. The CIO leadership recommended 
that	 each	 of	 its	 affiliates	 review	 the	 problems	 of	 unemployment	 so	
that their analyses could be incorporated into statements supporting 
full employment. In the summer of 1945, the C.I.O. News featured 
articles demonstrating the need for a full employment program. The 
CIO Political Action Committee, moreover, printed a pamphlet, “The 
Answer is FULL EMPLOYMENT,” that it disseminated during August 
of that year, the month the House held hearings on full employment. 
Within weeks after the war against Japan had ended, the CIO organized 
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marches in Washington, D.C. Hundreds of workers carrying signs say-
ing “Full Employment,” “Fair Employment,” and “Jobs for All” dem-
onstrated during the period in which the Senate was debating and voting 
on the full employment bill (Bailey 1964, pp. 93–94; Time 1945c).
AFL President William Green came out in favor of a federal pro-
gram for full employment and promised to mobilize AFL membership 
across the country on behalf of legislation. The AFL’s American Feder-
ationist printed editorials advocating full employment legislation as the 
Senate and House were considering the bill in the summer of 1945. The 
AFL was not as engaged in the advocacy for full employment in Con-
gress as some of the other labor groups, reportedly because of tensions 
with the CIO on the legislative agenda. Nevertheless, the AFL played a 
very important function because it distributed educational information 
on full employment legislation to all of its members—a number the 
organization estimated at six million (Bailey 1964, pp. 85–87).21
The importance of the full employment bill to organized labor was 
illustrated by a letter that Milo Lathrop, educational director of the 
United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, wrote to 
Senator Wagner. Lathrop stated that the union was gearing up the entire 
educational program to inform its members and the community about 
the legislation. At least some of the fruits of Lathrop’s work were not 
missed by Wagner, who received numerous letters supporting the bill 
from	local	affiliates	of	the	Electrical,	Radio,	and	Machine	Workers	of	
America.22
Many other unions busily supported a program for full employ-
ment, including the United Mine Workers, the United Auto Workers, 
the National Women’s Trade Union League, and the Railroad Brother-
hoods. Since the unions had existing structures, regular meetings, and 
newsletters, their potential to arouse public support for full employment 
was considerable. Victor Riesel might have been speculating when he 
wrote that labor publications reached 15 million American families in 
1945, but he was sound in emphasizing the important function of these 
labor papers (Riesel 1946).23 Union locals, furthermore, had among 
their members individuals who were talented in the arts of persuasion 
and organization.
National women’s organizations were involved in the public edu-
cation campaign for full employment as well. For example, both the 
Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) and the National 
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Council of Jewish Women actively disseminated information to their 
members and featured full employment in their publications. The Asso-
ciation of American University Women embarked on a letter-writing 
campaign. The National Council of Negro Women, particularly their 
leader Mary McLeod Bethune, voiced support for a strong full employ-
ment policy (Bailey 1964, p. 87).24
In addition to the National Council of Negro Women, other Afri-
can American organizations engaged in the public education campaign 
for full employment. Many African American groups had long been 
engaged in the struggle against employment discrimination, so they 
were already mobilized around employment issues.25 The National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) mailed 
reports on full employment to its 700 chapters and distributed informa-
tion to an estimated 500,000 people on its mailing list. The National 
Urban League also spoke out on behalf of a federal program for full 
employment (Bailey 1964, p. 87).26
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY 
MOVES ON S. 380
The Full Employment Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency had intended to consider full employment at a 
rather leisurely pace, with hearings beginning at the end of July and 
resuming after the scheduled August-to-October adjournment. How-
ever, the dramatic end of the war with Japan on August 14, 1945, altered 
plans. In a radio address two days later, President Truman labeled full 
employment “must” legislation and put pressure on Congress to act 
expeditiously (Truman 1961a). As a result of Truman’s intervention, the 
subcommittee accelerated its schedule on full employment. The long-
standing tradition of the August recess gave way to the goal of complet-
ing the Senate hearings on the full employment bill by Labor Day.
Concurrently with Truman’s speech and the hearings on S. 380, the 
letter-writing campaign that the liberal and labor groups had organized 
reached its zenith. Senator Wagner, for example, received dozens of let-
ters during this period, from New York to Alaska. These letters urging 
his leadership in enacting the full employment bill came mostly from 
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local unions but also from chapters of the Parent-Teacher Association 
(PTA) and various religious and neighborhood organizations.
A few days before the hearings on S. 380 began, four Republican 
senators joined their liberal colleagues in endorsing the proposal. The 
four senators were George Aiken of Vermont, William Langer of North 
Dakota, Wayne Morse of Oregon, and Charles Tobey of New Hamp-
shire.27 Although the Republican standard-bearer in 1944, New York 
governor Thomas Dewey, had advocated the principle of full employ-
ment, he never supported the right-to-employment idea. The Republican 
platform did not include a full employment proposal. Since Keynesian 
economic	policy	was	 incongruous	with	 the	fiscally	 conservative	 ide-
ology of the Republican Party, the action of these four senators was 
noteworthy and served as a harbinger of subsequent Senate action on 
the bill.
The Full Employment Subcommittee conducted extensive hearings 
from July 30 to September 1, 1945, with Wagner as chair. Other mem-
bers consisted of Senators George Radcliffe (D-MD), Abe Murdock 
(D-UT), Glen Taylor (D-ID), J. William Fulbright (D-AR), Hugh 
Mitchell (D-WA), Charles Tobey (R-NH), Robert Taft (R-OH), C. 
Douglass Buck (R-DE), and Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA).28 Almost 70 
individuals	representing	a	diversity	of	organizations	testified,	and	just	
as many groups or persons submitted statements for the record.
Mark Sullivan, a columnist with the Washington Post, commented 
on the unusual length of the hearings on the full employment bill and 
pointedly added that the need for a thorough discussion was apparent. 
Sullivan was among those print journalists who questioned the bill, not 
because he opposed the concepts (so he said), but because he doubted 
whether it could possibly achieve its objectives (Sullivan 1945). 
Sullivan was somewhat unique among journalists in that he was not 
openly hostile to the bill.
In contrast, Ralph Robey, chief economist at the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers, wrote a four-part series for Newsweek criticizing 
the full employment bill as the hearings began. Robey conceded that 
the government spending for welfare relief during the Great Depression 
was a proper use of taxpayers’ money because there was no alternative 
relief for the unemployed; however, he argued that the full employment 
bill embodied government spending gone awry because it would trig-
ger spending whenever bureaucrats anticipate a rise in unemployment, 
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regardless of whether that unemployment ever were to occur. Robey 
was convinced that the spending would rise unnecessarily and sum-
marized the full employment bill as “a clever trick designed just to fool 
you” (Robey 1945a, p. 66). In essence Robey argued that a federally 
funded dole was an acceptable response to unemployment, but that fed-
erally stimulated jobs were not.
Views such as Robey’s did not prevail during the series of hearings. 
Spokespersons from veterans groups, civil rights groups, unions, social 
welfare agencies, religious organizations, educational associations, and 
academia voiced support of the principles embodied in S. 380. Two 
major farm groups paired off, with the National Farmers Union advo-
cating for and the National Grange opposing the bill. Representatives 
from	 the	 business	 community	 reflected	 mixed	 attitudes	 toward	 full	
employment: a few were strong adversaries; some acknowledged posi-
tive features; most favored S. 380. The 10 spokespersons from the Tru-
man administration presented a rather solid front in support of the bill 
and an air of optimism that they were ready to handle the job of carrying 
it out (U.S. Congress 1945b).
Several themes emerged from the varied perspectives that the sup-
porters brought to the hearings. One was a fear that unemployment 
would resume after the war if the legislation was not enacted. This need 
for S. 380 was backed up by statements of overwhelming public sup-
port. Advocates asserted that S. 380 would help workers, farmers, and 
businessmen, especially small businessmen. Social workers, religious 
leaders and educators professed that many of society’s problems would 
be alleviated if America were fully employed. Finally, they argued that 
it was the responsibility of the federal government to institute an eco-
nomic program of full employment (U.S. Congress 1945b).
During these hearings it was rare to hear voices of opposition to 
S. 380, and usually these voices offered a simplistic reaction to the 
bill. The New York Chamber of Commerce opined, “Depressions are 
the price we pay for freedom.”29 Such a statement, although sincerely 
offered by opponents to the bill, inspired few to join the ranks of the 
opposition. 
A more sophisticated argument against the full employment bill did 
appear in a letter that Rufus Tucker, chief economist at General Motors, 
sent Wagner. Tucker feared that if the government promised to pro-
vide work for all citizens, the taxpayers might end up paying money 
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irrespective of the value of the work performed. He reasoned as fol-
lows: “The taxpayers collectively may have a moral obligation to keep 
any citizen from starvation or excessive suffering, but it may frequently 
happen	that	the	obligation	can	more	adequately	and	cheaply	be	fulfilled	
in other ways than by providing jobs.”30 Tucker, much like Robey, was 
among those who thought it more cost-effective to provide public wel-
fare assistance than to provide jobs.
That	 few	people	 formally	 testified	 against	 S.	 380	was	 somewhat	
surprising because opponents had been invited to speak. Senator Taft, 
the ranking Republican, had secured several opposition witnesses, but 
their voices seemed faint in contrast to the bill’s supporters. Its spon-
sors speculated that this reluctance of their adversaries to come for-
ward was a result of their strategy to paint the opposition as a small and 
selfish	minority	who	did	not	want	a	stable,	growing	economy.	Senator	
Murray	spoke	of	 the	critics	of	full	employment	as	wanting	a	floating	
pool of unemployed to keep wages down and maintain discipline over 
labor. Anyone who had reservations about S. 380 presumably risked 
being portrayed as favoring unemployment (Bailey 1964, pp. 105–107; 
U.S. Congress 1945b, pp. 16–17). Such concerns, however, hardly had 
stopped others from expressing opposition to full employment in the 
media. More likely, opponents of the legislation were not taking the 
hearings seriously. Indeed, it was August, a time when few people who 
had a choice stayed in Washington.
Later, Newsweek called the hearings of the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee “Selling FE” and credited Wagner and Murray, 
among others, with maneuvering “one of the neatest jobs of legislative 
stage setting in more than a decade.” The magazine also observed that 
the opposition to the full employment bill was disorganized and ineffec-
tive. It seemed, according to Newsweek’s sources, that the opponents of 
the full employment bill expected the conservative Democrats aligned 
with Sen. Harry Byrd of Virginia to join forces with the Republicans to 
stop the bill (Newsweek 1945a).31
Cosponsors of the bill only acquiesced on one point during the hear-
ings: the exclusion of full-time housekeepers. When Senator Murray 
presented his case for S. 380, Senator Murdock questioned him about 
the exemption from the law for persons with full-time housekeeping 
responsibilities. Essentially, Murdock argued that everyone should have 
the same opportunities. Murray hedged slightly, saying he did not want 
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to force housewives out of the home. Over the course of the exchange, 
however, Murray agreed that women should have the same employ-
ment opportunities as men. Subsequently, the committee concurred and 
eliminated this exemption from the bill (Time 1945a; U.S. Congress 
1945b, pp. 16–17).
When the subcommittee met to act on the legislation following the 
hearings, Taft, Radcliffe, Buck, Hickenlooper, and Fulbright offered 
amendments to dilute the provisions of the bill. These senators agreed 
that some sort of economic planning was good, but objected to the term 
“full employment,” to the guarantee of a “right to employment,” and to 
the ultimate reliance on federal expenditure and investment. Wagner, 
Taylor, Mitchell, Murdock, and Tobey held the line, and the resulting tie 
vote insured that the original language was reported from the subcom-
mittee (Bailey 1964, p. 113; Congressional Quarterly 1945).
The minority continued to press its case when the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency met to consider S. 380. Taft, Radcliffe, Buck, 
and Hickenlooper were joined by John Thomas (R-ID), Hugh Butler 
(R-NE), and Arthur Capper (R-KS) in pushing for substantial amend-
ments. Carter Glass (D-VA), Alben Barkley (D-KY), Ernest McFarland 
(D-AZ), and Sheridan Downey (D-CA) lined up with the subcommittee 
members who wanted the legislation approved without changes. Nine 
amendments were decided in close, critical votes: 9-9, 8-10, 8-11, 7-12, 
9-10, 10-9, 8-11, 9-10, and 8-11. Two Democrats, William Fulbright 
and E. P. Carville (NV), played the pivotal roles (Bailey 1964, p. 113; 
Congressional Quarterly 1945).
The only amendment that passed sought to soften the right-to-
employment clause by replacing the phrase “the right to useful, remu-
nerative, regular and full-time employment.” The new phrase, offered 
by Fulbright, became “entitled to an opportunity for useful, remunera-
tive, regular and full-time employment.” The committee then defeated 
a motion by Radcliffe to report the bill without a favorable recom-
mendation by an 8-11 vote. Murdock’s motion to favorably report out 
S. 380 passed by a vote of 13-7. The bill emerged with only its right-
to-employment clause weakened (Bailey 1964, pp. 115–116; Congres-
sional Quarterly 1945).
Meanwhile, celebrations of Labor Day across the United States fea-
tured signs labeled “Full Employment” and “Jobs for All.” Workers and 
their families paraded in the streets during the Labor Day festivities, 
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which were then commonplace in cities and towns across America. At 
least one national publication speculated that the fear of a resumption 
of unemployment when veterans returned home clouded the parades 
(Time 1945c).
DEBATE ON THE SENATE FLOOR  
On	September	24,	1945,	the	Senate	began	floor	debate	on	the	full	
employment bill. Wagner opened the debate in support of the bill by pro-
viding an overview of the bill’s main elements. Wagner also addressed 
what	he	identified	as	the	three	main	arguments	against	the	legislation.	
First, to those who maintained that full employment cannot be achieved 
in a free enterprise system, Wagner asserted, “No hostile foreign agent 
could do more to wreck the fabric of our society than to tell our people 
that unemployment is the price we pay for freedom.” Second, Wag-
ner spoke of those who feared that full employment would stimulate 
inflation,	giving	too	much	power	to	organized	labor	and	undermining	
individual work initiative. To them, Wagner countered, “Fear of unem-
ployment	and	depression	is	one	of	the	fundamental	causes	of	inflation.”	
He further argued, “The desire for betterment is the driving force in our 
free enterprise system. Nothing can stultify initiative more than a lack 
of opportunity.” Finally, Wagner challenged the view that government-
provided relief (i.e., public assistance) was cheaper than full employ-
ment, saying that critics holding such a view “take depression[s] for 
granted. They have no faith in the vitality of our free-enterprise system” 
(Congressional Record 1945b, p. 8957).
Murray followed with an address that highlighted how the bill 
would foster business, particularly small businesses. Referring to his 
years as the chairman of the Committee on Small Business, Murray 
said, “I have found that, above all, the one thing that small business 
needs in America is customers” (p. 8963). He maintained that the full 
employment bill would increase the purchasing power of consumers, 
which	in	turn	would	fuel	the	high-volume	market	that	benefits	business. 
Joseph O’Mahoney presented the economic overview, using graphs 
and charts to advocate S. 380. The leading Republican sponsor, Wayne 
Morse, concluded this quartet of speeches that formally endorsed the 
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bill	on	the	final	day	of	the	Senate	debate.	Amidst	these	orchestrated	pre-
sentations, a lively and sometimes bitter debate ensued over four days 
(Congressional Record 1945b, pp. 8954–9146). 
Despite the Committee on Banking and Currency’s acceptance 
of the Fulbright amendment that replaced the “right to employment” 
language with the phrase “entitled to an opportunity for useful, remu-
nerative, regular and full-time employment,” some senators warned 
of workers abandoning less desirable jobs to demand better positions. 
Burton K. Wheeler (D-MT) spoke of workers leaving the farm because 
“the Government . . . owes us a job at a remuneration such as we think 
we ought to get.” He also spoke of “the housewife . . . who ought to be 
at home taking care of her children” as among those who should not 
be guaranteed employment (p. 9060). In contrast to those who feared 
that people would demand better jobs, Sen. Kenneth Wherry (R-NE) 
expressed the view that some people, presumably striking union work-
ers, did not want to work. “Is there any way to avert unemployment,” 
Wherry asked, “if we cannot get labor back to work?” (p. 9053).32  
 Although the proponents of the legislation argued as if all of their 
opponents	considered	economic	depressions	natural	fluctuations	in	the	
business cycle that should be endured, and as if their opponents also 
considered a certain number of unemployed workers necessary to keep 
wages from rising, these were not the most meaningful critiques of the 
bill.	The	critical	points	of	contention	centered	on	issues	of	deficit	spend-
ing for public works and taxation to balance the budget (Congressional 
Record 1945b, p. 8958). Senator Taft, for example, asserted, 
I suggest that public spending outside of public works is not help-
ful in curing a depression. There are many better methods which 
can be used. There is no panacea to which we may resort . . . If 
there should be any increase in employment the increase would be 
merely temporary in character. The spending of public money for 
public	works	is	one	remedy,	but	to	say	that	it	is	the	final	solution	of	
our	difficulties	is	only	to	lay	down	for	this	country	a	policy	which	
will lead to destruction. (p. 9029)  
Hickenlooper echoed Taft’s concern about resorting to public fund-
ing when he remonstrated that “the proponents of the bill are now pro-
posing	to	embark	on	a	program	of	unlimited	financing,	without	giving	
one single thought, in the provisions of this bill, to where the money is 
coming from” (p. 9036). Colorado senator Eugene Millikin33 warned, 
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We would destroy our economy by relying on the printing presses 
as the source of our wealth and the panacea of our troubles. That is 
what the Senator would have us do, because he has resisted every 
effort to bring the objective of his bill into relation with a balanced 
budget or into relation with the other essentials to good, sound 
government . . . This country now has a debt of $300,000,000,000 
and	an	annual	deficit	of	$50,000,000,000.	Let	us	govern	ourselves	
accordingly, and at the same time remember where the wealth of 
the country is. (Congressional Record 1945b, p. 9033) 
It was O’Mahoney who responded to these critiques, largely by 
relying on his familiarity with economic statistical analysis (pp. 9048–
9062). In regards to taxation, the senator from Wyoming cited tax rev-
enue data and presented graphic depictions of federal receipts by tax 
bracket to illustrate that full employment would increase tax revenues. 
There	would	be	no	need	to	raise	taxes	to	pay	down	the	deficit	if	people	
were gainfully employed. When he emphasized that “in order to sup-
port our economy we must raise the standard of living of those at the 
bottom of the scale,” the Congressional Record (1945b, p. 9062) noted 
that there was applause from the galleries. 
O’Mahoney additionally offered a rather nuanced analysis of the 
role federal government might play in job creation and the promotion 
of small business through tax policy:
It goes to the creation of an atmosphere in which the investment of 
private capital may be encouraged. I believe it is based primarily 
upon a system of incentive taxation, taxation that will stimulate 
the owner of private capital to put his money into new enterprises. 
That is lacking now because of many factors of our taxation sys-
tem which I do not desire to go into now. But the second method 
of preserving and stimulating free enterprise would be to develop 
such a policy toward monopoly or concentrated power as to stake 
out a region in which little business would be free from suppres-
sion by the powers of concentrated economy. (p. 9051)
While O’Mahoney was willing to reduce the highest tax brackets, 
he	advocated	tax	policies	aimed	at	curbing	monopolies	and	benefiting	
small businesses. Most importantly, he appreciated the role that federal 
tax policy might have in job creation (pp. 9053–9054).34
O’Mahoney was also the bill sponsor who addressed the concerns of 
deficit	spending	on	public	works.	He	used	Hoover	Dam—then	known	
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as Boulder Dam—at that time the nation’s largest producer of hydro-
electric power as well as one of the largest man-made structures in the 
world, to illustrate the value of federal construction projects (Congres-
sional Record 1945b, p. 9056): 
I think of the building of Boulder Dam, authorized by the Congress 
under the Hoover administration. I think of the billions of dollars 
which were expended from the Federal Treasury in the construc-
tion of that dam. Every penny of that expenditure has been justi-
fied,	because	it	produced	business.	It	created	income,	not	only	for	
the people who were employed upon the project, but for those who 
supplied materials and commodities in connection with its con-
struction. It provided income for cities and States. It was in every 
sense of the word an expenditure which produced revenue. 
The	Senate	floor	debate	prompted	five	major	proposed	amendments	
and six minor voice votes. Radcliffe and Taft offered an amendment to 
provide that there would be no government investment except as con-
sistent with other obligations and except for accelerated public works. 
Carl Hatch (D-NM) substituted, in place of the Radcliffe-Taft amend-
ment, a provision that government investment and expenditure must be 
consistent with other obligations and considerations of national policy 
to achieve full employment. Most sponsors of S. 380 agreed with the 
compromise, and it passed by a voice vote. The Senate also adopted by 
division an amendment by Eugene Millikin (R-CO) that inserted the 
language of the Hatch amendment uniformly throughout the bill (Con-
gressional Record 1945b, p. 9125). 
Senator Taft offered an amendment that strove to prevent an increase 
in the national debt by requiring that a taxation program over a period 
of years must accompany the program of investment and expenditure. 
He won the approval of the bill’s sponsors when he added the phrase 
“without interfering with the goal of full employment.” The Taft amend-
ment passed unanimously, 82-0 (Congressional Record 1945b, p. 9144).
Hickenlooper continued the struggles he had waged in the subcom-
mittee and committee meetings. He proposed two amendments to rec-
tify what conservatives deemed the major problem with S. 380: that it 
interfered with and inhibited the free enterprise system. His amendment 
that would have prohibited government competition with free enterprise 
lost 30-49. The Senate also rejected (by a vote of 35-44) his amendment 
that government avoid unnecessary restrictions on industry. In oppos-
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
92   Wasem
ing the amendments, Senator O’Mahoney stated, “Great care has been 
exercised in drafting the bill, to make it clear that its primary purpose is 
to make the free enterprise system work” (p. 9146). Those who spoke 
against the Hickenlooper amendments rejected the premise that S. 380 
restricted free enterprise and stated that the amendments confused and 
diluted the bill (Congressional Record 1945b, pp. 9145–9151).
The	final	vote	on	the	full	employment	bill	was	a	surprising	71-10	
(p. 9153). Given the close margins in the Full Employment Subcom-
mittee and the Banking and Currency Committee, this outcome was 
impressive. The amendment that provided for increased taxes over a 
period of years to recoup any excess federal investment and expendi-
ture necessary to maintain full employment levels was key to the broad 
support	for	final	passage.	That	revision	gave	some	reassurance	to	fiscal	
conservatives who feared there would be negative repercussions from 
the	bill—namely	deficit	spending.
Gaining the support of prominent conservative Republicans like 
Taft was particularly noteworthy. Earlier, Taft had called the NRPB 
report on full employment “nonsense” and cited Henry Wallace’s advo-
cacy	of	full	employment	as	the	chief	reason	he	opposed	the	confirma-
tion of Wallace as secretary of commerce. Taft also had been critical 
of the full employment language in the Kilgore-Murray-Truman bill.35 
Taft biographer James T. Patterson acknowledged, “Taft upset right-
wing businessmen by agreeing that the federal government must play 
an important role in stabilizing business cycles and by admitting the 
need for compensatory spending under certain adverse conditions” 
(Patterson 1972, pp. 303–304).
As passed by the Senate, S. 380 addressed each of the four key ele-
ments	identified	at	the	start	of	this	book.	First	and	foremost,	it	would	have	
given the federal government the responsibility to ensure full employment 
when the private sector falls short, primarily through compensatory spend-
ing and other Keynesian tools. Second, to implement the responsibility, 
the president would have been required to submit a National Production 
and Employment Budget (shortened to National Budget) annually, and 
the Congress would have been required to establish a Joint Committee on 
the National Budget. Thus, the third element would have come about—
the concept of national economic planning would have been integrated 
with the proposed administrative and legislative structures to ensure full 
employment. The right to employment, the fourth key element, became 
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an opportunity for useful, remunerative employment. Most of the origi-
nal Senate sponsors stated that the bill remained strong, but they main-
tained that they had compromised as much as possible without under-
mining the objectives of the bill. It was clear they wanted to preempt any 
further tampering with the bill by the House (Bailey 1964, pp. 125–127; 
Congressional Record 1945b, pp. 9114–9153).
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Opponents Take Aim in the House
Observers of Congress frequently conclude that it is easier to 
obstruct bills than it is to enact legislation. Those opposed to a bill—
even when they hold a minority opinion—can draw on an assortment 
of maneuvers that may potentially block action on a bill. When those 
opposed to a bill happen to include the chair and ranking minority 
member of the committee that has jurisdiction over the bill, the chances 
that the committee will favorably report the bill are remote. Only when 
supporters are able to exert considerable force can a bill be dislodged 
from stubborn committee leadership.
Such was the case of the full employment bill in the House, and 
it took the intervention of the president to resolve the stalemate. The 
groups against the full employment bill emerged forcefully when the 
House considered the issue. The House action on the full employment 
bill	exemplifies	the	struggle	that	occurs	when	strong	forces	for	change	
collide with the unswerving power of the status quo.
COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT ALTERS THE BILL’S COURSE
From the outset in the House, H.R. 2202, a bill almost identical to 
the original Senate bill, faced an uphill battle because the House par-
liamentarian assigned it and a similar bill (H.R. 4181) to a committee 
with conservative leadership. The House Committee on Banking and 
Currency was chaired by Brent Spence (D-KY), a loyal supporter of the 
New Deal, and had among its members H.R. 2202 cosponsors Wright 
Patman (D-TX) and George Outland (D-CA).1 Banking and Currency 
would have seemed a more appropriate committee to handle such a 
major economic policy measure. However, the Committee on Expendi-
tures in the Executive Department (hereafter referred to as the Executive 
Expenditures Committee) had jurisdiction over all matters concerning 
the Bureau of the Budget. Parliamentarian Lewis Deschler referred it to 
the Executive Expenditures Committee because he concluded that the 
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budget process was the central thrust of the proposal.2 Although there 
had been internal discussion within the administration over whether the 
Bureau of the Budget or a newly created agency should set full employ-
ment policy, the administration as well as the bill’s congressional spon-
sors had apparently not weighed the committee jurisdictional conse-
quences of designating the bureau as the lead agency. 
The conservative reputations of Executive Expenditures Committee 
Chairman Carter Manasco (D-AL) and ranking minority mem-
ber Clare Hoffman (R-MI) signaled that the bill would not receive a 
warm reception.3 During the 1930s, Manasco had been the secretary to 
Representative William B. Bankhead when Bankhead was Speaker of 
the House. After Bankhead’s death in 1940, Manasco won that seat in 
the House in 1941. Although Bankhead had been a strong supporter of 
the New Deal, Manasco did not share his mentor’s liberalism. Hoffman, 
the ranking member of the Executive Expenditures Committee, was a 
vociferous critic of organized labor and the New Deal. His staunch iso-
lationist stand and his popularity with anti-Semitic groups and other 
extreme elements on the right led to accusations that Hoffman had fas-
cist sympathies.4 Hoffman was much more strident and controversial 
than the ranking member of the Banking and Currency Committee, 
Jesse Wolcott, who was also from Michigan.5
Although H.R. 2202 and S. 380 were introduced simultaneously, 
the House proceeded more slowly on the legislation. The Senate was in 
the	midst	of	the	final	floor	debate	and	vote	on	S.	380	before	the	House	
Executive Expenditures Committee even began hearings on H.R. 2202 
and H.R. 4181. The slow start, however, did not prevent the Executive 
Expenditures Committee from devoting most of its attention during this 
session of the 79th Congress to the full employment bill.
The character of the Executive Expenditures Committee’s delibera-
tions differed markedly from the tone of the deliberations in the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking and Currency. Unlike the Senate Banking 
and Currency Committee, the House Executive Expenditures Commit-
tee did not solicit the views of people within the administration who 
would have been responsible for implementing the full employment 
bill. Although the Executive Expenditures Committee did invite admin-
istration representatives and proponents of the full employment bill to 
testify, they gave free reign to those opposed to the proposal. As the 
House hearings proceeded during the autumn of 1945, the arguments 
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against the full employment bill were diverse—sometimes sophisti-
cated, sometimes strident, and always strongly held. 
 The vagueness of the term “full employment” was the object of 
much criticism by those testifying against H.R. 2202. Walter Spahr, 
professor of economics at New York University and spokesman for 
the National Association of State Chambers of Commerce, questioned 
not	only	whether	full	employment	could	be	defined	but	also	what	con-
stituted regular and full-time employment.6 Spahr wondered further 
whether the term full employment applied to seasonal and migratory 
workers and those in between jobs (U.S. Congress 1945c, p. 468). 
This criticism of vagueness, as the proponents realized, was dif-
ficult	 to	respond	to	because	the	term	“full	employment”	was	concep-
tual	rather	than	tangible.	Economists	offered	theoretical	definitions	and	
formulae for full employment that were too sophisticated for a general 
audience to comprehend. While someone educated in Keynesian eco-
nomics was able to answer Spahr’s questions satisfactorily, most people 
were confounded by such questions. 
In addition to the charges that the terms were nebulous, opponents 
raised doubts about the validity of economic forecasting, a necessary 
ingredient in the bill. The California State Chamber of Commerce 
characterized the bill as requiring “the President and Congress to take 
immediate	 action	 to	 fill	 some	 unknown	 gap	 between	 this	 obviously	
unreliable	forecast	of	spending	and	employment	and	a	vaguely	defined	
condition of full employment.” The opposition was quick to point out 
that the federal government had often erred in its economic forecasts. 
A spokesman for the Illinois Manufacturers Association remarked that 
estimates of federal expenditures had been off target by 14 percent in 
1935, by 30 percent in 1937, and by 27 percent in 1939. One speaker 
feared that if the bill was approved a small group of statisticians would 
control the entire economy. This distrust of forecasts and econometri-
cians	pervaded	the	remarks	of	those	who	testified	in	opposition	to	the	
bill (U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 473, 495, 707).
Opponents of H.R. 2202 also maintained that the government was 
incapable of achieving full employment. The West Virginia Chamber 
of Commerce held that since the bill’s provisions could not be enforced 
nor its objectives attained, the measure would lead to frustration and 
discord. The New York Chamber of Commerce asserted that “only a 
totalitarian	government	could	assume	and	possibly	fulfill	the	responsi-
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bility of directing all economic activities and providing jobs for every-
body” (U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 451, 455).
The extent to which some committee members agreed with the 
criticisms	 that	 the	 bill	was	 nebulous,	 ill-defined,	 and	 unfeasible	was	
revealed in the members’ reactions to Walter Spahr’s statement that the 
bill was a series of assertions cut loose from realities. Clare Hoffman 
and Robert Rich (R-PA) both echoed Spahr’s remarks and used them 
as springboards for their own observations. When Charles La Follette 
(R-IN) objected to Hoffman and Rich’s unsolicited testimonies, which 
he called “stump speeches,” a feisty exchange ensued. The acrimony 
peaked as John Cochran (D-MO), a liberal who had cosponsored the 
bill, asked Spahr rather challenging questions, and Hoffman interjected 
his own remarks to disrupt the discussion.7 It was apparent that House 
members opposed to the legislation were much less restrained than their 
counterparts in the Senate and went on the offensive with zest (U.S. 
Congress 1945c, p. 470).
The provision that aroused the greatest concern among opponents 
of H.R. 2202 was that of right to employment. They surmised that H.R. 
2202 would disrupt the free market by guaranteeing jobs to all work-
ers. They expressed particular objection to the implication that the gov-
ernment would be the employer of last resort. They maintained that 
business would have to compete with government for workers and that 
inflated	wages	would	result.	A	few	opponents	also	speculated	that	the	
bill would establish legal grounds for unemployed workers to sue the 
government for employment (U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 606, 658).
The right-to-employment provision was caught up in a sometimes 
subtle, sometimes overt hostility toward organized labor on the part of 
those testifying against the bill. James Donnelly, executive vice pres-
ident of the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association (IMA), asserted that 
workers should be free to work where they pleased without paying trib-
ute to persons or organizations for the right to employment, an obvious 
reference to the open-versus-closed shop debate (U.S. Congress 1945c, 
pp. 47, 638, 666–667, 708).8
Personal disgust over the United Auto Workers strike occurring in 
his home state of Michigan prompted Hoffman to interrupt the testi-
mony of fellow congressman Patman to declare his own views regard-
ing idle workers: “Now wait a minute,” he challenged. “You were 
speaking about these men who can’t get jobs. In Michigan today there 
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are many employers who can’t get workers.” Hoffman went on with his 
veiled criticism of labor unions: “And while we are talking about full 
employment, have you any plan whereby those who apparently don’t 
want to work now can be persuaded, peacefully I mean, of course, by 
inducement, to go to work?” (U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 47, 638, 666–
667, 708). The fear that the enactment of this legislation would increase 
the power of organized labor was implied by various other opponents of 
the bill and foreshadowed the sentiments that led to the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act the following year.9
The opponents of H.R. 2202 also stated that a right-to-employment 
clause would destroy incentive. Indeed, they argued that the entire bill 
undermined the work ethic. They maintained that the legislation would 
create a secondary labor force that would be continuously dependent on 
government funds and whose numbers would escalate. Workers, they 
contended,	would	simply	lose	the	motivation	to	find	jobs	in	the	private	
sector	if	the	government	pledged	to	find	jobs	for	them	(U.S.	Congress	
1945c, p. 1123).
Several	of	those	who	testified	against	the	bill	voiced	the	fear	that	the	
legislation	would	induce	individuals	to	sacrifice	their	personal	freedom	
for the promise of full employment. The Merchants and Manufactur-
ers Association went so far as to say, “Full employment is closely akin 
to slavery.” Millard Brown of the Philadelphia Textile Manufacturers 
Association	 concluded	 that	 full	 employment	 legislation	was	 the	 first	
step toward Nazism and communism.10 This charge of totalitarianism 
was	not	uncommon	among	those	who	testified	against	the	bill.	Echoes	
of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom were heard throughout the hearings 
(U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 803, 1161).
Several of the arguments against the full employment bill derived 
from	 ideological	 controversies	 within	 the	 field	 of	 macroeconomics,	
specifically	regarding	Keynesian	theory.	As	one	would	have	expected,	
those who rejected Keynesian economic theory also opposed full 
employment legislation. The New York Chamber of Commerce called 
the theories of Lord Keynes fallacious. The New York Times econom-
ics writer Henry Hazlitt, who was testifying on behalf of the American 
Enterprise Association, quipped regarding Keynesian theory, “It is to 
economics what chiropractic is to medicine.”11 More evenhandedly, 
Spahr indicated that there were intellectual disputes among economists 
regarding Keynesian economics (U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 196, 451). 
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Hazlitt	also	warned	against	 the	dangers	of	deficit	spending.	Most	
of those testifying against the bill compared the federal budget to an 
individual’s	personal	finances,	concluding	that	debts	were	bad,	regard-
less of who incurs them. Chairman Manasco joined James Donnelly of 
the	IMA	in	speculating	that	deficit	spending	by	the	federal	government	
would lead to totalitarianism (U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 197, 711).
A	few	opponents	expanded	the	arguments,	stating	that	deficit	spend-
ing	would	stimulate	inflation.	Willford	I.	King,	economist	and	chairman	
of the Committee for Constitutional Government, maintained that pro-
viding full-time, remunerative employment for anyone not employed 
by private industry would require approximately $68.5 billion annually, 
and that this amount pumped into circulation each year would result in 
inflation.12	This	inflation	would	wipe	out	profits	and	thus	would	stymie	
industrial expansion. Hazlitt concurred with King and warned that the 
bill’s	 lack	 of	 antideficit	 provisions	 came	 at	 the	 very	 time	 a	 balanced	
federal budget was essential (U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 133, 197, 203).
The opponents of H.R. 2202 emphasized that it would harm private 
enterprise during the critical postwar period. Donnelly stressed that the 
bill would retard production and decrease job opportunities, particu-
larly in small businesses. “This bill, if enacted,” the Connecticut Cham-
ber of Commerce stated, “will prove another link in a chain to fetter 
free competitive enterprise, thus discouraging the investment of private 
capital in trade and commerce, retarding development of our natural 
resources, and creating unemployment rather than full employment.” 
This reasoning argued that incentives to private enterprise, rather than 
a full employment program, would foster a strong postwar economy 
(U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 446, 706).
Critics suggested that forecasting unemployment and recessions 
would	prove	to	be	self-fulfilling	prophesies.	The	Committee	for	Eco-
nomic Development’s Ralph Flanders used a folksy analogy of the 
Joneses deciding not to buy kitchen linoleum because the newspapers 
had predicted a depression.13 Donnelly and Manasco concurred that pes-
simistic economic predictions would accelerate a depression because 
manufacturers would reduce inventories and consumers would curtail 
purchases (U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 593, 711).
Witnesses speaking in opposition to H.R. 2202 described depres-
sions	as	natural	fluctuations	in	the	business	cycle.	Donnelly	advanced	
the view that depressions were not typical of the U.S. economy, stating 
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that there were only three instances prior to the 1930s when more than 
three million people were unemployed. Several of those opposed to H.R. 
2202 implied that the personal hardships precipitated by depressions 
had been exaggerated. Speaking from his own experiences and obser-
vations of depressions in both the 1890s and 1930s, Hoffman asserted 
that people “had enough to eat, a good place to sleep, and enough to 
wear.” He challenged one witness to cite evidence of local communi-
ties that did not take care of people in need. Hoffman, however, cut off 
the	response	when	the	witness	proceeded	to	cite	specific	instances	of	
hardships that went unmet by local communities (U.S. Congress 1945c, 
pp. 81, 713).
Chairman Manasco struck a chord that harmonized with those testi-
fying against H.R. 2202 when he rhetorically asked, “I am just wonder-
ing	if	our	people	are	sufficiently	alarmed	with	the	essential	dangers	of	
a planned economy.” To many of those opposed, the planning embod-
ied in the legislation connoted something more than elite statisticians 
determining policies through forecasts, more than strong unions setting 
high wages, more than unemployed workers suing for jobs, more than 
unbridled	deficit	financing	(U.S.	Congress	1945c,	pp.	802,	997).
Economic planning, for those who shared Manasco’s view, was 
something that violated the essence of the free enterprise system. No 
one captured this sentiment better than Albert S. Goss, master of the 
National Grange. “The government’s chief role in a free enterprise sys-
tem,” he asserted, “is to see that it is free . . . Under such a system 
America has developed a standard of living so much higher than any 
other nation in history, that we can see no sound reason for abandoning 
it” (U.S. Congress 1945c, pp. 802, 997).
Manasco and Hoffman represented constituencies that were over-
whelmingly rural, as did Goss. It was this rural base of many opponents 
to full employment legislation that led Stephen Bailey to conclude that 
the legislation the House passed was the product of the provincial per-
spective of many House members. Chairman Manasco, from the rural 
coal-mining region of Alabama, however, had a very different back-
ground from that of Clare Hoffman, who hailed from an agricultural 
area along Lake Michigan, or that of Goss, who came from the eastern 
part of Washington State. Observers at that time were oversimplifying 
matters when they assumed that rural Americans held uniform views. 
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A more nuanced view from the nonurbanized portion of Amer-
ica emerged in the testimony of Republican businessman James S. 
Schramm of Burlington, Iowa.14 Schramm provided a midwestern 
assessment of the legislation, referring to Iowa farmers as rugged indi-
vidualists who do not like bureaucracy and unnecessary controls. He 
acknowledged that they had learned there were some things they could 
not do for themselves: Iowans agreed, he said, that there were “some 
things the city and county governments must do for them, some the 
State must do, and some things only the Federal Government can do . . . 
And I don’t think we can trust to luck for economic stability and full 
employment in peacetime any more than we could trust American war 
production to luck” (U.S. Congress 1945c, p. 206).
Despite the various arguments voiced against full employment, and 
despite the interjections of Manasco and Hoffman, most of the opin-
ions	 expressed	during	 the	hearings	 reflected	 the	 sentiments	of	 James	 
Schramm. Spokespersons for a variety of religious and social welfare 
organizations, such as the YWCA, the National Council of Jewish 
Women, the American Association of Social Workers, and the Con-
gregational Christian Churches, endorsed the legislation. The Ameri-
can Federation of Labor, the United Mine Workers, and the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations delivered the support of organized labor. 
Representatives of the agricultural community were split, as the Ameri-
can Farm Bureau and the National Grange opposed the bill and the 
National Farmers Union and the Agricultural Workers Union advocated 
it. African American groups represented by the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League 
offered	unified	support	for	the	bill.	
The Truman administration sent Secretary of Commerce Henry 
Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson, Secretary of Labor 
Lewis Schwellenbach, and Secretary of the Treasury Fred Vinson to 
Congress to stress the importance of this legislation. Harold Smith, 
director of the Bureau of the Budget, John Snyder, director of War 
Mobilization and Reconversion, and General Omar Bradley, adminis-
trator	of	Veterans	Affairs,	also	testified	in	favor	of	the	measure.	
Perhaps Mrs. Henry Ingram of the YWCA best captured the essence 
of the support for full employment legislation in her testimony. She 
declared the following: 
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This bill is championed by numerous organizations, covering the 
social	work	field,	religious	leaders,	small	business	and	labor.	But	
the demand, however inarticulate, for full employment is far wider 
and far stronger than any organization can indicate. It is the one 
thing that American workers, be they white collar or industrial, 
have on their minds. They may not know about legislative propos-
als but they know they want jobs for all. Everyone remembers and 
dreads another depression. Everyone has seen what America can 
produce when it has to. Workers will not forget these lessons . . .  
The American people will not tolerate more depressions. (U.S. 
Congress 1945c, p. 1142) 
TRUMAN PRESSES FOR ACTION
Many liberal leaders of the day, as well as subsequent scholars of 
the period, have criticized President Truman for not acting with suf-
ficient	conviction	and	speed	on	the	full	employment	bill.	The	thrust	of	
this criticism is that Truman did not push for the passage of S. 380/H.R. 
2202	until	the	autumn	of	1945	and	that	he	was	too	willing	to	sacrifice	
major features of the bill in order to have some kind of employment 
legislation enacted. The critics characterized Truman’s stance as drift-
ing and indecisive (Bernstein and Matusow 1966, pp. 11–13; Donovan 
1977, pp. 122–124; Hamby 1973, p. 63). 
Several factors, however, point to the need for a reappraisal of these 
judgments. Most important is the fact that since the bill had passed the 
Senate with bipartisan support and few changes, there had been little 
need for Truman to engage in active lobbying for the bill’s passage. 
Second, within weeks of the victory in World War II in August, Truman 
had turned his attention to the domestic front and had begun to push 
for passage of the full employment legislation. Truman thus entered the 
fray at the earliest appropriate time.
Truman made it clear that full employment was a top priority of his 
domestic agenda. He emphasized full employment legislation as a major 
objective in his September 6 radio message. Time magazine, though 
critical of the full employment bill, reported that the public response to 
Truman’s speech was positive. Time also pointed out that, immediately 
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following the speech, the stock market jumped to its highest point in 
eight years, and the magazine implied that Truman’s postwar economic 
plan was the stimulus (Time 1945f). 
Truman followed his public pronouncements by assigning to spe-
cific	agencies	of	the	executive	branch	the	tasks	of	supporting	various	
aspects	of	 this	 legislation	and	giving	 the	Office	of	War	Mobilization	
and Reconversion the job of overall coordination. By October he had 
established a special cabinet-level committee (hereafter referred to as 
the cabinet committee) to work exclusively with Congress to ensure 
quick passage of the full employment bill.15
The cabinet committee consisted of Secretary of the Treasury 
Vinson, Secretary of Commerce Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture 
Anderson,	and	Secretary	of	Labor	Schwellenbach.	At	its	first	meeting	
on October 16, the cabinet committee decided that it could operate most 
effectively if its existence were not revealed, because the members 
wanted to avoid the impression of an organized campaign.16 The effect 
of	this	covert	strategy	was	difficult	to	assess,	but	it	no	doubt	contributed	
to scholars’ underestimating the administration’s role in the process.
It was abundantly clear to the members of the cabinet commit-
tee that their task of lobbying the House on the full employment bill 
was going to be a tough assignment. Chairman Manasco had just been 
quoted in a national publication as saying he was “leery” of the bill. 
The Alabaman went on to say that he thought the only jobs that the full 
employment bill would create would be jobs for bureaucratic planners 
(Newsweek 1945b).
In	addition	to	Manasco,	 the	cabinet	committee	 identified	William	
Whittington	(D-MS)	and	Joseph	Mansfield	(D-TX)	as	key	congressmen	
who were hostile to the bill.17 They recommended that Truman talk to 
each of these congressmen personally to underscore how important this 
bill was to the administration. They were especially emphatic that the 
president see the members individually so that the three would not be 
able to present a united front.18
Within a few days of the receipt of the cabinet committee’s rec-
ommendation, Truman met separately with Manasco, Whittington, 
and	Mansfield.	To	the	cabinet	committee	in	a	meeting	to	outline	lob-
bying strategy, the president appraised the men’s responses in these 
discussions. Manasco had remained fundamentally opposed to any leg-
islation for full employment but was noncommittal regarding a com-
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pletely	emasculated	employment	bill.	Mansfield	had	remained	uncon-
vinced but indicated he would support some employment measure. 
Whittington had said that he might go along if his own ideas on employ-
ment policy were incorporated into the measure. By the end of October, 
it was clear to the administration that Whittington would play the piv-
otal role in determining the fate of the full employment legislation.19
Truman wrote House Speaker John McCormack on October 29 to 
express his concern that the House act on the legislation. “I am most 
anxious,” Truman began, “that the House Committee on Expenditures 
of Executive Departments report out the full employment legislation. 
Such legislation is of the utmost urgency and importance to the future 
of our nation.” Truman went on to say that it would be reckless to “wait 
and see” if mass unemployment reoccurred before enacting the legisla-
tion and that it was not enough to have a transition to temporary pros-
perity.	Truman	indicated	that	he	was	not	referring	to	any	specific	bill,	
but to the general purposes and principles of full employment legisla-
tion.20 This remark probably referenced the fact that Truman was aware 
that the Executive Expenditures Committee was rewriting S. 380 and 
that he was willing to approve any bill reported out as long as it adhered 
to the basic tenets of full employment. 
Replying to a letter from Eleanor Roosevelt urging him to do all 
he could to ensure that Congress enacted full employment legislation, 
Truman	 affirmed	 that	 he	was	most	 anxious	 to	 have	 the	 full	 employ-
ment program enacted. The new president also conveyed the frustration 
of a reformer. “As you probably learned long ago,” he related to Mrs. 
Roosevelt, “it is not easy to get the right kind of people with the correct 
social	point	of	view	who	have	influence	with	those	Congressmen	who	
are blocking the program.”21
HOUSE MEMBERS NEGOTIATE A COMPROMISE
The oft-repeated version of the House action on the full employ-
ment bill maintains that the Executive Expenditures Committee over-
whelmingly voted down the original proposal and subsequently wrote 
a	substitute	bill.	Hoffman	asserted	during	the	floor	debate	in	December	
that the committee had voted down H.R. 2202 by a resounding vote 
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of 17 “nays” to 3 “yeas” at a November 7, 1945, committee meeting. 
Apparently Hoffman was trying to minimize support for full employ-
ment (Bailey 1964, p. 164–166). 
Although the minutes of the Executive Expenditures Committee are 
terse,	they	provide	sufficient	detail	to	contradict	the	Hoffman	account	
and	to	reveal	a	series	of	close	votes	and	compromises.	During	the	first	
meeting after the hearings on November 7, Edward Gossett (D-TX) 
moved to appoint a subcommittee to study a substitute measure that 
would not be reported before January 1946.22 To stymie this delaying 
tactic, Cochran, a sponsor of H.R. 2202, offered a substitute motion 
to appoint a subcommittee to study and draw up a substitute bill to be 
submitted to the whole committee but with no set date. The Cochran 
substitute passed in the committee with an 8-7 vote. Both liberals and 
conservatives voted for the Cochran plan. The subcommittee they 
formed consisted of Manasco, Whittington, Cochran, Hoffman, and 
George Bender (R-OH).23 In setting no date for the committee to report, 
Cochran no doubt assumed that public, presidential, and congressional 
pressure would compel the subcommittee to offer a bill before the ses-
sion ended.24 
By this time, the Truman administration had already mapped out a 
strategy to ensure that the Expenditures Committee reported out H.R. 
2202	before	the	session	ended.	When	Secretary	Vinson	had	confiden-
tially conferred with Whittington early in November, he realized that 
the Mississippi congressman would drive a hard bargain before acqui-
escing on full employment legislation. Truman and the cabinet commit-
tee agreed to a set of compromise points on the bill as “an approach that 
will work.”25
Although some have written that Truman consented to Vinson’s 
suggestion that the term “full employment” be dropped from the bill 
in order to appease the conservatives, Truman instructed Vinson that 
the compromise terms should preserve the full-employment language 
as well as the right-to-employment clause. The Truman administration 
offered to change the title to the “Full Production and Full Employ-
ment Policy Act” and to add the words, “full production” wherever the 
bill mentions full employment, thereby broadening and diffusing the 
purpose of the measure. They also agreed to emphasize that “action by 
the Federal Government shall be consistent with our system of free, 
competitive	private	 enterprise.”	They	 further	 offered	 that	 no	benefits	
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under the act would be extended to persons able but unwilling to work 
(Donovan 1977, p. 122).26
As it turned out, the major point of controversy and negotiation 
between the administration and the subcommittee was the machinery 
for administering the policy. Whittington was adamant that a board of 
experts appointed by the president and approved by the Senate should 
administer the legislation. Although this idea had not received much 
attention during the Senate and House hearings, questions over admin-
istrative structure had been raised in various quarters. 
Whittington’s idea for a board of experts might well have been 
influenced	by	the	Committee	for	Economic	Development	(CED).	The	
CED had been formed in 1942 and was considered one of the most 
progressive business groups of the day, particularly because it endorsed 
economic planning (Graham 1976, pp. 10–15). The CED’s Ralph Flan-
ders	had	testified	before	the	Executive	Expenditures	Committee’s	hear-
ings on the full employment bill and had just unveiled the CED plan 
for full employment. This plan called for a “small working body of the 
ablest men” to serve as a presidential commission on full employment 
(Time 1945g).
Such an idea was not a new concept. In 1944, Leon Keyserling had 
proposed a “joint congressional executive structure” to prepare national 
budgets and engage in economic planning.27 Since the previous year, 
economists in the executive branch had been debating whether full 
employment was best administered by the Bureau of the Budget or by 
a newly created agency. For example, V.O. Key had suggested a “Divi-
sion	of	Economic	Policy”	within	the	Executive	Office.	Both	Key	and	
Colm had expressed the view that a new agency would be focused on 
full employment and that it would not have the competing responsibili-
ties that the Bureau of the Budget had.28 
The Truman administration responded to Whittington’s proposal 
by agreeing to six of its conditions: 1) that the president would direct 
and supervise the preparation of the national budget as stipulated in 
S. 380; 2) that the bill would establish a National Budget Council com-
posed of the secretaries of Treasury (who would serve as council chair-
man), Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; 3) that this council would 
advise and assist the president in the preparation of the national budget 
and would consult other agencies of government, business, and labor; 
4) that the council would coordinate and direct the statistical planning 
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and research and work with the Bureau of the Budget to obtain neces-
sary data; 5) that this council would cooperate with the Joint Commit-
tee on the National Budget, furnish it with copies of reports, and pro-
vide technical personnel when requested; and 6) that the council would 
appoint an executive director and such staff as necessary to discharge 
its functions.29
Meanwhile,	the	subcommittee	had	drawn	up	a	confidential	substi-
tute proposal. This recommendation struck out all of the original bill 
after the enacting clause and replaced it with what was basically a new 
bill.30 Although some of the language changes retained ideas consistent 
with the original bill, other provisions of the new bill were at odds with 
the fundamental principles of full employment.
One of the most ardently argued provisions of the full employment 
bill, the right-to-employment clause, did not survive. The subcommit-
tee even rejected Senator Fulbright’s compromise language stating that 
“all Americans able to work and seeking work are entitled to an oppor-
tunity for useful, remunerative, regular and full-time employment.” The 
subcommittee’s substitute bill offered instead only an occasional refer-
ence to “aiding and assisting the employables.”31
The original HR. 2202 and the Senate-passed bill provided for a 
carefully	 planned	 economic	 program	 and	 specified	 a	 wide	 variety	
of tools to be utilized and areas to be targeted in planning for a full 
employment economy. The subcommittee proposal did not mention any 
specific	policy	areas.	Rather,	it	made	more	general	references	to	“plan-
ning and adopting a program of sound public works, consistent with a 
financially	sound	fiscal	policy.”
The subcommittee substitute stripped the bill of its provision of 
countercyclical, compensatory spending by the federal government. 
H.R. 2202 and S. 380 designated the government to provide “such 
volume of Federal investment and expenditure as may be needed, in 
addition to the investment and expenditure by private enterprises, con-
sumers, and State and local government, to achieve the objective of 
continuing full employment.” The revised version no longer mandated 
such Keynesian economic policies.
Both the original and the subcommittee substitute provided for the 
creation of a joint congressional committee, the former bill calling it the 
Joint Committee on the National Budget and the latter bill designating 
it the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. The size of the com-
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mittee was altered in the revision, but in each proposal it was made up 
of an equal number of Senate and House members and required that 
the	partisan	composition	should	reflect	the	relative	membership	of	the	
majority and minority parties in each chamber.
The “Economic Report of the President” replaced the “National 
Production and Employment Budget” in the subcommittee substitute. 
The latter required the president to transmit a budget detailing estimates 
for the number of employment opportunities needed for full employ-
ment, the production of goods and services at full employment, and the 
volume of investment and expenditure needed for such; current trends 
in employment opportunities, production, investment, and expendi-
tures; a general program to ensure full employment, including mea-
sures	to	prevent	inflation	or	deflation;	and	a	review	of	the	performance	
of the previous year’s economic program. The president was to submit 
this budget annually as well as transmit quarterly economic reports to 
Congress.
The Economic Report of the President was to be submitted at the 
beginning of each session of Congress. Although the language of the 
substitute provision was entirely new, the basic thrust was the same. 
The economic report was not a budget per se, but it served to review and 
forecast	economic	conditions	and	 to	offer	specific	programs	 to	attain	
high levels of employment, production, and purchasing power and to 
alleviate	 inflationary	 conditions.	The	 significant	 element	 in	 this	 new	
language emerged when viewed alongside the Budget and Accounting 
Act of 1921. The latter gave the president sole responsibility for the 
national budget and created the position of director of the budget to 
carry out this responsibility under the direction of the president. The 
new language retained presidential responsibility but assigned the task 
to a newly created entity, not the Bureau of the Budget.
This new entity was the Council of Economic Advisers, Whitting-
ton’s board of experts. Although Whittington had not agreed to the 
Truman administration’s compromise offer of a “cabinet committee/
executive director” structure, he dropped the stipulation that council 
members	be	confirmed	by	Congress,	and	he	went	along	with	reducing	
the area in which they could make independent investigations and limit-
ing the authority of Congress to obtain reports from the council. Now 
the president was to appoint to this three-member council individuals 
whose training, experience, and attainments made them “exceptionally 
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qualified	to	analyze	and	interpret	economic	developments,	to	appraise	
programs and activities of the government . . . and to formulate and 
recommend national economic policy to promote employment and pro-
duction under the American system of free competitive enterprise.”32 
As	a	result,	this	consolidation	of	the	planning	authority	created	a	flex-
ible, and possibly powerful, apparatus for national economic planning.
Whittington sought the views of Secretary of the Treasury Vinson 
regarding the subcommittee substitute. Treasury Department econo-
mists who had reviewed the draft had called it “a stinker.” Vinson’s 
formal comments to Whittington were less colorful but quite critical. 
Beginning his reply by stating that the Senate bill was superior, Vin-
son acknowledged that the subcommittee had made a sincere effort and 
conceded that they had spotted two weaknesses in the bill: its insuf-
ficient	emphasis	on	full	production	and	purchasing	power	and	its	inad-
equate machinery for the preparation of the national budget. Vinson 
advanced	justifications	for	full	employment	and	the	need	for	the	bill	to	
specify those objectives to achieve full employment. He also contended 
that the Council of Economic Advisers undermined presidential author-
ity in the budget process. Vinson recounted that Congress had decided 
not	to	have	the	Senate	confirm	the	director	of	the	Bureau	of	the	Budget	
because the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 gave the president sole 
responsibility and freedom in the preparation of the federal budget. Vin-
son opposed the council as a staff agency of the president that would be 
the “handyman for Congress.”33
Following the receipt of Vinson’s letter, Whittington advised the 
secretary that he was willing to yield to some degree to the administra-
tion,	but	not	on	the	establishment	of	the	council.	The	final	subcommit-
tee bill reduced the extent to which Congress would have had authority 
over the council and the extent to which Congress could make requests 
of the council. Most importantly, Whittington assured Vinson that he 
would be “reasonable” when the conference committee considered the 
bill.34
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THE HOUSE MOVES ON THE LEGISLATION
When the Executive Expenditures Committee met on November 
27, 1945, to consider the subcommittee substitute for S. 380, which 
Whittington presented, various committee members offered minor 
amendments that would have weakened the compromise bill even fur-
ther.	These	amendments	 failed	by	close	votes	 that	 reflected	 the	 ideo-
logical alignment of the committee. Gossett again moved to postpone 
consideration of the bill until January 15, 1946, but this delaying action 
failed by a 10-10 split.35
The	first	committee	vote	on	the	bill	became	entangled	in	a	series	of	
amendments, in part because of the refusal of some sponsors to com-
promise. While other sponsors were willing to support the substitute, 
some joined the opponents in voting against the compromise. Bender 
first	moved	to	strike	all	of	the	bill’s	language	after	the	enacting	clause	of	 
S. 380 and insert the text of H.R. 2202, the original House version. 
Bender was one of four committee members who sponsored the ini-
tial legislation and was the only Republican committee member to 
have done so. The other sponsors on the committee were Alexander 
Resa (D-IL), William Dawson (D-IL), who later chaired the Executive 
Expenditures Committee, and Cochran.36 It was Cochran who inter-
ceded, offering a substitute amendment to strike out all of the bill’s lan-
guage after the enacting clause of S. 380 and insert the text of the sub-
committee version. The Cochran motion failed by a vote of 13 “nays” 
to 7 “yeas,” with several advocates of full employment voting against 
the	amendment.	When	the	initial	Bender	motion	finally	came	to	a	vote,	
three people voted for it.37
The subcommittee met the following day to resume consideration 
of the subcommittee substitute. After making some semantic changes, 
the committee once again voted down a motion to postpone consider-
ation of the bill until January 15, 1946. The split was a narrow vote of 
7 “nays” to 6 “yeas.” The committee then ironed out details such as the 
composition of the Joint Committee and the salaries of the council.38
When the committee convened on November 29, Rep. Ralph Church 
(R-IL) yet again moved to withhold action until after recess—i.e., until 
January 15, 1946. This time more members were present, and the mar-
gin was 11 opposed versus 9 in favor. At last, on December 5, 1945, the 
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Executive Expenditures Committee met and voted to delete everything 
after the enacting clause and insert the substitute, now known as Com-
mittee Substitute 380, Print No. 3. The vote was 13 “yeas,” 5 “nays,” 
and 1 “present.” The members asked Whittington to write the commit-
tee report.39
Both at the time and subsequently, observers criticized the assign-
ment of the bill to the Executive Expenditures Committee, maintaining 
that the committee’s conservative reputation doomed the bill. Wright 
Patman speculated that a different committee might have reported out 
the original bill he had sponsored. Stephen Bailey puts the referral of 
the	bill	to	the	conservative	Executive	Expenditures	Committee	first	on	
his list of factors that determined the fate of the full employment bill 
(Bailey 1964, p. 178; Congressional Record 1945c, p. 12024). 
The construction of an ideology score based upon 10 roll call votes 
that the Union for Democratic Action (UDA) highlighted as key lib-
eral votes in a New Republic article enables us to further explore this 
question of the conservative bias of the Executive Expenditures Com-
mittee.40 The members of the Executive Expenditures Committee as a 
whole averaged an ideology score of +0.05, in the middle of the spec-
trum. When one compares the committee score to the average ideol-
ogy score for the entire House of Representatives, which was +0.02, 
one can hardly maintain that the Executive Expenditures Committee 
was uniquely conservative. However, the House Banking and Currency 
Committee, a logical alternative, averaged an ideology score of +0.10, 
had a liberal chairman in Brent Spence, and arguably might have been 
more likely to report out a version more akin to the Senate-passed bill.41
In mid-December, Congressman Whittington submitted the major-
ity report of Executive Expenditures Committee to Congress. He con-
trasted the substitute version with the Senate bill and asserted that gov-
ernment assurance of full employment would destroy the free enterprise 
system.	Whittington	 emphasized	 that	 it	 was	 definitely	 not	 a	 federal	
responsibility to guarantee the right to employment. He also contended 
that experience demonstrated that government spending did not pro-
mote high levels of employment or prosperity. He did, however, make 
a strong case for economic planning. He maintained that the substitute 
bill would provide for sound coordination of public works programs 
and stimulation of private industry. He concluded that the Council of 
Economic Advisers would give the best available economic advice and, 
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thus,	enhance	the	quality	and	efficiency	of	handling	the	national	econ-
omy (U.S. Congress 1945a).
Hoffman, Church, Gibson, and Rich submitted a minority report 
that stated, “At its best, the bill can only be construed as a planning 
measure, a new version of the discarded National Resources Planning 
Board.” They argued that public support for H.R. 2202 was the result 
of fraudulent propaganda, and conjectured that the only jobs created 
by the bill would be the three positions on the council (U.S. Congress 
1945a, pp. 16–18).
La	Follette,	Dawson,	Hart,	and	Resa	filed	separate	views	with	the	
Executive Expenditures Committee report. They echoed the principles 
of the original bill, particularly regarding the federal responsibility. 
Although they did not agree with all aspects of the committee report, 
they voted to report out the legislation so that the entire membership of 
the House could vote on the subject (U.S. Congress 1945a, pp. 18–20).
S. 380 COMES TO THE HOUSE FLOOR
The two-day debate in the House, which began on December 13, 
1945, differed markedly from the Senate debate a few months earlier. 
The members of the House of Representatives spent little time discuss-
ing	 the	matters	 of	 public	 finance	 and	 federal	 budgets	 that	 the	 Sena-
tors had debated for several days in September. Issues such as public 
works,	inflation,	taxes,	and	compensatory	spending	were	not	among	the	
major themes when the House considered S. 380. Rather, much of the 
House debate was between two streams of American populism—one 
that warned against unfettered big business and one that warned against 
unfettered big government. 
Opponents of H.R. 2202 gained a critical procedural advantage 
when Manasco obtained the order of the rule regarding the debate and 
floor	 action	 just	 as	 he	 had	 requested	 it.	The	 committee	 substitute	 to	 
S. 380 was to be the legislative vehicle. The Democratic leadership of 
the House Committee on the Rules had broken with Speaker of the 
House John McCormack over New Deal legislation. At this point in 
time, Speaker McCormack held no sway to structure the debate over 
legislation he strongly supported. The control of the debate would be 
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equally divided between Manasco and Hoffman. Such a division of the 
debate between the ranking committee members of each party was not 
uncommon, but in this case it resulted in two members controlling the 
debate who were hostile to both H.R. 2202 as introduced and S. 380 
as passed by the Senate.42 More importantly, the Rules Committee had 
consented	to	a	five-minute	rule	that	permitted	the	exclusion	of	the	origi-
nal and the Senate-passed versions from consideration and forced the 
choice to be between the substitute or a vote to recommit (Congressio-
nal Record 1945c, p. 11972).
Manasco opened the debate with his arguments against H.R. 2202 
as introduced and S. 380 as passed by the Senate. “Of course, you can 
give full employment by tax dollars or by borrowing money,” he said 
(Congressional Record 1945c, p. 11973), “but when the Federal Gov-
ernment borrows money or when it taxes people you are taking money 
that would ordinarily be used by private investors to give jobs to our 
people.” Manasco speculated that the federal government would have 
had to pay the prevailing wage to employ a man to “count trees” to 
maintain full employment. As he concluded his opening statement, the 
congressman from Alabama became passionate, populist, and personal:
I have heard a lot of these people beating their chest for the under 
dog and the under privileged . . . I think I know as much about the 
under dog and the under privileged as any man in this House. I 
was born the son of a tenant farmer who had pellagra, and anybody 
knows	that	a	man	who	has	pellagra	has	it	because	of	deficiency	in	
his	diet.	My	father	lay	flat	on	his	back	and	my	mother	was	keeping	
boarders	to	feed	five	hungry	mouths,	and	yet	I	am	accused	of	being	
a tool of Wall Street when I get up and protect a system that made it 
possible for a son of a tenant farmer to be a Member of Congress. 
(Congressional Record 1945c, p. 11976)
Manasco subsequently turned much of the time he controlled over 
to Whittington, who presented the case for the substitute measure. Whit-
tington proceeded to take the middle course. “I assert that the sound 
policy of government is to promote rather than guarantee employment.” 
he said (p. 11980). He devoted much of his time to describing the eco-
nomic planning features and procedural elements of the legislation. 
When queried by Hoffman, Whittington acknowledged that he objected 
to H.R. 2202 because he was convinced it would lead to socialism. He 
maintained that the committee substitute was a “constructive approach 
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to the problem of unemployment” (Congressional Record 1945c, 
p. 11982). 
Along with Whittington, Cochran spoke on behalf of the commit-
tee substitute. He stated that the employment planning envisioned in 
the	bill	would	create	beneficial	public	works,	rather	than	jobs	to	“rake	
leaves.” Cochran also pointed out, “Do not forget that when you talk 
about private industry, that private industry did not hesitate in 1933 to 
appeal to the President and the Congress to save it from destruction. It 
was willing then to have the Government come to its rescue” (Congres-
sional Record 1945c, p. 11978).
The states’ rights issue—perennially a hot-button topic—prompted 
an extended exchange between Congressmen Benton Jensen (R-IA) 
and Charles La Follette (R-IN) that echoed the Anti-Federalist popu-
lism of earlier times in American history.43 As	he	 spoke	 on	 the	floor	
for full employment, La Follette asserted that his fellow Republicans 
“ought to abandon the idea of States’ rights, because, actually, there 
is no State sovereignty.” He continued, “The man who speaks of State 
sovereignty speaks the language of totalitarianism” (p. 11979). Jensen 
challenged La Follette by stating that certain rights had been left to the 
states and that state governments were closer to the people. “Because 
a government close to the people is more effective is why I think we 
should preserve States’ rights,” Jensen said. He concluded, “I still con-
tend there are such things as States’ rights” (Congressional Record 
1945c, p. 11980).
La Follette did not relent to Jensen or to a subsequent challenge by 
Congressman George Bates (R-MA).44 Instead, he grew more emphatic 
in his argument countering the Anti-Federalist tradition:
Let me repeat, there are no States’ rights. There are rights of the 
people who live in the State of Iowa, but they themselves can dele-
gate to the government of the State of Iowa those things which they 
think the State of Iowa will do better for them . . . Of course, there 
was an argument about States’ rights in the Continental Congress 
and the Convention which created the Constitution, because it is 
always true that people who have power to govern other people—
government—hate to give it up, but the people of the State of Mas-
sachusetts determined that in order to have a full government—a 
government which could serve them better—they would delegate a 
part of their sovereignty to a new Federal Government so that they might 
be better served. (Congressional Record 1945c, p. 11980)
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Congressman Fritz Lanham (D-TX) offered his view on the role 
of the federal government in opposition to La Follette and to the other 
supporters of the employment legislation:45
I think it is high time that we get back to our organic law, which 
in my judgment has been disrupted in a great many respects, and 
adhere to the principles upon which this Government was estab-
lished. Give free enterprise a fair chance to go into operation, and 
remove these restrictions that are preventing it from operating and 
from giving employment. There is a lot of employment in this 
country available today that people will not accept. (Congressio-
nal Record 1945c, p. 12008) 
The preceding rhetoric over states’ rights and the role of the federal 
government, however, seemed tame in retrospect after Congressman 
John Gibson (D-GA) asked, “Do you people actually believe we are 
doing anything but destroying this country when we set the Govern-
ment up in business throughout the length and breadth of this land?”46 
Gibson grew more agitated. “Talk about this do-good business, helping 
the poor. I get so sick of that, I get so sick and tired of hearing it until I 
become nauseated” (p. 11986). It was Gibson, along with Church, who 
led	much	of	the	floor	fight	against	the	passage	of	any	employment	bill,	
including the committee substitute to S. 380. Frequent innuendos, and 
sometimes accusations, of socialism, communism, or fascism peppered 
the remarks of some who opposed the employment bills (Congressional 
Record 1945c, pp. 11966–12028).
In	the	meantime,	it	appeared	that	a	sufficient	number	of	members	
who had sponsored H.R. 2202 were ready to vote “no” on the committee 
substitute to S. 380, which Emanuel Celler (D-NY) quipped had been 
“written by the best minds of the eighteenth century” (Congressional 
Record 1945c, p. 12071).47 Along with the opponents to any employ-
ment bill, these discontented proponents of full employment seemed 
prepared to stop passage of the committee substitute to S. 380. As Wal-
ter Granger (D-UT) stated, “It is like the choice that is sometimes given 
to a criminal when he has been convicted. They ask him whether he 
would rather be shot or hanged” (p. 12085).48 
H.R. 2202 sponsors Wright Patman and George Outland continued 
to argue for the strongest bill possible. Patman began on December 13 
by charging that his bill had been misunderstood as well as misrepre-
sented. He made clear that he was “opposed to all of these ‘isms,’ like 
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fascism, communism, and socialism.” He also quoted Thomas Dewey, 
the Republican presidential nominee in 1944, who reportedly had said, 
“If	at	any	time	there	are	not	sufficient	 jobs	in	private	employment	to	
go around, the Government can, and must, create job opportunities, 
because there must be jobs for all in this country of ours . . . That is 
everybody’s business. Therefore, it is the business of government” (p. 
12088).49 Patman concluded on December 14 by advocating for a “real 
full employment bill” to prevent the boom and bust of postwar conver-
sion. In direct response to House members who had labeled the Senate-
passed version of S. 380 socialistic and communistic, Outland asked 
that the Senate roll call on S. 380 be read into the House record, noting 
the names of the senators who had voted for the bill (Congressional 
Record 1945c, pp. 11986–11990, 12084).
On December 14, Outland offered his own observation about states’ 
rights and the role of the federal government: “You will recall . . . during 
the last depression how every mayor, every Governor of every State in 
this Union came to Washington asking for relief,” he said. “We did not 
hear anything about communism then. We did not hear anything about 
socialism then. All we heard was the cry for help, because that help had 
to come from the Government as a whole.” Outland spoke about the 
urgency	“to	fulfill	our	responsibilities	to	the	American	people”	and	“to	
take constructive action” to prevent depressions (Congressional Record 
1945c, p. 12084). 
Other proponents of H.R. 2202 rose in support of the original bill. 
To those who argued that full employment was the antithesis of free 
enterprise, Congressman Andrew John Biemiller (D-WI) asserted, 
“There is just one way the American free enterprise system will fall. 
That is if we continue to have recurring depressions, with large num-
bers of unemployed and nothing being done about it” (p. 12086). Con-
gressman Jerry Voorhis (D-CA) expanded on this theme: “There are 
duties of government today which, if performed wisely and well, can 
increase the true freedom of not only our people but also our industry 
and agriculture” (Congressional Record 1945c, p. 12064).50
The	floor	action	on	December	14	 intensified	as	 the	advocates	 for	
full employment legislation sought to circumvent the Rules Committee, 
which had prevented a vote on H.R. 2202 and the Senate-passed version 
of the bill. House Speaker John McCormack shared the objective of the 
Truman administration that at least some employment bill be passed by 
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the House. The strategy assumed that the conference committee then 
would	pattern	the	final	legislation	after	the	Senate-passed	version.	Sup-
porters of the original legislation succeeded in bringing H.R. 2202 to 
a vote while the House was operating in the Committee of the Whole. 
The teller vote (roll call votes are not taken during proceedings of the 
Committee of the Whole) of 185 “nays” to 95 “yeas” signaled the fail-
ure of the full employment bill. A voice vote adopted the committee 
substitute (Congressional Record 1945c, pp. 12094–12095).
When the House came out of the Committee of the Whole, Hoff-
man moved to recommit the substitute bill. This tactic was defeated by 
a roll call vote of 243 “nays” to 136 “yeas.” Finally, the House voted to 
enact the committee substitute with a roll call vote of 255 “yeas” to 126 
“nays” (Congressional Record 1945c, pp. 12094–12095). 
The House had yielded a very different version of S. 380 than the 
Senate had passed a few months earlier. The House-passed version 
had stripped S. 380 of its provisions on countercyclical, compensatory 
spending by the federal government. Instead, it made general refer-
ences to planning and public works that were meant to be consistent 
with	a	financially	sound	fiscal	policy.	The	provision	that	all	Americans	
were entitled to useful remunerative work, which had been present in 
S. 380 as passed by the Senate, was replaced by language on aiding 
and assisting the “employables.” The House-passed S. 380, however, 
had strengthened the structures responsible for economic planning by 
proposing a Council of Economic Advisers in the executive branch as 
well as a Joint Committee on the Economic Report in Congress. It now 
remained for the House-Senate Conference Committee to resolve the 
differences between the two bills.
Notes
 1. Spence was elected in 1930 and served until 1963. He became chairman of the 
Banking and Currency Committee in 1943. Patman served in the House from 1926 
to 1976. He advocated liberal social programs from the New Deal through the 
Great Society and chaired the Banking and Currency Committee from 1963 to 
1975. Outland served from 1943 to 1947. He was defeated for reelection.
 2. Deschler was appointed parliamentarian by Speaker Nicholas Longworth (R-OH) 
in 1927 and served to 1974. He is best known as the author of Rules of Order 
(1976, posthumously).
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  3. In 1948, liberal Carl Elliot defeated Manasco in the Democratic primary. From 
1949 to 1985, Manasco served as the legislative counsel for the National Coal 
Association. Hoffman was elected from western Michigan in 1934 and served 
until his retirement at the end of 1962. 
 4. Although Hoffman remained a Republican throughout his congressional career, 
he	 reportedly	flirted	with	 the	America	First	 Party	 in	 1944.	Not	 to	 be	 confused	
with the America First Party formed in 2002, this party ran Gerald L. K. Smith for 
president in 1944 and later became the Christian Nationalist Crusade. For more on 
Hoffman and his alleged ties to fascist groups, see Walker (1982).
 5. Wolcott generally opposed the New Deal. He served in Congress from 1931 to 
1957. President Eisenhower appointed him to be a director of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation in 1958, where he served until 1964.
 6. In 1933, Spahr was a founder of the Economists’ National Committee on Mon-
etary Policy, which lobbied for a return to the gold standard and opposed the mon-
etary policies of the New Deal.
 7. Rich was the general manager (and later president) of Woolrich Woolen Mills 
when he was elected to Congress in 1930. He served in Congress through 1950, 
with a break in 1943–1944. La Follette served from 1943 to 1947. He was a distant 
cousin of the Progressive congressman Robert La Follette, as well as a great-
grandson of Congressman William Heilman. Cochran had served as staff for vari-
ous	congressmen	from	Missouri	and	was	first	elected	to	the	House	in	1926	to	suc-
ceed the member for whom he had worked. In 1934 he ran unsuccessfully in the 
Democratic primary against Sen. Harry Truman. He retired at the end of 1946.
 8. Donnelly later became a prominent attorney in Illinois, where he served as state 
finance	chairman	for	Ronald	Reagan’s	presidential	campaigns.
 9. The Taft-Hartley Act, which rolled back some of the worker rights that the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 had provided, proved to be one of the most 
controversial laws passed by the 80th Congress. It was enacted over President 
Truman’s veto and became a rallying cry in his 1948 reelection campaign.
 10. Brown had gained national attention during the 1934 strike of the textile workers 
in Pennsylvania (Salmond 2002).
 11. The American Enterprise Association is now known as the American Enterprise 
Institute.
 12. The Committee for Constitutional Government was interconnected with the 
National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government, which had formed in 
opposition to Roosevelt’s plan to increase the size of the U.S. Supreme Court. It 
evolved into an advocacy group with a broader conservative agenda.
 13. Flanders was a successful businessman and president of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston. He was appointed to the Senate in 1946 by Vermont governor Mortimer 
Proctor and represented Vermont until 1959.
 14. Schramm managed the family business, Schramm’s Department Store, from 1934 
to 1962. He was active in the Iowa Republican Party, including a stint as chairman 
of the State Committee in the 1950s.
	15.	 Harry	S.	Truman	 to	Fred	Vinson,	16	October	1945,	Truman	official	file,	Harry	
S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, Missouri; Vinson to Truman, 22 
October	1945,	Truman	official	file.		
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 16. Ibid. 
 17. Whittington represented the delta region of Mississippi from 1925 to 1950. He 
distanced himself from his fellow Mississippian, Sen. Theodore Bilbo, who was 
known for his adherence to the views of white supremacy and who was under 
Senate	investigation	for	corruption	when	he	died	in	1947.	Mansfield	was	elected	
in 1916 and served until his death in 1947.
	18.	 Vinson	to	Truman,	22	October	1945,	Truman	official	file.
 19. Memorandum from the secretary of the treasury, “The Cabinet Committee For-
mula	and	the	Full	Employment	Legislation,”	n.d.,	Truman	official	file	(hereafter	
cited as Memorandum, “Cabinet Committee Formula”).
	20.	 Truman	to	John	McCormack,	29	October	1945,	Truman	official	file.	
	21.	 Eleanor	Roosevelt	to	Truman,	1	November	1945,	Truman	official	file;	Truman	to	
Eleanor	Roosevelt,	6	November	1945,	Truman	official	file.
 22. Gossett was a conservative Democrat who served from 1939 to 1951.
	23.	 Bender	was	first	elected	to	Congress	in	1938	and	was	a	close	ally	of	Ohio	senator	
Robert Taft. Bender was appointed to serve out Taft’s Senate term when Taft died 
in 1953.
 24. Minutes of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, U.S. 
Congress, House of Representatives, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 7 November 1945, 
National Archives and Records Service, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as Min-
utes, Expenditures Committee).
 25. Secretary of the treasury, “Basis for a Compromise on Full Employment Legisla-
tion,”	November	1945,	Truman	official	file.
 26. Ibid.
 27. Keyserling had been a top legislative staffer of Sen. Robert Wagner from 1933 
to	1937	and	is	credited	with	drafting	significant	portions	of	Wagner’s	New	Deal	
legislation. He served as counsel for several housing agencies in the Roosevelt 
administration. Truman appointed him vice chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers in 1946.
 28. Keyserling, oral history interview by Gerhard Colm, Harry S. Truman Library and 
Museum, Independence, MO; memorandum, V.O. Key to George Graham, 31 July 
1945, Gerhard Colm Papers, Truman Library, Independence, MO.
 29. Memorandum from the secretary of the treasury to Truman, “Basis for Compro-
mise	on	Full	Employment	Legislation,”	November	1945,	Truman	official	file.
	30.	 Confidential	subcommittee	print,	“Proposed	Substitute	For	S.	380	Recommended	
by the Subcommittee,” 21 November 1945, National Archives and Records Ser-
vice, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as Subcommittee Substitute).
 31. Subcommittee Substitute, 21 November 1945. This source covers the material in 
the	next	five	paragraphs.
 32. Memorandum, “Cabinet Committee Formula”; Subcommittee Substitute.
 33. Vinson to William Whittington, 24 November 1945, Colm Papers; memorandum, 
Gerhard Colm to J. Weldon Jones, 26 November 1945, Colm Papers.
 34. Memorandum, “Cabinet Committee Formula.”
 35. Minutes, Expenditures Committee, 27 November 1945.
 36. Resa served only one term in Congress, representing Chicago. Dawson was 
elected	to	Congress	from	Chicago	in	1942.	He	is	perhaps	best	known	as	the	first	
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African American to chair a standing committee of the House of Representatives, 
becoming chairman of the Executive Expenditures Committee (later the Govern-
ment Operations Committee) in 1949 and serving until his death in 1970.
 37. Minutes, Expenditures Committee, 27 November 1945.
 38. Minutes, Expenditures Committee, 28 November 1945.
 39. Minutes, Expenditures Committee, 29 November and 5 December 1945.
 40. To test the interpretation that that committee was conservative, an ideology score 
from	10	roll	calls	identified	as	critical	by	the	UDA	was	calculated.	The	ideology	
score	could	range	from	+1.0	at	the	liberal	end	to	−1.0	at	the	conservative	end.	For	
a more detailed discussion of this ideology score, see Appendix B.
	41.	 Manasco	scored	a	−0.3,	and	the	ranking	Republican,	Clare	Hoffman,	scored	a	per-
fect	−1.0.	Whittington	had	an	ideology	score	of	+0.4,	which	was	one	of	the	most	
liberal scores of any Southern member of Congress. The average ideology score 
of the Democratic members of the Executive Expenditures Committee was 0.4, 
and	the	average	for	the	Republican	members	was	−0.5.	The	House	Banking	and	
Currency Committee Democrats scored more liberally (+0.6) and the Republi-
can	members	more	conservatively	(−0.7)	than	their	counterparts	on	the	Executive	
Expenditures Committee.
 42. By 1937, the House Committee on the Rules was controlled by an alliance of 
conservative Southern Democrats and Republicans, even though it was chaired by 
liberal Chicago Democrat Adolph Sabath. The conservative domination endured 
into the 1960s (Davis 2003).
 43. Benton Jensen represented Iowa in Congress from 1935 to 1965. 
 44. George Bates represented Salem, Massachusetts, from 1937 until he died in a 
plane crash in 1949.
 45. Son of a former Texas congressman and governor, Frederick Garland (Fritz) Lan-
ham was elected to Congress in a special election in 1919 and served until 1947.
 46. John Gibson represented Georgia from 1941 to 1947, when he lost in the primary 
election.
 47. Celler represented New York City from 1923 until he was defeated in the 1972 
Democratic primary by Elizabeth Holtzman. As chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, Celler led the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Immigration Act of 1965, which ended the 
national origins quota system.
 48. Granger was elected to represent Utah in 1940 and served until he ran for the Sen-
ate unsuccessfully in 1952.
 49. The Dewey quote has been frequently cited as an excerpt from a campaign speech 
he gave in Seattle, Washington, on September 21, 1944.
 50. Labor and civil rights activist Biemiller was elected from Wisconsin in 1944, 
defeated in 1946, and reelected in 1948. He served as the director of the AFL-
CIO’s Department of Legislation from 1956 to 1978. Horace Jeremiah “Jerry” 
Voorhis represented Los Angeles County from 1937 until he was defeated by 
future president Richard Nixon in 1948.
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Socioeconomic and Political Forces
The	issues	that	defined	the	debate	on	the	full	employment	bill	are	
clear. The positions of most key leaders are also apparent. Indeed, the 
outcome of the legislative action on the full employment bill is now well 
known. The question that remains is whether legislators who favored a 
redefinition	of	 the	government’s	 role	and	responsibility	 for	maintain-
ing economic well-being differed, in systematic and meaningful ways, 
from their colleagues who did not. 
We know that why a member of Congress votes a certain way ex-
tends beyond how he or she assesses the merits of the issue. Members 
are	influenced	by	the	needs	of	their	constituents,	the	priorities	of	their	
party, and their sense of what may be in the best interests of the nation. 
The	field	of	legislative	behavior	has	a	rich	literature	on	the	factors	that	
relate to congressional decision making.1 This chapter builds on this 
scholarly research to explore a subset of socioeconomic and political 
factors that are measurable and analyzes the degree to which these vari-
ables are linked to support for full employment. The resulting statistical 
analysis sheds further light on the dynamics that shaped the enactment 
of the Employment Act of 1946.
MEASURING SUPPORT FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT
At the heart of this analysis is crafting an unambiguous measure 
of support for full employment. In this instance, there is a very limited 
set of observed behaviors on which to operationalize support for the 
full employment bill, and these behaviors form the basis of the full 
employment score. It is interesting to compare the House’s distribution 
on the full employment score with the Senate’s distribution, as Figure 
6.1 presents. In contrast to the Senate, where 55 percent of the members 
consistently supported the bill, only 21 percent of the House members 
had perfect support scores.  
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The full employment score is actually two different measures—a 
score for the Senate and a score for the House.2 In the Senate, the score 
comprises three roll call votes on S. 380, two that amended it and one 
that passed it. In the House, the three components consist of sponsor-
ship of H.R. 2202, a roll call to recommit the compromise bill, and a 
roll	call	on	its	final	passage.	That	a	member	had	to	be	a	sponsor	of	H.R.	
2202 in the House to obtain a perfect score, while sponsorship of S. 380 
in the Senate was not used in the score, may account for the lower per-
centage of perfect scores in the House. Conversely, the Senate score is 
based on votes that were taken on legislation much closer to the original 
full employment proposal than the version of H.R. 2202 that came to 
the	House	floor.	
Figure 6.1  Legislative Support for Full Employment: Comparison of 
Senate and House Scores
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NOTE:	There	were	zero	members	of	the	House	at	the	−0.67	level	of	support	for	full	
employment	and	zero	members	of	 the	Senate	at	 the	−0.33	 level	of	support	 for	 full	
employment.
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CORRELATES OF SUPPORT FOR THE FULL 
EMPLOYMENT BILL
The full employment bill was preceded by more than a decade of 
economic upheaval, social change, and political realignment. The exist-
ing research leads us to expect that the forces of constituency, econom-
ics,	electoral	security,	ideology,	and	party	all	were	potentially	influential	
in the legislative action on the full employment bill. The challenge is 
in drawing on data from the 1940s to measure these concepts of con-
stituency, economics, electoral security, ideology, and party in order to 
clarify our understanding of the dynamics that led to the passage of the 
compromise version of the full employment bill. Despite the various 
problems inherent in operationalizing these concepts, the variables do 
offer a basis for exploring statistical models of legislative action on full 
employment.3
The Senate
Descriptive analysis of the senators’ rankings on the full employ-
ment score by party shows clear differences. For the 55 Democratic 
senators, the average of 0.71 on the full employment score is almost 
twice the overall mean of 0.36. The average score for the 40 Republican 
senators	(−0.15),	however,	falls	well	below	the	total	average	score.	Sen-
ators	from	the	regions	of	New	England	and	the	Pacific	coast	have	the	
most	consistently	high	scores,	regardless	of	party	identification.	Demo-
cratic supporters of full employment represent states that experienced 
somewhat greater average unemployment than those Democrats who 
had negative scores on full employment. Those favoring the bill came 
from states that had lower average per capita personal income in 1943 
as well as in 1933 than those opposing the bill, but these differences 
fade when party is taken into account.4
The paucity of cases and the constrained statistical variation of this 
state-level data limit the use of more powerful statistical techniques 
for the Senate. A limited multivariate analysis of Senate support for 
full employment, however, does reveal a bit about how these measures 
work in concert. In this instance, simple correlation and regression 
techniques are used.5
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Being a member of the Democratic Party clearly correlates most 
strongly with support for full employment, as Table 6.1 shows. Sena-
tors from high unemployment states were only somewhat more likely 
to have supported full employment. This analysis hints that support for 
full employment increases somewhat with the candidate’s electoral per-
centage. As a state’s per capita income rises slightly, support for full 
employment appears to decrease. 
When a regression equation is used to measure the multivariate 
effects of party, employment, urban change, working class, and per 
capita income upon the full employment scale, it is apparent that party 
is the dominating variable. State unemployment rates and per capita 
income both have modest effects on the full employment scale; how-
ever,	 the	multiple	 correlation	 coefficient	 of	 the	 regression	 of	 0.45	 is	
modest (Table 6.2). 
The importance of this analysis lies not in the strength or weak-
ness	of	its	findings,	but	rather	in	its	identifying	the	vulnerable	elements	
of what appeared to be overwhelming support for full employment in 
the Senate.6 When one examines the distinguishing characteristics of 
the senators and the states they represent, one sees subtle differences 
between supporters and opponents that sketch the dynamics of support 
for the full employment bill. Moreover, the importance of party—and to 
a lesser extent per capita personal income and state unemployment lev-
els—foreshadow the forces that the full employment bill encountered 
subsequently in the House of Representatives.
The House of Representatives
The number of representatives in the House and the diversity of 
their districts provide a richer source of data for analysis. Such data 
enable us to speculate on how these measures of constituency, econom-
ics, electoral security, ideology, and party may relate to support for the 
full employment bill. The 79th House of Representatives consisted of 
242 Democrats, 193 Republicans, and 1 Progressive. In general, the 
eastern and midwestern sections of the country were dominated by the 
Republicans, while the southern and western parts were controlled by 
the Democrats. 
New	 England,	 the	 Pacific	 coast,	 and	 the	 east	 and	 west	 North- 
Central regions were the wealthiest according to the adjusted living 
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level, in contrast to the South, Border, and Mountain regions. The unem-
ployment rates tended to differ in a pattern across regions that show 
the Mid-Atlantic and Border districts with the highest averages and 
the	Pacific	and	North-Central	districts	with	 the	 lowest.	New	England	
and the Mid-Atlantic had the largest average proportions of working- 
class people.7 
The typical sponsor of full employment in the House was a liberal 
Democrat elected during the New Deal realignment from a district that 
was	more	working	class,	had	experienced	urbanization	and	an	 influx	
of immigrants, and had been hardest hit by the Great Depression. The 
members	who	voted	for	the	final	measure	were	generally	nondescript	in	
contrast to the sponsors, but they still were characterized as Democrats 
(and some Republicans) who represented districts that had more for-
eign-born, more African Americans, and more working-class people—
all groups who were more likely to have been unemployed in 1937.8
Table 6.1  Senators’ Support for Full Employment and Selected 
Measures: Simple Correlation Coefficients
Full employment score
Party (1 = Democrat) 0.65
Unemployment rate 0.27
Most recent percentage of vote 0.20
Per capita personal income, 1943 −0.16
Percentage working class 0.13
Percentage urban change 0.02
Table 6.2  Senate Full Employment Score Regressed on Selected 
Variables
Partial R
Party 0.59
Per capita personal income, 1943 −0.13
Unemployment rate 0.12
Most recent percentage of vote −0.09
Percentage change in urban population −0.05
Percentage working class 0.01
Multiple	correlation	coefficient 0.45
NOTE: Partial R is the correlation between two variables after removing the effects of 
other variables.
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Simple	correlation	coefficients	measuring	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	
full employment scale varies along with the constituency, economics, 
electoral security, ideology, and party measures are presented in Table 
6.3. Political party (recoded in this analysis as “1” for Democrats and “0” 
for all others) has the highest correlation with support for full employ-
ment, 0.65. The percentage working class has the second-highest cor-
relation	 coefficient,	 followed	 by	 percentage	 foreign-born,	 percentage	
African American, and percentage unemployed. Those characteristics 
that have noteworthy negative relationships with full employment are 
biographical	status,	tenure	in	office,	and	age	of	the	member.	
These	 findings	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 analysis	 presented	 earlier	
because they indicate that Democrats were much more likely to have 
supported full employment. To a lesser extent, several of the constitu-
ency and economic characteristics are correlated with full employment; 
districts with larger proportions of African Americans and unemployed 
persons, as well as those with a lower level of living standards, all are 
somewhat more likely to support full employment. 
Table 6.3  House Full Employment Score upon Party, Electoral, and 
District Traits: Simple Correlation Coefficients
Full employment score
Political party 0.65
Percentage working class 0.27
Percentage foreign-born 0.26
Percentage unemployed, 1937 0.22
Biographical status −0.13
Percentage African American 0.11
Age −0.11
Tenure in Congress −0.09
Percentage urban change 0.06
New Deal realignment 0.06
Median education 0.06
Living-level index −0.05
Margin of victory 0.02
NOTE:	For	definitions	of	terms	in	this	table,	see	Appendices	A	and	B.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Socioeconomic and Political Forces   131
The next logical question becomes, “What is the effect of each 
of these variables on full-employment support when all of the other 
independent variables are held constant?” Multiple regression equa-
tions enable us to address this question, because such equations aid us 
conceptually in differentiating the direct relationships from the indirect 
relationships. Table 6.4 presents these results.
The political party of the member again dominates the support for 
full employment. Percentage foreign-born and percentage unemployed 
lose strength as predictors of support for full employment when the 
other variables are taken into account, but they remain statistically 
significant.	
The analyses thus far reveal that there are several independent vari-
ables that are at least partially related to support for full employment. 
However,	it	is	also	apparent	that	the	partisan	identification	of	the	mem-
ber overwhelms all other variables in terms of explaining support. This 
finding	 logically	 follows	 from	 the	 simple	 analysis	 presented	 above,	
which suggest that Democrats were more likely to support the legisla-
tion regardless of the other measures. 
Table 6.4  Multiple Regression: House Full Employment Score on Party, 
Electoral, and District Traits
Partial R
Political party** 0.62
Percentage unemployed, 1937** 0.11
Percentage foreign-born** 0.11
Percentage working class 0.08
Median education 0.08
Tenure in Congress 0.05
Living-level index 0.05
Margin of victory −0.05
Age −0.04
Percentage urban change 0.03
Percentage African American −0.03
Biographical status −0.03
Multiple	correlation	coefficient 0.72
NOTE:	**significant	at	the	0.05	level.						
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The dominance of party is not surprising given previous research on 
the importance of party in legislative behavior. It is furthermore consis-
tent with the qualitative research on the debate over full employment. 
This legislation was a top priority of the Democratic president and was 
supported in Congress by key leaders in the party. It grew out of eco-
nomic, constituent, and electoral forces that had shaped the Democratic 
realignment	of	the	previous	decade	and	reflected	the	next	generation	of	
policy perspectives that had created the New Deal. That partisan iden-
tification	overwhelms	other	measures	bearing	on	the	members’	support	
for full employment may, in part, tap the degree to which all Democrats 
advocated this major change in the federal role regardless of the eco-
nomic,	constituency,	electoral,	and	personal	influences	upon	them.
It is intuitively clear that the forces of constituency, economic fac-
tors, personal ideology, party, and electoral security all did not converge 
simultaneously	 in	1945	 to	 influence	 the	outcome	of	 the	 full	 employ-
ment bill. The economic traits of the district and the constituency char-
acteristics already had affected the type of person elected to Congress, 
particularly whether the representative was a Democrat or Republican. 
These district characteristics may also have had a further effect on the 
likelihood that the representative supported the full employment bill, an 
effect that is distinct from the party of the member, as the earlier analy-
sis of those who deviated from their party’s position suggests. 
An additional explanation for the dominance of party in the regres-
sion equation is that party is colinear with many of a given district’s 
socioeconomic characteristics.9 The case of party being colinear with 
constituent and economic traits is not an issue of multiple measures of 
the same basic concept. The concepts are distinct, but the actual mea-
sures	available	have	patterns	so	similar	that	it	is	difficult	to	discern	the	
differences, as Table 6.5 illustrates.
When support for full employment is approached as a sequential 
process, political party again dominates. Being a member of the Demo-
cratic Party yields a 0.70 direct effect on support for full employment 
in the House of Representatives. Percentage working class, which has 
one	of	the	highest	simple	correlation	coefficients	with	full	employment,	
appears to have more of an indirect effect through party than a direct 
effect on the House full employment scale. Most of the effect of urban 
change is felt through party, as are the effects of race and ethnicity. 
The unemployment rate, on the other hand, has some direct effect on 
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support for full employment over and above its effect on party. When 
regional groupings are taken into account, party remains the leading 
predictor, and the percentage of urban change decreases to the point 
where its effect becomes trivial. The South, as one might expect, has a 
noteworthy positive effect on electing a Democrat and a negative effect 
on support for full employment.10 Overall, the structural equation mod-
els	presented	in	Appendix	E	yield	multiple	correlation	coefficients	of	
0.71 to 0.74 and explain about half of the variance in the House full 
employment score.
It	 is	difficult	 to	assess	whether	a	model	explaining	50	percent	of	
the variance is a cup half empty or a cup half full. Given that several of 
the measures lack the precision one might wish and that the exogenous 
variables are “muted” for the metropolitan congressional districts (see 
Appendix A), one might speculate that better data would have produced 
stronger results. It is best, nonetheless, to say the cup is half full and 
only half full.
Still, the other half of the cup poses unanswered questions that are 
not explained by the statistical models. The crudeness of the variables 
makes it plausible to attribute much to measurement imperfections. At 
least a portion of the unexplained variance is due to aspects of legis-
lative behavior that defy measurement in this study: the judgment of 
the	member,	the	influence	of	interest-group	lobbying,	the	power	of	the	
press, the role of political brokering, and the power of the status quo.
Table 6.5  Multiple Regression: Democratic Party on District Traits of 
the House
Partial R                                 
Living-level index** −0.32
Percentage African American** 0.28
Percentage foreign-born** 0.24
Percentage urban change** 0.20
Percentage working class** 0.16
Median education 0.06
Percentage unemployed, 1937 0.03
Multiple	correlation	coefficient 0.63
NOTE:	**significant	at	the	0.05	level.
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The matter of a member’s judgment and worldview may have 
played out in several different scenarios. The debates in the House 
offered many forceful arguments concerning full employment that 
spoke to national concerns and ideological beliefs. A member could 
have represented a district that was “vulnerable” to unemployment as 
characterized by the exogenous variables, but that member might have 
concluded that the full employment bill would have assigned too much 
power to the federal government. Such a member might have viewed 
a small group of economic planners directing a national employment 
policy as a potentially tyrannical bureaucracy that would have been far 
worse than cyclical problems of unemployment. On the other hand, a 
member from a district that was not especially vulnerable to unemploy-
ment might have concluded, regardless, that it was in the best interests 
of the nation to have the federal government assume the responsibility 
for maintaining full employment. These two perspectives on the role of 
government were not unique to that time and can be traced back to the 
Federalist versus Anti–Federalist philosophies that took root during the 
founding of the United States.
Pressure groups were perceived as especially powerful before the 
enactment	of	the	first	comprehensive	federal	lobbying	law,	the	Federal	
Regulation of Lobbying Act, in August 1946.11 As discussed in previ-
ous chapters, a formidable number of business interests, labor unions, 
and other pressure groups were intensely engaged in the full employ-
ment legislation. The persuasive powers of such groups helped delin-
eate the issues of national policy. Members who did not perceive their 
districts as especially vulnerable to unemployment might well have 
opted to follow the advice of interest-group lobbyists to whom they 
were close. Even a member whose district’s traits would have suggested 
an alternative action might have heeded an interest group because of the 
advantages that that interest group offered the member. Prior to federal 
regulation of lobbying, such pressure groups had considerable clout to 
reward	their	friends	and	otherwise	influence	the	debate.
The power of the press to interpret events and shape the debate is 
another element to be factored in. Although Chapter 3 presents survey 
research data indicating overwhelming public support for the federal 
government having a role in job creation and full employment, the press 
was largely opposed to the legislation. Public opinion research was a 
relatively	new	field	in	the	1940s.	Senators	and	representatives	at	 that	
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time did not track opinion polls as they do today. They were more likely 
to presume they had been elected to show sound judgment in voting 
rather than to mirror the views of their constituents. That the campaign 
against	full	employment	legislation	waged	in	the	print	media	amplified	
the views of those opposed, albeit a minority view, served to further 
minimize the public support for the legislation. 
Political brokering is a longstanding activity in Congress, and none 
would doubt that it plays an important function. One form is colloqui-
ally known as “back-scratching,” where members trade votes on bills 
they	are	less	concerned	with	to	ensure	sufficient	support	on	measures	
important to them. Another form of political bargaining is the role party 
leaders play in exerting pressure on members to vote with the majority 
of their party on issues deemed of national importance. The academic 
literature	defines	this	broker	role	of	party	leaders	as	part	of	the	“coali-
tion representational” model. One easily can imagine that some arm-
twisting occurred over the full employment bill, some of which may 
have been captured in the explanatory power of the political party vari-
able (Jackson 1974). 
Finally, the power of the status quo might well have led some mem-
bers whose districts might have been described as vulnerable to unem-
ployment to nonetheless vote against the full employment bill, their 
rationale being, “Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t.” 
This folk adage could well have characterized the sentiments of some 
members who might have concluded that unemployment was a serious 
problem but lacked trust in a federal policy to resolve it. Though less 
sophisticated perhaps than the classic Federalist versus Anti-Federalist 
tension, the power of the status quo is a familiar force in legislative 
dynamics.
We know there were many reasons for why members of Con-
gress either supported or opposed full employment. The unmeasurable 
aspects mentioned above offer such plausible explanations of legislative 
behavior that the explanatory power of the statistical analysis provides 
a noteworthy contrast. Yet even though the statistical analysis does not 
account fully for this dramatic change in the role of the federal govern-
ment,	it	does	enlighten	our	understanding	of	this	change.	This	signifi-
cant legislation passed the U.S. Congress for a complex set of reasons, 
not least of which were the political party of the members voting on it 
and the economic characteristics of their congressional districts.
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Notes
 1. Some of the major works of legislative behavior research that guide these analyses 
include the following: James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New 
Deal (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967); Duncan MacRae, Dimen-
sions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); 
Warren	 E.	 Miller	 and	 Donald	 E.	 Stokes,	 “Constituency	 Influence	 in	 Congress,”	
American Political Science Review, vol. 57, no. 1 (March 1963); Aage Clausen, 
How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus (New York: St. Martin Press, 1973); Jer-
rold Schneider (1979), Ideological Coalitions in Congress (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press); John E. Jackson, Constituencies and Leaders in Congress (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); Joshua D. Clinton, Simon Jackman, 
and	Douglas	Rivers,	“The	Statistical	Analysis	of	Legislative	Behavior:	A	Unified	
Approach,” American Political Science Review, vol. 988, no. 2 (Clinton, Jackman, 
and Rivers 2004); and Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political Repre-
sentation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
 2. For an explanation of how these scores were constructed, see Appendix B.
 3. These county-level data are used to construct congressional district–level data 
according to a rather complex set of procedures. Appendix A describes this process 
in some detail and also discusses why actual 1940 data are used rather than interpo-
lated 1945 estimates.
 4. Looking at senators whose scores deviated from their party reveals some rather 
interesting	patterns.	For	the	purposes	here,	deviance	is	defined	as	Democrats	who	
score negatively on the full employment scale and Republicans who score posi-
tively. The lowest rates of unemployment are in states with Democrats who have 
negative scores on full employment. These same Democrats also represent states 
that, on average, are the poorest in 1943 and that have experienced the slowest 
growth in per capita personal income over the previous decade. For the most part, 
these deviant Democrats are from the South. Republicans who score positively on 
full employment do not differ meaningfully from their fellow Republicans except 
in regard to urbanization. These deviant Republicans come from states with the 
lowest average increase in urbanization from 1920 to 1940. This phenomenon is 
largely attributable to Republicans from New England states that already had high 
levels of urbanization. For further analysis, see Appendix C.
	 5.	 See	Appendix	F	for	methodological	references.	Tests	of	significance	are	not	pre-
sented as part of these analyses because the data captures the entire population 
during	the	span	of	time	under	study;	however,	tests	of	significance	for	each	exog-
enous variable are used as a gauge of how directly that variable relates to support 
for the full employment bill in the multivariate analysis of the House. 
 6. The relationships among partisan, regional, electoral, economic, and demographic 
characteristics to one’s support for full employment are explored more fully in the 
analysis of the House action on the legislation.
 7. Appendix D provides detailed supporting analysis. 
 8. Again, Appendix D provides detailed supporting analysis. 
 9. This multicolinearity undermines the multiple regression assumption of the addi-
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tive model, which requires the exogenous variables to be independent of one 
another.
 10. Appendix E presents models of support for full employment that approach it as a 
sequential process by means of structural equations. The traits of the district are 
used to predict the party of the candidate who won the most recent election—
i.e.,	 the	current	member	of	Congress.	In	turn,	 the	member’s	party	identification	
is used to predict his or her position on full employment. Of course, this set of 
relationships is more complex than this simple statement implies and captures 
other	variables	as	well,	such	as	the	1937	unemployment	rate’s	influence	upon	the	
party of the person representing the district as well as upon his or her support for 
full employment.
 11. Enacted as Title III of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, P.L. 79-601, 
this law requires certain persons, groups, and organizations engaged in lobby-
ing	activities	to	keep	detailed	financial	accounts,	file	financial	statements,	and	in	
certain cases register as lobbyists before engaging in lobbying activities. Several 
key court cases, notably United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), and United 
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953), narrowed the scope of the law in its early 
years.
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The Employment Act of 1946
The spirit was one of optimism as 1946 opened. The United States 
had defeated the powers of fascism and, in the process, had risen out of 
the	Great	Depression.	Sacrifice	and	austerity	gave	way	to	pent-up	con-
sumer demand. People began having children at a rate that countered 
virtually a century of decline in the fertility rate. The United States had 
the deterrent power of the atomic bomb, without the full awareness of 
its horrors. It was a heady, joyful moment in the nation’s history. 
The enactment of the Employment Act of 1946 was true to this 
moment	 in	 time.	 It	 signaled	 a	 confidence	 that	America	 could	 allevi-
ate unemployment in peacetime as well as during the war, and that the 
federal government was ready to stimulate the economy when private 
enterprise fell short. It was a covenant between the federal government 
and the people that the United States would not tolerate depressions.
FINAL PUSH FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT
As 1946 opened, President Truman used his bully pulpit to advance 
the Senate-passed version of the full employment bill. During his radio 
speech of January 3, he encouraged voters to contact their represen-
tatives on behalf of “real” full employment legislation. Truman him-
self had already written to the congressional conferees urging them to 
approve no less than the Senate-passed bill (Truman 1961c).1
On January 6, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce publicly recom-
mended a permanent government commission on unemployment 
and	business	fluctuations.	Although	 the	U.S.	Chamber	of	Commerce	
roundly rejected what it called “totalitarian collectivism,” it acknowl-
edged that “numerous techniques and policies for shortening periods of 
income	and	job	losses	and	avoiding	extreme	fluctuations	are	known.”	
The Chamber apparently recognized that it could not block enactment 
of some form of the full employment bill and opted to push for a ver-
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sion resembling H.R. 2202, which had become the House-passed S. 380 
(Cotton 1946). 
In his 1946 State of the Union Message, President Truman contin-
ued to push for full employment legislation. In the speech, he asserted, 
“It is the responsibility of Government to gear its total program to 
the achievement of full production and full employment.” Again, he 
emphasized his wish that Congress would enact a full employment bill 
like the one the Senate had passed. Indeed, during the address Truman 
expressed strong and repeated references to the need for full employ-
ment (Truman 1961d).
Public support for a federal role in job creation remained high. In 
a Fortune survey published in February 1946, only 17.7 percent of 
respondents chose the response “Let business and industry work out 
the problem without any government interference at all.” As Figure 7.1 
depicts, a total of 38.1 percent selected the survey responses depicted 
by the two sections of the pie chart dealing with “continuous public 
works”: 10.3 percent of those chose large-scale continuous public 
works programs, and 27.8 percent chose public works programs that 
would	ebb	and	flow	with	fluctuations	in	the	business	cycle.	Almost	one-
third (31.0 percent) selected the survey response “Depend mainly on 
business and industry to create enough employment normally, and just 
provide work at those times when industry cannot employ everyone,” 
represented on the pie chart by the phrase “Business & industry with 
government” (Cantril 1951, p. 904).
The day after Truman’s State of the Union address, the confer-
ence committee began meeting on the full employment legislation. 
Sen. Robert Wagner, initially the chair of the conference managers, had 
become ill a few weeks earlier and was not able to assume the task. 
This key sponsor of the original bill was replaced by respected Senate 
majority leader Alben Barkley (D-KY), who also supported the origi-
nal language.2 The other Senate conference managers were Murdock, 
Taylor, Radcliffe, Tobey, Taft, and Buck. The House conferees were led 
by Manasco and included Cochran, Whittington, Bender, and Hoffman.
From	all	unofficial	accounts,	it	appears	that	the	conferees	engaged	
in	a	series	of	hard-fought	struggles.	During	 the	first	 two	sessions,	no	
agreements	were	 reached,	and	 it	 took	five	sessions	 just	 to	debate	 the	
bill’s opening declaration of policy. Meanwhile, rumors abounded not 
only	of	infighting	between	two	pivotal	administration	officials—Vinson	
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and Snyder—but of administration strategies to co-opt a key Republi-
can conferee (Bailey 1964, pp. 222–227). 
The debate focused on two substantive issues: full employment and 
compensatory spending. Whittington led the House managers in oppos-
ing any reference to full employment or to the government’s guarantee 
of employment. Whittington also argued that the spending provisions 
must be deleted. Barkley, on the other hand, blasted the House-passed 
version and restated the importance of full employment and compensa-
tory spending. Furthermore, Barkley emphasized President Truman’s 
warning that only the Senate-passed version was acceptable to Truman 
(Bailey 1964, pp. 222–227). 
The	conferees	finally,	on	February	3,	1946,	hammered	out	a	com-
promise that essentially resulted in a totally rewritten bill. The confer-
Figure 7.1  Public Opinion on the Government’s Role in Employment: 
February 1946
Which one of these comes closest to expressing your ideas of what the govern-
ment should do to avoid periods of unemployment after the war?
SOURCE: Fortune, February 1946 (Cantril 1951, p. 904).
Business & 
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ence legislation was briefer than previous versions and used the kind of 
sweeping	 language	 that	offended	 few	and	defied	 strict	 interpretation.	
The planning structures—i.e., the Council of Economic Advisers and 
the Joint Committee on the Economic Report—became the crux of the 
proposal. 
The Council of Economic Advisers and the Joint Committee on 
the Economic Report now were charged with the task of achieving the 
objectives of the legislation. The policy declaration contained in the 
bill expressed these objectives and represented the carefully crafted 
compromise:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy and 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practical means 
consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential con-
siderations of national policy with the assistance and cooperation 
of industry, agriculture, labor, and State and local governments, to 
coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the 
purpose of creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated to fos-
ter and promote free competitive enterprise and the general wel-
fare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employ-
ment for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote 
maximum employment, production and purchasing power. (U.S. 
Congress 1946)
Almost all of the interested parties claimed victory. The conser-
vatives were pleased that they had stripped the law of its right-to- 
employment phrases, its provisions requiring compensatory spending 
in times of private sector shortfalls, and its full employment language. 
Liberals were pleased that the bill created structures for economic plan-
ning, that it did not require a balanced budget, and that it vested the 
federal government with the responsibility and the authority to draw on 
all of its resources and functions to promote maximum employment, 
production, and purchasing power. Although it was turgid prose, it 
appeared to be a semantic success.
The House and Senate quickly acted on the conference commit-
tee report. Wright Patman, one of the original drafters, was joined by 
Cochran, Whittington, and Manasco in expressing support for the com-
promise legislation. The House passed it by a vote of 320 to 84 on Feb-
ruary 6, 1946. Two days later the Senate approved the conference report 
without dissent (Congressional Record 1946, pp. 999–1009, 1170). 
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On February 20, 1946, President Truman signed the Employment 
Act, making it Public Law 304 of the 79th Congress. It was not the 
strong bill he had requested, but he expressed the intent to implement 
it in a manner true to the original language. Reviewing the key compo-
nents of the initial bill—federal responsibility and structure, economic 
planning, right to employment, and compensatory spending—it was 
clear that Truman would be able to do much within the language of the 
enacted law.
The Employment Act promoted “maximum employment,” not 
“full employment.” Though the administration had fought to retain the 
term, it now said the difference between full employment and maxi-
mum employment was the difference between “Tweedledum and Twee-
dledee” (Congressional Quarterly 1946). This comment on the insignif-
icance of the difference was true regarding the Truman administration’s 
application of the law, but it would not hold true in the presidencies to 
follow.
Maximum employment, unlike full employment, was not a value-
laden term. The latter was a panacea to some, an anathema to others. 
Some called full employment fascism, some called it communism, and 
some called it the hallmark of a free society. Maximum employment, 
on the other hand, did not carry such divergent connotations. Noth-
ing	in	the	Employment	Act	precluded	defining	maximum	employment	
in Keynesian terms, yet nothing required it. The importance of the 
Employment	Act	was	that	it	clarified	the	federal	responsibility	to	assure	
maximum employment.
Neither chamber of Congress had been able to muster a major-
ity that would accept the right-to-employment provision, despite the 
importance Roosevelt had given it in his 1944 State of the Union 
address. Even many who agreed with the concept in theory were uncer-
tain about a statute in which the federal government guaranteed a job 
for anyone who wanted one. The Employment Act, nonetheless, stated 
that the government would maintain “conditions under which there will 
be afforded useful employment for those able, willing, and seeking to 
work.” In other words, instead of pledging the right to employment, it 
promised an economic climate of employment opportunities.
The Employment Act did not require compensatory spending. 
The conservatives’ favorite amendment—requirement of a balanced 
budget and a tax plan to ensure it—also was omitted. The absence of 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
144   Wasem
such	specific	language	freed	subsequent	policymakers	to	use	the	most	
acceptable	fiscal	and	monetary	practices	to	meet	the	objectives	of	the	
act.	Clearly,	Keynesian	fiscal	policies	such	as	compensatory	spending	
implicitly fell within the “all practical means” and “all plans, functions, 
and	 resources”	 that	 the	 federal	 government	might	 use.	Most	 signifi-
cantly, the Employment Act emphasized two key elements that Hansen 
had highlighted earlier—1) maximum production and 2) purchasing 
power—and instituted “consumer Keynesianism.”
Finally, the Employment Act established the federal structures for 
economic planning. As stated at the onset, most scholars hail the law 
for	 this	accomplishment.	Moreover,	 the	final	 law	was	superior	 to	 the	
initial	bill	in	terms	of	creating	a	flexible	and	accountable	apparatus	for	
national economic planning. In this regard, the Employment Act her-
alded a new era in the federal role. 
The dreaded postwar unemployment never swept the United States. 
Some have subsequently argued that because this unemployment did 
not materialize, members of Congress retreated on their initial commit-
ment to full employment. The passage of the Employment Act, how-
ever, occurred when economic forecasters were still sending mixed 
messages, when war production workers were being laid off, and when 
it was too soon to measure the full effect of soldiers returning home 
(e.g., Time 1945b,d,e,h). Thus, it was the wisdom of hindsight that cred-
ited members of Congress with such foresight.
Indeed, the passage of the Employment Act had a positive effect 
by buoying the U.S. economy during this critical period of demobi-
lization. In many ways, the Employment Act offered economic secu-
rity to American consumers, workers, and business. It might well have 
been an antidote to the economic pessimism that public opinion surveys 
found during the war years and might well have provided some of the 
confidence	that	fueled	postwar	consumerism.
IMPLEMENTING THE EMPLOYMENT ACT
Absent	 the	 specific	 requirements	of	 the	original	 full	 employment	
legislation, the overarching question becomes, “Would the Employ-
ment Act succeed in accomplishing the goals of its initial sponsors?” 
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Given the compromises that were made to ensure its passage, there was 
no guarantee that the policies prescribed by the Employment Act would 
be vigorously pursued by the structures the act created. As Cervantes 
wrote, “The proof of the pudding is in the eating.” 
The Employment Act established the Joint Committee on the 
Economic Report (now commonly referred to as the Joint Economic 
Committee) with only an advisory role.3 It had no power to authorize 
programs, pass laws, or appropriate funds. The Joint Economic Com-
mittee’s functions included reviewing options and programs to further 
the government’s policy of maximum employment and purchasing 
power, as well as studying the economic report, which the administra-
tion would produce annually. It provided guidance and critical assess-
ment of the economic report to other congressional committees. This 
legislative mandate enabled the Joint Economic Committee to consider 
and make recommendations on a whole range of economic policy. The 
clout of the Joint Economic Committee would hinge on the connec-
tional power of its members—that is, whether members of the com-
mittee also had prominent or powerful positions within the legislative 
bodies.
Sen.	 Joseph	 O’Mahoney	 became	 the	 first	 chairman	 of	 the	 Joint	
Committee on the Economic Report. O’Mahoney had achieved wide-
spread attention on economic matters when he chaired the Temporary 
National Economic Committee, created in 1938 to study monopolistic 
business practices. That congressionally mandated committee had pro-
duced a report in 1941 that analyzed 50 years of economic data and 
found that a few corporations had gathered a growing concentration of 
wealth and economic power (Temporary National Economic Commit-
tee 1941). O’Mahoney had cosponsored the Full Employment Act of 
1945 (S. 380) and had presented the economic arguments in support of 
S.	380	during	the	Senate	floor	debate.	He	was	a	very	influential	sena-
tor, sitting on the powerful Appropriations Committee and the Judiciary 
Committee. At that time he chaired the Committee on Indian Affairs, 
and he later chaired the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.4
Senator Robert Taft was the ranking member of the Joint Economic 
Committee and a leading Republican.5 He led the Republican Policy 
Committee and served on the Banking and Currency and the Education 
and Labor Committees. Taft had played a pivotal role in the legislative 
action that established the Employment Act. He had been outspoken in
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NOTE: The original Associated Press cutline for this photo said, “DISAGREE: Sen-
ators Joseph C. O’Mahoney (left) and Robert D. Taft shake hands Jan. 16 despite 
their disagreement over action on President Truman’s report on economic conditions. 
O’Mahoney suggested that the Senate-House committee act promptly to carry out the 
President’s ideas. Taft said he saw no need for haste.”
SOURCE: Joseph O’Mahoney Collection, Box 390, Folder 48, American Heritage 
Center, University of Wyoming.
his opposition to full employment but ultimately supported S. 380 after 
his amendments were incorporated.
O’Mahoney’s Democratic colleagues on the Joint Economic Com-
mittee were similarly well-placed on key authorizing committees. The 
Senate Democrats were the following three men: Abe Murdock, who 
served on the Banking and Currency Committee’s Full Employment 
Subcommittee as well as on the Appropriations and Judiciary Commit-
Illustration 7.1  Senators Joseph O’Mahoney and Robert Taft
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tees; James Tunnel, who chaired the Committee on Pensions and also 
served on the Education and Labor Committee; and Francis Myers, who 
served on the Patents and Naval Affairs committees (and who would 
become Democratic whip in 1949). The House Democrats were as fol-
lows: Edward Hart, who had chaired the Committee on War Claims and 
now chaired the House Committee on Un-American Activities; Wright 
Patman, who was chairman of the Select Committee on Small Business 
and a member of the Banking and Currency Committee; George Out-
land, who was also on the Banking and Currency Committee; and Wal-
ter Huber, who served on the Census and the Civil Service committees.6 
The other Republican senators on the Joint Economic Committee were 
equally representative of other key committees. Senator Styles Bridges 
(R-NH) was the ranking Republican on the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee and served on the Republican Policy Committee. Senator Robert 
M. La Follette Jr. served on the Education and Labor Committee.7 
Interestingly, the House Republicans on the Joint Committee all came 
from one committee—the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive 
Departments. George Bender was one of Republican House members 
who sponsored the initial full employment legislation and also an ally 
of Sen. Robert Taft. Walter Judd had supported the Whittington rewrite 
of the Employment Act. Robert Rich opposed the legislation through-
out the legislative debate.
In the 79th Congress, both sides of the aisle chose their Joint Eco-
nomic	Committee	 from	among	 its	most	 influential	members	and	key	
congressional committees. Additionally, most of the selected members 
had considerable ownership in the Employment Act. The combined 
clout of the members also signaled that the 79th Congress was ready to 
go toe-to-toe with the executive branch when it came to the economy 
and employment policy. As a consequence, the Joint Economic Com-
mittee was transformed from an advisory committee with very little 
statutory	authority	on	paper	into	a	very	influential	committee	through	
the connectional power of its members.
As it did with the Joint Economic Committee, the Employment Act 
assigned the Council of Economic Advisers only an advisory role when 
it created the body. Its statutory duties were to provide economic advice 
to the president and to help the president write an annual economic 
report. The president was not required to heed the council’s guidance. 
Compared to the Bureau of the Budget, it was a very small unit within 
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the	Executive	Office	of	the	President.	The	power	of	the	council	would	
hinge	on	its	efficacy	as	an	authoritative	source	about	the	economy	and	
on the closeness of its relationship with the president.
That Alvin Hansen was not chosen to lead the council is rather 
significant.	Hansen	was	 considered	 “the	American	Keynes”	 and	was	
the foremost scholar and tactician on full employment policies in the 
United States.8 His prominence on full employment may well have 
been the reason he was not selected. As discussed in earlier chapters, 
many credit the demise of the NRPB to its publication of Hansen’s After 
the War—Full Employment in January 1942. Hansen was a lightning 
rod to those who feared an enlarged federal role and to the business 
community.	 The	 economist	 chosen	 in	 his	 stead	 later	 confirmed	 that	
“Alvin Hansen, who has been the pioneer of the American branch of the 
Keynesian movement, was thought of [to be the chair of the council]. 
He had been a protagonist . . . so there was opposition to him.”9
Instead, President Truman selected Edwin Nourse, vice president of 
the	Brookings	Institution,	to	be	the	first	chairman	of	the	Council	of	Eco-
nomic Advisers. Nourse grew up near Chicago and earned his doctorate 
in economics from the University of Chicago. He was a noted agri-
cultural economist when he joined the Institute of Economics, which 
was one of the entities that subsequently merged to form the Brookings 
Institution.	Although	Nourse	identified	himself	as	neither	Democrat	nor	
Republican, he had become personal friends with Henry Wallace when 
they both lived in Iowa. Nourse’s position on the council, however, 
likely came through Sen. James Murray, one of the original drafters 
of the full employment bill. According to Norse, Murray “had become 
interested	in	what	I	was	doing	in	the	field	of	economic	statesmanship,	as	
relating to the question of what private industry would do in adjusting 
to the postwar situation.”10 The CED had also consulted with Nourse on 
economic	policy	while	he	was	at	Brookings.	Nourse	said	the	first	time	
he met Harry Truman was at the White House when the president asked 
him to serve on the Council of Economic Advisers (Knapp 1979). 
President Truman chose Leon Keyserling, general counsel of the 
National Housing Authority, as the vice chairman of the council. Born 
in Charleston, South Carolina, Keyserling obtained a law degree from 
Harvard and then studied economics at Columbia University under Rex-
ford Tugwell. He left graduate school before completing his doctorate 
to work as a legislative assistant to Sen. Robert F. Wagner from 1933 to 
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1937. During his years with Wagner, he drafted several landmark pieces 
of New Deal legislation, notably the National Industrial Recovery Act 
of 1934 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Keyserling was 
also quite involved in writing the Social Security Act of 1935. He then 
served in the Roosevelt administration, where he ardently advocated for 
full employment.11
The third member of the council was John D. Clark, dean of the busi-
ness school at the University of Nebraska. Originally from Wyoming, 
Clark was a successful businessman with a law degree from Columbia 
who had been vice president of Standard Oil of Indiana in the 1920s. He 
left Standard Oil to pursue a doctorate in economics at Johns Hopkins 
University. People in Washington labeled Clark a conservative. He was, 
nonetheless, a long-time Democrat who had been a delegate for Wood-
row Wilson at the Democratic convention in 1912 and had served in the 
Wyoming State Legislature (Donovan 1977; Hamby 1973).12 
The Council of Economic Advisers hired Bertram Gross as staff 
director. Gross’s role in drafting the original language of S. 380 and his 
experiences with members and staff in Congress gave him considerable 
clout. That he had established a close working relationship with econo-
mists in the Bureau of the Budget and the Federal Reserve while drafting 
the legislation further enhanced his position.
Meanwhile, public opinion data revealed a growing sense of job 
security in the months after the Employment Act was enacted. By June 
1946, over half of those surveyed—55 percent—said there was no 
chance that they would be unemployed in the coming year. As Fig-
ure 7.2 shows, only 9 percent thought there was a great chance that 
they would be unemployed in the next year. Just two years earlier, Gal-
lup had asked a sample of the civilian adult population whether they 
thought they would have a job following the war. In that poll, conducted 
during July 1944, only 40 percent were “very certain” they would have 
a job after the war, and 35 percent of the respondents reported that they 
were “not at all certain” they would have a job after the war (Cantril 
1951, p. 903). 
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EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACT
The years immediately after passage of the Employment Act were 
politically tumultuous in the U.S. Congress. Republicans swept the con-
gressional elections in 1946, picking up 55 seats in the House for a 
246-member	majority.	They	also	won	control	of	the	Senate	for	the	first	
time since 1928, holding 51 seats to the Democrats’ 45. In his Bud-
get Message of January 10, 1947, Truman made clear that “as long as 
business, employment, and national income continue high, we should 
maintain tax revenues at levels that will not only meet current expendi-
tures but also leave a surplus for retirement of the public debt. There is 
no	justification	now	for	tax	reduction.”	Republicans	in	Congress	none-
theless moved to cut taxes. True to his word, Truman vetoed tax cuts 
Figure 7.2  Public Attitudes on Personal Job Prospects: 1946
During the next year, do you think there is any chance that you (your husband) 
will be unemployed?
SOURCE: American Institute of Public Opinion, June 5, 1946 (Cantril 1951, pp. 904–
905).
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that the 80th Congress had passed, asserting that the cuts favored the 
wealthy. Ultimately, the Republicans garnered the votes in Congress to 
override Truman’s veto of their tax cut in legislation passed in 1948.13
Much has been written about Truman’s campaign to retain the 
White House in 1948, and a core feature was its populist critique of the 
80th Congress, which Truman nicknamed the “Do-Nothing Congress.” 
The Democrats’ gain of nine seats in the Senate was enough to give 
them control of the chamber after the 1948 election. They also picked 
up 75 seats in the House. The Democrats returned to power just as an 
economic recession was beginning in late 1948.
The Council of Economic Advisers, led by Nourse, agreed on their 
assessment of the economic situation as well as the proper course of 
action to address the unemployment level, which was approaching 
6 percent. President Truman and many in Congress supported their 
actions to reverse the downturn. The recession was short-lived, but 
internal	disputes	took	their	toll	on	the	council.	The	infighting	was	not	
over	Keynesian	policies,	taxes,	or	deficit	financing;	rather,	it	was	a	per-
sonal disagreement between Nourse and Keyserling on whether they 
should testify before Congress. Nourse viewed his position as solely 
that of an economic adviser to the president and did not think it appro-
priate to engage in political affairs. Keyserling argued that the Council 
of Economic Advisers had an additional responsibility to extend its eco-
nomic recommendations to Congress. Keyserling proceeded to testify 
before Congress, and Nourse resigned from the council in 1949.14 
In 1950, House Republican leader Joseph Martin was among those 
who	led	 the	campaign	against	“extravagant”	deficit	spending	and	 the	
“economic witch doctors” in the Truman administration. Martin fur-
ther charged that “these socialistic schemers and political medicine men 
who now infect the executive branch must be run out of Washington.” 
The feisty Keyserling retorted that Martin regarded a certain amount of 
unemployment	as	permanent,	implying	that	Martin	would	be	satisfied	
with a higher level of unemployment. Martin, in turn, sniped that “one 
of the medicine men” he was referring to was Keyserling (Washington 
Post 1950).
The Republicans picked up a few congressional seats in 1950 and, 
along with conservative Democrats, clashed with Keyserling, who had 
become the chairman of the council. The Joint Economic Committee 
maintained considerable clout and continued to have extensive hear-
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ings, expand its staff of experts, and produce its own economic reports. 
The 82nd Congress cut off almost all appropriations for the Council 
of Economic Advisers, and the council seemed as if it would expire in 
early 1953 (Engelbourg 1980). 
It was President Dwight D. Eisenhower, elected in 1952, who 
breathed new life into the Council of Economic Advisers by appoint-
ing Arthur F. Burns as chairman. Burns earned his PhD in econom-
ics at Columbia University and had already established himself as the 
leading expert on business cycles while a professor at Columbia and a 
researcher with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).15 
Eisenhower completed the council by selecting Neil H. Jacoby, a tax 
specialist who was dean of the School of Business at the University of 
California, and Walter W. Stewart, an expert on monetary theory who 
had been a professor at the Institute for Advanced Studies. 
The recession of 1953–1954 put the principles of the Employment 
Act to the test in a Republican administration. Burns clashed vigorously 
with Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey on what the proper 
federal response should be. Humphrey was a wealthy businessman who 
ran a steel conglomerate in Ohio and who had close ties to Sen. Robert 
Taft.16 Although Eisenhower is generally considered to have been an 
economic conservative, he was persuaded by Burns’s advocacy of 
anti-recession	policies	in	the	form	of	tax	cuts	and	deficit	spending,	and	
Burns prevailed in 1954. Council member Neil Jacoby later held that 
“Keynesian economic thinking played a key role in the recession of 
1954 under Eisenhower” (Engelbourg 1980; Sloan 1991). 
By the tenth anniversary of the enactment of the Employment Act 
of 1946, the mainstreams of both political parties in the United States 
had accepted the principles it embodied. It surprised no one that Wright 
Patman, vice chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, would praise 
the act as he detailed the important contributions of the Joint Economic 
Committee. Senator O’Mahoney, former chairman of that committee, 
likewise acknowledged the importance of the act and emphasized the 
unprecedented economic growth over the 10 years since its passage. 
Especially noteworthy, however, were the observations of Republi-
can congressman Jesse Wolcott, then serving as chairman of the Joint 
Economic Committee. “A recession in late 1953 and early 1954 was 
skillfully brought under control,” Wolcott said, adding, “I consider this 
record a tribute to the Employment Act of 1946.” Republican senator 
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Ralph Flanders, a member of the committee who had formerly served 
as its vice chairman, similarly acknowledged “the respect which we 
must all accord the operation and usefulness of the Employment Act” 
(Colm 1956).
There remained in both parties, nonetheless, opposition to the 
Employment Act among those who opposed a strong federal govern-
ment	and	those	who	reflected	conservative	corporate	interests.	Indepen-
dent research groups, most notably the American Enterprise Institute, 
thrived as they offered conservative alternatives. Publications such as 
William F. Buckley’s National Review served as a sophisticated forum 
to disseminate the opposing perspective (Bernstein 2001; Phillips-Fein 
2009). 
VANTAGE POINT OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The United States has experienced almost a dozen recessions since 
passage of the Employment Act, as Figure 7.3 depicts, but no eco-
nomic depressions. Even during these recessions, the unemployment 
rates remained below 8 percent until the 1974–1975 recession. In 1982, 
the annual unemployment rate reached its highest level since the Great 
Depression—9.7 percent. There were 10.7 million people unemployed 
in 1982 and 1983. The recession that began in December 2007 has 
resulted in comparably high levels of unemployment.
Over this same span of years, the United States experienced dra-
matic periods of prosperity and economic growth. The low unemploy-
ment levels of the 1960s afforded Congress and Presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson the opportunity to establish education and job training pro-
grams aimed at those left behind in the expanding economy. Initially 
enacted in response to the recession of 1960, the Area Redevelopment 
Act of 1961 subsidized training for workers in economically depressed 
areas. The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 authorized the Com-
munity Work and Training Program, which permitted the states to enroll 
adult recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in “work-
fare” programs. The Manpower Development and Training Act and the 
Trade Adjustment Assistance Act, both enacted in 1962, aided workers 
who were displaced by automation and trade policies. The Economic 
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Opportunity Act of 1964 established a set of employment and job train-
ing programs, including Job Corps. Through these programs and other 
policy	initiatives	of	the	1960s,	the	activist	fiscal	policies	of	the	Employ-
ment Act were put in full throttle.
The recessions of the 1970s were triggered in part by the sharp 
increase in oil prices, an international dynamic not envisioned by spon-
sors	of	the	Employment	Act.	The	rising	oil	prices	fueled	inflation,	and	
the	anti-inflation	policies	competed	with	job	creation	to	be	the	top	eco-
nomic priority. The presumed relationship between unemployment and 
inflation,	known	as	the	Phillips	curve,	had	been	a	stable	trade-off	for	
policymakers. But by the 1970s, this balancing act no longer appeared 
valid,	and	the	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	based	upon	the	Phillips	curve	
became	ineffective.	While	Republicans	had	long	feared	inflation	more	
than unemployment, survey research data had shown that unemploy-
ment	was	a	greater	concern	for	the	American	public	than	inflation	until	
the 1970s. But as prices began to rise faster than real wages, the balance 
Figure 7.3  Unemployment Rates and Recessions, 1946–2010
SOURCE: BEA (2012a); BLS (2012); author’s calculations.
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of public opinion began to tip (Hibbs 1982; Smith 1980; Temin 1998; 
Weir 1992).
In 1976, Keyserling and Gross, along with many others, came 
together again to craft legislation aimed at addressing what they per-
ceived	 to	 be	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 Employment	Act	 of	 1946.	 The	 Full	
Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 became commonly 
known as Humphrey-Hawkins, a reference to its sponsors, Rep. Augus- 
tus Hawkins (D-CA) and Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-MN).17 Originally 
meant to ratchet up the federal goal to “full employment” from the 
“maximum	employment”	of	the	1946	Act,	as	finally	enacted	Humphrey- 
Hawkins established goals that competed with full employment. The 
act’s expressed purpose was
to translate into practical reality the right of all Americans who are 
able, willing, and seeking to work to full opportunity for useful paid 
employment at fair rates of compensation; to assert the responsibil-
ity of the Federal Government to use all practicable programs and 
policies to promote full employment, production, and real income, 
balanced growth, adequate productivity growth, proper attention 
to national priorities, and reasonable price stability; to require the 
President each year to set forth explicit short-term and medium-
term economic goals; to achieve a better integration of general and 
structural economic policies; and to improve the coordination of 
economic policymaking within the Federal Government.
Quite	 significantly,	 Humphrey-Hawkins	 established	 a	 dual	 man-
date of full employment and price stability, and it required the Federal 
Reserve to use monetary policy to pursue full employment as well as 
curb	inflation.	Whether	the	Federal	Reserve	has	acted	on	its	responsibil-
ities for full employment policy remains in dispute. For this and other 
reasons beyond the scope of this book, the debate leading up to the 
passage of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 is 
considered to be the “last hurrah” of Keynesian dominance in U.S. poli-
cymaking, rather than the major step forward its sponsors had hoped it 
would be (U.S. Congress 2007; Weir 1992).
A last look back at selected economic indicators over the years 
after enactment of the Employment Act—in addition to the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis time series on recession and unemployment levels 
presented in Figure 7.3—sheds a little more light on the subject. While 
there is a myriad of economic data on which the Employment Act might 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
156   Wasem
be judged, Figures 7.4–7.6 offer three varied perspectives with which 
to assess the legislation’s long-term impact. The Congressional Budget 
Office’s	capital	infrastructure	spending	trends	present	a	snapshot	of	the	
federal government’s investment strategies. Internal Revenue Service 
data on tax rates and receipts shed some light on the tax priorities. The 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s personal income data as well as income 
data from the World Top Incomes Database convey a picture of the rela-
tive prosperity of Americans over the past 60 years.18 
The initial spurt of capital infrastructure spending in the post–World 
War II period occurred during the Eisenhower administration. As Fig-
ure 7.4 illustrates, the rate of federal infrastructure spending to the gross 
domestic product (GDP) had its sharpest rise during the Eisenhower 
years. The federal interstate highway program remains the premier 
example of infrastructure spending on public works that reaps multi-
plicative	benefits	for	the	economy	and	the	American	people.19 While it 
is true that Senator O’Mahoney had cited the construction of Boulder 
Dam (renamed Hoover Dam in 1947) as the quintessential example of 
public	spending	for	the	common	good	during	the	Senate	floor	debate	
over	S.	380,	the	highway	program	brought	more	benefits	because	the	
construction of federal interstate highways reached almost all corners 
of the nation. Not only did the interstate system open communities up 
for commerce and ease of travel to work, it helped boost the auto indus-
try. President Eisenhower himself recognized that the federal highway 
program would “have some effect in leveling out the peaks and valleys 
in our economic life” (Sloan 1991, p. 134).
Figure 7.4 also depicts the rise in capital infrastructure spending in 
response to the spike in unemployment during the mid-1970s. Congress 
and the Carter administration increased capital infrastructure spending 
generally and as a rate of GDP from 1977 through 1980. The stimulus 
package included public works, public employment, and an expansion 
of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Unem-
ployment dropped correspondingly until the recession of the early 
1980s. 
It was in the 1980s that policy priorities on unemployment and the 
federal role in employment stimulation shifted. Unemployment spiked 
to its highest levels since the Great Depression, rising above 10 per-
cent for several months and staying above 8 percent for two years. In 
response, Congress and the Reagan administration cut infrastructure 
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spending generally and as a rate to GDP. Although there were limited 
increases in capital infrastructure spending during the mid-1980s, the 
Reagan administration advocated the use of tax policy as its main tool 
to address the recession and high levels of unemployment (Bernstein 
2001; Brownlee and Graham 2003).
The relationship between full employment policy and taxation was 
one of the key features of Hansen’s After the War—Full Employment 
report and a major issue of contention during the Senate debate on 
S. 380. The rates of the 1950s were quite high by contemporary stan-
dards, as Figure 7.5 shows, especially for the upper income levels. 
Many political leaders of the 1940s and 1950s, such as Sen. Robert Taft, 
argued that tax rates should be increased to balance the budget when 
additional federal spending was necessary. Taft, for example, voted to 
increase taxes to pay for the Korean War (Patterson 1972; Sloan 1991). 
Walter Heller, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers for 
President Kennedy, advocated passing tax cuts during the 1960s. Con-
Figure 7.4  Capital Infrastructure Spending, 1956–2009 (2009 dollars)
SOURCE: BEA (2012b); BLS (2012); CBO (2010); author’s calculations.
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gress and the Kennedy administration listened: they cut taxes sharply, 
as Figure 7.5 shows, for the lowest tax bracket as well as the top tax 
bracket. The tax cut, enacted in early 1964, after Kennedy’s death, cut 
the top marginal income tax rate from 91 percent to 70 percent and 
reduced the corporate income tax rate from 52 percent to 47 percent. 
Much has been written about the implementation of Keynesian econom-
ics by Heller and his colleagues on the Council of Economic Advisers, 
Kermit Gordon and James Tobin. In its 1962 report, the council estab-
lished a 4 percent unemployment level as the interim target for full 
employment. Heller, Gordon, and Tobin maintained that unemployment 
could	be	reduced	without	increasing	inflation	(Bernstein	2001).
In the 1980s, Congress and the Reagan administration enacted 
further tax cuts for upper income earners and corporations. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top marginal tax rate to a low of 28 
percent. As mentioned above, these cuts were a response to the reces-
sion and high levels of unemployment, and their proponents hoped the 
Figure 7.5  GDP, Federal Tax Receipts, and Tax Rates, 1946–2010
SOURCE: BEA (2012b); IRS (2012); author’s calculations.
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cuts would have a stimulating effect comparable to the tax cuts of the 
1960s. The “New Federalism” articulated by President Reagan and 
embodied in the tax cuts, moreover, shifted the major responsibility for 
job creation back to the private sector. As Reagan famously said, “Gov-
ernment is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.” 
The federal role in job creation mandated by the Employment Act was 
not repealed, but it was rendered obsolete (Bernstein 2001; Brownlee 
and Graham 2003; Jones 1988; Philips 1993).
A critical feature of full employment policy—and ultimately the 
Employment Act—was to increase purchasing power. Job creation and 
increased purchasing power went hand-in-glove. The statistical models 
of legislative support for full employment discussed in Chapter 6 showed 
that the demographic and economic characteristics of the congressional 
districts	correlated	with	action	on	the	legislation.	More	specifically,	the	
districts’ unemployment levels in 1937, percentage of working class 
residents, and percentage of foreign-born and African American resi-
dents were among the variables underlying legislative support for the 
Employment Act. A fundamental issue was whether these hardest-hit 
segments of the workforce would be reached by these policies. 
Personal income has risen substantially since the passage of the 
Employment Act, as Figure 7.6 shows. Average personal income stood 
at $8,907 per capita (in 2005 dollars) in 1946 and reached $33,010 per 
capita (in 2005 dollars) in 2010, increasing by 271 percent over this 
period. The average personal income plus capital gains of the bottom 90 
percent of earners had its largest gains (an 84 percent increase) during 
the period from 1946 through 1980 and has only increased by 4 percent 
since 1981. The average personal income plus capital gains of the top 
1 percent of earners grew modestly (a 34 percent increase) from 1946 
through 1980 but has increased by 138 percent since 1981. The bursting 
of the high-tech bubble led to a dip in the average personal income of 
the top 1 percent of earners in the early 2000s.
The difference between the average personal income plus capital 
gains of the bottom 90 percent of earners and the top 1 percent of earn-
ers (both in 2010 dollars) was $304,906 in 1946. By 2007, the difference 
between the average personal income plus capital gains of the bottom 
90 percent of earners and that of the top 1 percent of earners (both in 
2010 dollars) was $1,400,905. The time series in Figure 7.6 illustrates 
the growing income inequality in the United States, which has been 
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well-documented elsewhere (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011; Bartels 
2008; Piketty and Saez 2003).
More enlightening on income inequality than Figure 7.6 is the re-
search on wage structure during the mid-twentieth century that Claudia 
Goldin and Robert A. Margo conducted. They found “extraordinary” 
wage compression by education, job experience, and occupation from 
1940 to 1970. Their analysis implies that the segments of the workforce 
that were hardest-hit in the Great Depression thrived, relatively, in the 
postwar period. They also found that the wage differentials had returned 
to	1940	levels	by	the	late	1980s.	Goldin	and	Margo	identified	the	eco-
Figure 7.6  Average Personal Income (2005 dollars) and Average 
Personal Income Plus Capital Gains of the Bottom 90% and 
Top 1% (2010 dollars) 
NOTE: Average personal income plus capital gains of the top 1 percent (2010 dollars) 
is scaled on the right axis, while average personal income (2005 dollars) and average 
personal income plus capital gains of the bottom 90 percent (2010 dollars) are scaled 
on the left axis.
SOURCE: BEA (2012b); World Top Incomes Database (2012); author’s calculations.
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nomic and demographic factors that contributed to the changes in wage 
structure, but they did not explore the policy factors that might have 
influenced	 the	 wage	 compression.	 There	 is	 abundant	 research	 under	
way on the reasons for the wage compression as well as the reversal of 
the trends that had prevailed from the 1940s up until the 1980s (Goldin 
and Margo 1992; Jacobs and Skocpol 2005). The part the Employment 
Act played in establishing the federal role in job creation—as well as 
increased production and purchasing power—cannot be measured as 
the economic factors can be, but the correlates of the Employment Act 
to these income trends are not likely to be serendipitous.
As it turned out, the Employment Act of 1946 accomplished much 
of what those who drafted it had envisioned. Although it cannot be said 
that the act directly created the prosperity of the postwar period, it no 
doubt had a role in facilitating it. It gave the federal government the 
mandate as well as the tools to alleviate recessions and high levels of 
unemployment. And for many years a series of Congresses and presi-
dents drew on that authority to counter recessions and foster job growth. 
Notes
1. Harry S. Truman to Sen. Robert Wagner and Rep. Carter Manasco, letters, 20 
December 1945, Truman Papers.
2. Barkley entered the House of Representatives in 1913, and Kentucky elected him 
to the Senate in 1926. Truman chose him as his vice presidential candidate in 1948. 
Barkley was reelected to the Senate in 1954 after serving as vice president.
3. The committee was initially composed of seven members from the House and 
seven members from the Senate. The partisan makeup was based on the relative 
membership of the majority and minority parties in each chamber. According to the 
Employment Act, the Joint Economic Committee members were to be appointed 
by the president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House.
4. O’Mahoney also chaired the Joint Economic Committee in the 81st and 82nd 
Congresses.
5. Taft would become chairman of the Joint Economic Committee when the Repub-
licans gained the majority in the 80th Congress.
6. Tunnel represented Delaware for one term. He defeated a Republican incumbent 
in 1940 but lost his bid for reelection in 1946. Myers served from Pennsylvania in 
the House of Representatives from 1939 to 1945 and then in the Senate from 1945 
to 1951. He was defeated for reelection in 1950. Hart represented New Jersey from 
1935 to 1955. In 1954, he did not seek reelection. Huber represented Ohio from 
1945 to 1951.
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7. Bridges served as the Republican senator from New Hampshire from 1937 until 
his death in 1961. He was the Senate minority leader from 1952 to 1953. In 1925, 
La	Follette	was	elected	as	a	Republican	senator	from	Wisconsin	to	fill	the	vacancy	
caused by the death of his father. He was a founder of the Wisconsin Progressive 
Party in 1934, and he was reelected to the Senate in 1934 and 1940 as a Wiscon-
sin Progressive. When the Wisconsin Progressive Party folded, he returned to the 
Republican Party for the 1946 campaign. Joseph McCarthy defeated him for the 
Republican nomination that year.
8. Hansen subsequently returned to Harvard, where he continued as the Lucius N. 
Littauer Professor of Political Economy.
9. Edwin G. Nourse, oral history interview conducted in Washington, DC, by Jerry 
N. Hess, March 7, 1972.
10. Ibid.
11. Keyserling often spoke of a national essay contest he had won earlier in his career 
in which he proposed full employment policy as the solution to the nation’s eco-
nomic problems. The source for the material in this paragraph is Keyserling, from 
an oral history interview conducted in Washington, DC, by Jerry N. Hess, May 3, 
1971, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.
12. In addition to Donovan and Hamby, the material in this paragraph also comes from 
Keyserling, in an oral history interview conducted in Washington, DC, by Jerry N. 
Hess, May 3, 1971, Truman Library, Independence, MO. 
13. From political and historical perspectives, the clashes between Truman and the 
80th Congress over labor law and the rights of workers to organize and to bargain 
collectively	were	more	 significant	 than	 the	 fight	 over	 tax	 cuts.	 Congress	 over-
rode Truman’s veto of the Taft-Hartley legislation, which rolled back some of the 
worker rights that the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 had provided. 
14. Keyserling, oral history interview conducted in Washington, DC, by Hess, May 
3, 1971, Truman Library, Independence, MO; Nourse, oral history interview con-
ducted in Washington, DC, by Hess, March 7, 1972. 
15. Burns would later become Chairman of the Federal Reserve under President 
Richard Nixon.
16. Humphrey had been a major supporter of Taft’s campaign for the Republican nom-
ination for president in 1952. After Eisenhower won the nomination, he chaired 
the	 finance	 committee	 for	 the	 Republican	 Party	 in	 the	 1952	 general-election	
campaign.
17. Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, H.R. 50, 95th Cong. (1978).
18. For further discussion of the World Top Incomes Database, see Atkinson, Piketty, 
and Saez (2011). 
19. The funding for the U.S. Highway Trust Fund mainly comes from gasoline and 
automobile taxes. 
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Appendix A
Variables and Their Sources
This appendix describes the variables used in Chapter 6 of this book and 
where they were obtained. Scores and indices constructed from other measures 
are discussed in Appendix B.
UNITS OF ANALYSIS  
The constituency and economic traits of the congressional districts are 
plagued by a problem of unit of analysis. The census data are county-level, and 
the unit of analysis for this research is “member of Congress and congressional 
district.” In 1944, most congressional districts neatly follow county boundar-
ies, but the metropolitan counties have more than one congressional district 
within their area. 
There is no straightforward way to disaggregate the metropolitan coun-
ties that have multiple congressional districts. I initially divided the census 
into	two	data	files:	one	containing	all	counties	represented	by	only	one	con-
gressional district; the other containing all counties represented by more than 
one congressional district. The former data set is aggregated by congressional 
district number within each state. For those congressional districts from the 
same counties, the census data for each district are prorated in equal propor-
tions according to the number of districts. The two data sets are then merged 
together	to	form	a	master	file,	with	all	congressional	districts	represented.
This solution dilutes the impact of a metropolitan congressional district 
having factors that may be skewed in particular ways. For example, differences 
in Wayne County, Michigan, between Hamtramck, Inkster, and Grosse Pointe 
are lost, and the economic, social, and ethnic factors are muted.
“TIMELINESS” OF DATA
After serious consideration and some data manipulation, I decided not to 
interpolate 1945 estimates for the census variables. The primary reason is con-
ceptual:	I	assume	that	the	influence	of	the	constituency	and	of	the	economic	
variable precedes the election of the representative and the ultimate outcome 
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on the full employment bill. In this regard, 1940 is a reasonable year for which 
to	draw	measures	of	constituency	and	economic	influences.	
A	second	justification	for	not	calculating	1945	estimates	is	that,	despite	the	
fact	that	we	know	that	significant	demographic,	social,	and	economic	changes	
were occurring during the war years, we also know that these changes did not 
occur uniformly across local areas of the country. For example, people were 
shifting from some parts of the country to other areas to work in war pro-
duction. Economic and demographic change, moreover, occurred at differing 
paces over the course of the decade in response initially to war mobilization 
and subsequently to demobilization.
I decided that the question of “change” was best handled by a single vari-
able that provides a measure of these shifts in each congressional district from 
1940 to 1950. Although imperfect, the percentage of urban change from 1940 
to 1950 serves to operationalize this dynamic. This variable addresses the issue 
of varying amounts of change in different parts of the country, but it is limited 
because it also captures changes that took place after the passage of the Employ-
ment Act. 
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Table A.1  Variables Used in the Analysis of the House Vote on Full 
Employment, and Their Sources
Variable        Source
Unemployment rate, 1937 ICPSR (2013c)
% foreign-born, 1940 ICPSR (2013c)
% African American, 1940 ICPSR (2013c)
% urban, 1940 ICPSR (2013c)
% population change, 1920–1940 ICPSR (2013c)
Occupation categories, 1940  
(% distribution of those reporting an occupation by  
major occupation classes)
ICPSR (2013c)
Median years of school completed for those over 25 years  
of age, 1940
 Males
 Females
ICPSR (2013c)
Region of the country ICPSR (2013c)
State ICPSR (2013c)
% urban change, 1940–1950 ICPSR (2013b)
Median family income, 1950 ICPSR (2013b)
Farm-living-level index, 1940 ICPSR (2013b)
Member’s military rank or experience ICPSR (2013d)
Member’s occupation prior to election to Congress ICPSR (2013d)
Member’s college attendance ICPSR (2013d)
Member’s cumulative years served in Congress prior to the  
79th Congress (tenure in 1945)
ICPSR (2013d)
Year	member	was	first	elected	to	Congress ICPSR (2013d)
Member’s age when 79th Congress began ICPSR (2013d)
Member’s reason for leaving Congress ICPSR (2013d)
Congressional district ICPSR (2013a)
Member’s margin of victory, 1944 ICPSR (2013a)
Candidate’s % of total vote in most recent election, 1944 ICPSR (2013a)
Member’s vote on roll call to recommit S. 380 / H.R. 2202 ICPSR (2013e)
Member’s vote on roll call to pass S. 380 ICPSR (2013e)
Member’s sponsorship of H.R. 2202 Hand-tabulated 
from Bailey (1964)
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Variable Source
% urban change, 1920–1940 Hand-tabulated by author from U.S. Census 
Bureau (1940a)
% working class, 1940 Hand-tabulated by author from U.S. Census 
Bureau (1940b)
Per capita personal income, 1933 Hand-tabulated by author from U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1943)
Per capita personal income, 1943 Hand-tabulated from U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1943)
Unemployment rate, 1940 Hand-tabulated from U.S. Census Bureau 
(1940b)
% of vote in most recent election ICPSR (2013a)
Table A.2  Variables Used in the Analysis of the Senate Vote on Full 
Employment, and Their Sources
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Appendix B
Scores and Indices
This	 book	 draws	 on	 several	 existing	 indices	 and	 calculates	 or	modifies	
other scores and indices for use in this research. This appendix details the com-
ponents	 of	 each	 of	 these	 variables.	 Specific	 variables	 and	 their	 sources	 are	
listed in Appendix A.
FULL EMPLOYMENT SCORE
The full employment score is actually two different measures—a score 
for the Senate and a score for the House. In the Senate, the score is composed 
of three roll call votes on S. 380, two that amended it and one that passed it. 
In the House, the three components consist of sponsorship of the full employ-
ment	bill,	a	roll	call	to	recommit	the	compromise	bill,	and	a	roll	call	on	its	final	
passage.
Both of these scores, however, are constructed in the same manner and are 
fashioned after the roll-call scoring approaches used by many others (Clausen 
1973, pp. 12–35; MacRae 1958; Miller and Stokes 1963). In this instance, 
behaviors deemed to be supporting full employment are assigned the value of 
1.0, and behaviors deemed to be opposing full employment are assigned the 
value	of	−1.0.	In	the	case	of	the	Senate,	voting	to	amend	S.	380	is	considered	to	
be in opposition to full employment. In the House, voting to recommit S. 380 is 
considered an antagonistic action. It almost goes without saying that sponsor-
ing	and	voting	for	final	passage	are	supportive	of	full	employment.
After	each	member	was	given	a	1.0	or	−1.0	score	 for	each	of	 the	 three	
possible actions, the three values were summed for each member. This sum 
became the numerator in a ratio that had 3—the total possible behaviors—as 
the denominator. This ratio was computed for each member to form a score 
that	ranged	from	−1.0	to	1.0.
PARTISANSHIP SCORE
The partisanship score is an index of support calculated from those 50 roll 
calls in which a majority of one party opposed a majority of the other party 
during	the	first	session	of	the	79th	Congress.	It	forms	a	ratio,	with	1.0	as	the	
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perfect	partisanship	score	and	−1.0	as	the	most	extreme	negative	partisanship	
score. The numerator is the number of times the legislator voted with his or 
her party’s position minus the number of times the legislator voted with the 
opposing party’s position. The denominator is 50, which was the total number 
of party-line votes (i.e., when the majority of one party votes in contrast to the 
majority of the other party) that were taken in the U.S. House of Representa-
tive during the 79th Congress. 
Unlike other scores based upon roll calls, this ratio does not equate non-
voting to voting with the opposition, and the Democratic partisanship score 
symmetrically complements the Republican partisanship score.
This partisanship score differs from the Rice Index of Party Cohesion on 
several dimensions. Foremost, this partisanship score is calculated for each 
member based upon his or her voting record. The Rice Index is calculated for 
parties according to sessions of Congress and is based upon the degree that 
members of the same party voted together. This partisanship score also differs 
from the Index of Party Unlikeness, again because the unit of analysis for the 
latter is the Congress rather than the member.
IDEOLOGY SCALE
The liberal-conservative ideology scale is based on selected roll-call votes 
that tap liberal versus conservative cleavages. The New Republic published 
how each member of Congress voted on 10 roll calls occurring during the 79th 
Congress	 that	 the	Union	for	Democratic	Action	 (UDA)	 identified	as	critical	
“progressive” votes in the areas of foreign policy, civil liberties, farm policy, 
price	controls,	poll	taxes,	antiracketeering,	and	the	confirmation	of	Henry	Wal-
lace as commerce secretary (New Republic 1946a,b).
As in the case of the partisanship score, nonvoting is not equated with a 
negative vote. The number of votes against the liberal positions is subtracted 
from the number of votes with the liberal positions and then divided by the total 
number of times the member voted. Those members of Congress on record as 
having voted for all 10 liberal stands scored a perfect +1.0, and those on record 
as	having	voted	10	times	against	the	liberal	position	scored	a	perfect	−1.0.	
ADJUSTED LIVING LEVEL
The 1952 County and City Data Book provides a “Farm Living Level 
Index” for 1940 that is unsophisticated compared to contemporary measures 
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such as the Consumer Price Index, but is used as a relative measure of wealth. 
It was originally designed to be a measure of wealth that was based on more 
than simple income—e.g., the nonsalary resources and expenditures of farm 
households. Analysis reveals that this Farm Living Level Index parallels the 
median family income in direction and in distribution across areas. It is a valu-
able index of living levels because it measures the nonincome resources of 
agricultural families. 
I made adjustments to the Farm Living Level Index to deal with the coun-
terpoint—exclusively urban counties. First, the Farm Living Level Index was 
correlated with median family income, and all congressional districts were 
ranked according to their median family income. Values were then imputed for 
exclusively urban congressional districts according to the Farm Living Level 
Index of those congressional districts that had corresponding median family 
incomes. These imputed values accounted for less than 5 percent of the cases.
INDICES
New Deal Realignment
This variable is constructed from the “Year First Elected to Congress” 
variable	in	the	Roster	of	Congressional	Officeholders	data	set	listed	in	Appen-
dix A. It simply assigns a number “1” to all members of Congress elected in 
1932 or later. All other members are coded “0.”
Biographical Status
Three variables pertaining to the members’ background are ranked and 
summarized into a score—“biographical status.” The three components are 
1) member’s occupation prior to election to Congress, 2) college that the 
member attended, and 3) member’s military rank. I made subjective decisions 
regarding the ordinal values of the categories for the three component vari-
ables. Each of these three variables is potentially worth three points, so they 
have equal weight and sum to nine.
Occupation:
 Business (includes agriculture) = 3
 Law, education, and other professional = 2
 Miscellaneous and other = 1
 None, unreported or retired = 0
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College attended:
 Ivy League = 3
 Other private colleges = 2
 Major state university = 1
 No college reported = 0
Military rank:
 General, colonel, lt. colonel, major = 3
 Captain, lieutenant = 2
 Enlisted or nonranked = 1
 No military service reported = 0
Percentage Working Class
A summary measure of occupation for 1940 is constructed by summing 
the categories that are deemed working class. Consistent with the discussion in 
Chapter 2, this “working class” variable includes people who reported occupa-
tions as laborers, operators, domestics, clerical, craftsmen, foremen, service 
workers, and farm laborers. It excludes business and professional occupations 
as well as farm owners. 
Region
This variable is a traditional grouping of states by geographic area and is 
the standard ICPSR region variable. The categories are shown in Table B.1 on 
the following page. 
For	 some	 analyses,	 these	 eight	 regions	were	 combined	 into	five	group-
ings. In such cases, the Northeast includes the New England and Mid-Atlantic 
states. The Midwest includes the East North-Central and the West North- 
Central states. The South and the Border states remain intact, and the Mountain 
and	Pacific	states	are	grouped	into	the	West.
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Table B.1  Traditional Grouping of States by Geographic Area, Serving 
as the Standard ICPSR Region Variable
Region State Region State
New England Connecticut South Alabama
Maine Arkansas
Massachusetts Florida
New Hampshire Georgia
Rhode Island Louisiana
Vermont Mississippi
North Carolina
Mid-Atlantic Delaware South Carolina
New Jersey Texas
New York Virginia
Pennsylvania Border Kentucky
Maryland
East North-Central Illinois Oklahoma
Indiana Tennessee
Michigan West Virginia
Ohio
Wisconsin Mountain Arizona
Colorado
West North-Central Iowa Idaho
Kansas Montana
Minnesota Nevada
Missouri New Mexico
Nebraska Utah
North Dakota Wyoming
South Dakota
Pacific California
Oregon
Washington
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Appendix C
Profiling Support for S. 380
Appendix C presents further analysis underpinning the discussion of Sen-
ate support for S. 380 in Chapter 6. There are clear partisan underpinnings to 
support for full employment legislation. As Table C.1 presents, the Democratic 
average on the full employment score is almost twice the overall mean of 0.36. 
The Republican mean score, however, falls well below the total average score. 
Table C.1  Senate Full Employment Mean Scores by Region and Party
Region (n ) Mean
Democratic
mean
Republican
mean
New England (12) 0.62 0.50 0.77
Mid-Atlantic (8) 0.42 1.00 −0.55
East North-Central (10) −0.06 1.00 −0.33
West North-Central (14) −0.03 1.00 −0.11
Border (10) 0.33 0.62 −0.67
South (20) 0.42 0.42
Mountain (16) 0.59 1.00 −1.00
Pacific	(6) 0.79 1.00 0.56
National (96) 0.36 0.71 −0.15
Total cases 96a 55 40
The regional variation in support for full employment is also quite inter-
esting.	The	New	England	and	Pacific	Coast	regions	have	the	most	consistently	
high	scores,	regardless	of	party	identification.	All	of	the	other	regions,	with	the	
exception of the exclusively Democratic South, have a partisan split in their 
mean scores on full employment. The East and West North-Central regions are 
the least supportive of full employment. 
It	is	possible	that	electoral	factors	might	influence	whether	a	senator	would	
support such an avant-garde (but potentially popular) piece of legislation. One 
could speculate that senators who are more secure electorally would be more 
likely to deviate from their party’s position on S. 380 because it is easier for 
them to take risks. The importance that the Democratic Party leadership placed 
on this bill suggests that the more seasoned legislators supported it. Tenure 
in	office	might	have	had	an	intervening	effect	on	the	importance	of	electoral	
factors.
aDemocratic and Republican cases do not sum to total because one senator was an Independent.
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The	importance	of	partisan	identification,	discussed	above,	is	not	forgotten	
in this context. Republicans came from states that were wealthier, both in 1943 
and 1933, and that had experienced less of a percentage increase in urbaniza-
tion from 1920 to 1940. The difference in state unemployment rates between 
Democratic and Republican senators, however, is trivial. 
These differences are small, but the directions in which they move are 
consistent	and	expected.	The	findings,	though	based	upon	simple	analyses,	hint	
that less relative wealth and greater vulnerability to unemployment might be 
linked to support for full employment. These results do not challenge what we 
might intuitively hypothesize from the earlier discussion of public opinion, but 
they beg for further scrutiny (Table C.2). 
It	is	enlightening	to	refine	the	inquiry	by	looking	at	senators	whose	scores	
deviated from their party’s average score. For the purposes here, deviance is 
defined	as	Democrats	who	score	negatively	on	the	full	employment	scale	and	
Republicans who score positively. Table C.3 presents some rather interesting 
patterns. The lowest rates of unemployment are in states with Democrats who 
have negative scores on full employment. These same Democrats also repre-
sent states that, on average, are the poorest in 1943 and that have experienced 
the slowest growth in per capita personal income over the previous decade. For 
the most part, these deviant Democrats are from the South.
Republicans who score positively on full employment do not differ 
meaningfully from their fellow Republicans except in regard to urbanization. 
These deviant Republicans come from states with the lowest average increase 
in urbanization from 1920 to 1940. This phenomenon is largely attributable 
to Republicans from New England states that already had high levels of 
urbanization.
Table C.2  Economic and Demographic Characteristics by Senators’ Party
Mean value
Democrat Republican
Unemployment rate (%) 14.1 14.3
Per capita personal income, 1943 ($) 908 1,043
Per capita personal income, 1933 ($) 280 341
Change in per capita income, 1933–1943 (%) 2.1 2.3
Change in urban population, 1920–1940 (%) 6.2 4.3
Total cases 55 40
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Table C.3  Economic and Demographic Characteristics by Party and Full 
Employment Score
Mean value
Positive Negative
Democrats
Unemployment rate (%) 14.9 11.9
Per capita personal income, 1943 ($) 943 923
Per capita personal income, 1933 ($) 285 328
Change in per capita income, 1933–1943 (%) 2.1 1.9
Change in urban population, 1920–1940 (%) 5.8 4.4
Total cases 40 7
Republicans
Unemployment rate (%) 14.6 14.1
Per capita personal income, 1943 ($) 1,037 1,056
Per capita personal income, 1933 ($) 355 333
Change in per capita income, 1933–1943 (%) 2.2 2.3
Change in urban population, 1920–1940 (%) 3.4 5.0
Total cases 9 24
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Appendix D
Profiling Support for H.R. 2202
Appendix D provides a more detailed analysis of House support for H.R. 
2202/S. 380, which is discussed in Chapter 6. The size and diversity of the 
House of Representatives offers the opportunity for more in-depth analysis 
of the characteristics of its membership than does the 96-member Senate. The 
79th House of Representatives consisted of 242 Democrats, 193 Republicans 
and 1 Progressive. The region with the most representatives in the House was 
the South, with 22.8 percent. The Mid-Atlantic and East North-Central regions 
followed, with 21.7 and 19.5 percent, respectively.  The smallest delegation 
came from the Mountain region and constituted only 3.8 percent of those serv-
ing in the 79th Congress.
Breaking	down	party	affiliation	by	region	presents	some	striking	patterns.	
In general, the eastern and midwestern sections of the country were dominated 
by the Republicans, while the southern and western parts were controlled by the 
Democrats (see Table D.1). The Mid-Atlantic region was the most balanced, 
with 57.1 percent Republicans and 42.9 percent Democrats. The most extreme 
region was the South, which was exclusively represented by Democrats.
The congressional districts had an average district population living in 
urban areas of 45.3 percent. During the period from 1930 to 1950, congressio-
nal districts experienced a mean percentage increase in total population of 25.8 
percent. On average, 8.3 percent of the population in the districts was foreign-
born and 9.3 percent was African American in 1940. The median number of 
school years completed by men over the age of 25 was 8.6, and the median 
number of years in school for women over 25 was 8.2. 
Table D.1  Political Party, by Region
                                                                                   Democratic Republican n
New England 35.7 64.3 28
Mid-Atlantic 42.9 57.1 98
Border 82.1 17.9 39
South 100.0 0.0 103
East North-Central 30.7 68.3 88
West North-Central 20.5 79.5 44
Mountain 58.8 41.2 17
Pacific 58.8 41.2 34
Total no. of districts 242 193 435
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As Table D.2 indicates, most of these constituency characteristics did 
not vary a great deal by the party of the representative elected in the district, 
though the Democratic districts tended to be slightly more urban and less edu-
cated. A notable exception was race. Democratic districts had a considerably 
larger proportion of African Americans (14.9 percent, in contrast to 2.0 percent 
for Republican districts). 
There were observable differences in constituency traits by region. The 
New England and Mid-Atlantic congressional districts were the most urban, 
and the South, West North-Central and Border districts were the least urban-
ized. While the South and Border districts had means of 28.6 percent and 10.6 
percent, respectively, of their populations that were African American, the 
remaining regions each averaged less than 4 percent African American. Con-
versely, the South and Border districts had the smallest averages of their pop-
Table D.2  Mean Constituency Traits, by Party and Region
                                                                            Democratic Republican         Total
% foreign-born 8.2 8.5 8.3
% African American 14.9 2.0 9.3
% urban 46.9 43.9 45.3
% population change 29.4 21.2 25.8
Years in school, male 8.4 8.8 8.6
Years in school, female 8.0 8.4 8.2
                                                                      
                                                New England Mid-Atlantic Border South
% foreign-born 16.7 16.1 1.2 1.4
% African American 1.4 3.6 10.6 28.6
% urban 67.8 71.5 21.8 21.5
% population change 17.2 16.0 21.8 27.9
Years in school, male 9.2 8.3 7.9 8.2
Years in school, female 8.7 8.4 7.5 7.6
East North-
Central
West North-
Central Mountain Pacific
% foreign-born 8.5 5.4 6.2 12.2
% African American 3.4 2.2 0.7 1.3
% urban 52.6 30.1 28.1 58.5
% population change 21.0 11.4 35.6 87.2
Years in school, male 8.6 8.8 9.5 9.2
Years in school, female 8.4 8.3 8.6 10.1
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ulation	 that	were	 foreign-born.	The	New	England,	Mid-Atlantic	and	Pacific	
districts had the largest average percentages of foreign-born residents.
The economic characteristics, which Table D.3 presents, exhibit interest-
ing differences. Overall, the mean of all districts’ adjusted living level was 
85, the average 1937 unemployment rate was 10.8 percent, and the average 
of the workforce reporting working-class occupations was 62.7 percent. The 
proportion of working class in the district did not vary much by party. The 
unemployment rate was slightly higher for the Democratic districts. There 
was a dramatic difference, moreover, in the adjusted living level by party. The 
Democratic districts averaged a modest 67 score, in contrast to the Republican 
mean score of 108.5. Thus, the Republicans represented districts that were 
much more prosperous in terms of standard of living. 
Table D.3  Mean District Economic Traits, by Party and Region
Democratic Republican Total
% unemployed, 1937 11.4 10.1 10.8
% working class 62.8 62.6 62.7
Adjusted living level 67.0 108.5 85.0
                                                                       
New England Mid-Atlantic Border South     
% unemployed, 1937 11.5 12.6 12.6 10.3
% working class 76.4 76.5 54.9 50.5
Adjusted living level 102.4 74.6 60.7 46.7
                                                                       
East North-
Central
West North-
Central Mountain Pacific
% unemployed, 1937 9.7 9.4 10.0 9.7
% working class 67.1 49.0 55.4 67.1
Adjusted living level 121.1 104.6 81.9 124.8
The regions also differed widely on these economic measures. New Eng-
land,	the	Pacific,	and	the	East	and	West	North-Central	regions	were	the	wealth-
iest, according to the adjusted living level, in contrast to the South, Border 
and Mountain regions. The unemployment rates tended to differ in a pattern 
across regions that shows the Mid-Atlantic and Border regions with the highest 
averages	and	the	Pacific	and	North	Central	regions	with	the	lowest.	New	Eng-
land and the Mid-Atlantic had the largest average proportions of working-class 
people, while the West North-Central and the South had the lowest percentages 
of working class.
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The Democratic delegation as a whole appeared more secure electorally, as 
Table D.4 indicates. On average, the victorious Democratic candidate received 
72.2 percent of the votes cast in their 1944 congressional elections. Success-
ful Republican candidates got an average of 60.4 percent of the total votes 
cast in their districts. The average margin of victory of the two parties further 
accentuated the Democrats’ greater electoral strength over the Republicans: 
the successful Democratic congressman had a 46.4 percent mean margin of 
victory, and the successful Republican congressman had a 21.7 percent mean 
margin of victory. Again, the South’s unique electoral features were skewing 
the Democratic averages, as the regional breakdown reveals.
Democrats’ tenure—i.e., mean number of cumulative years served at the 
beginning of the 79th Congress—was longer than that of the Republicans. The 
mean number of years’ tenure for the Democrats was 7.2, and the mean number 
of years’ tenure for the Republicans was 6.4. However, the South’s unusu-
ally	long	tenure	in	office—an	average	of	more	than	nine	years—drove	up	the	
Democratic average. 
Despite	the	fact	that	the	Democrats	had	more	years	of	tenure	in	office,	they	
were, on average, younger in age than their Republican peers. The average age 
of a Democratic congressman was 52.4 years. The Republican representatives’ 
mean age was 53.6. (See Table D.5.)
Differences in background that the members of the two parties and eight 
regions evidence is summarized in the “biographical status” score presented in 
Table D.5. Republicans on average had higher status scores than their Demo-
Table D.4  Mean Electoral Traits, by Party and Region
Democratic Republican Total
% most recent vote 72.2 60.4 66.8
% margin of victory 46.4 21.7 35.2
Tenure in 79th Congress 7.2 6.4 6.9
     
New England Mid-Atlantic Border South
% most recent vote 60.1 55.8 65.1 90.5
% margin of victory 20.4 17.5 30.6 81.4
Tenure in 79th Congress 6.7 6.2 6.5 9.2
                                                                       
East North-
Central
West North-
Central Mountain Pacific
% most recent vote 60.7 60.1 58.5 66.4
% margin of victory 22.1 20.5 17.2 32.9
Tenure in 79th Congress 6.9 6.5 4.2 4.6
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Table D.5  Mean Ideological/Personal Traits, by Party and Region
Democratic Republican Total
Partisanship score 0.47 0.59
Ideology score 0.44 −0.57 0.0
Biographical status 4.1 4.7 4.4
Age 52.4 53.6 53.0
                                                                           
New England Mid-Atlantic Border South
Partisanship score
Democrats 0.60 0.64 0.57 0.51
Republicans 0.45 0.43 0.73
Ideology score −0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
Biographical status 4.2 4.9 4.6 4.1
Age 52.8 52.9 52.7 52.9
East North-
Central
West North-
Central Mountain Pacific																			
Partisanship score
Democrats 0.68 0.63 0.59 0.67
Republicans 0.67 0.64 0.70 0.40
Ideology score −0.1 −0.4 0.0 0.3
Biographical status 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.0
Age 54.6 52.6 53.3 51.0
NOTE: Blank = not applicable. South region is blank for the Republicans because there were no 
Republican representatives from the South.
cratic counterparts. The Mid-Atlantic region scored highest on this measure, 
while	the	Pacific	region	averaged	the	lowest	value	on	this	summary	scale.
A look at the components of the biographical score provides a fuller expla-
nation of the regional and party differences in status. The Democratic members 
were preponderantly lawyers before entering Congress, 61 percent being from 
the legal profession. While the Republican delegation consisted of 45.7 percent 
lawyers, it had larger proportions of professionals (excluding lawyers), busi-
nessmen, and agricultural occupations than the Democratic delegation. Across 
every region, law was the most prevalent occupation listed by the House mem-
bers of the 79th Congress. The percentage of lawyers ranged from an over-
whelming 82.5 percent of the congressmen from the South to 35.3 percent of 
both	the	Mountain	and	Pacific	regions.	Some	38.8	percent	of	the	Mid-Atlantic	
region’s delegation reported that they had been businessmen before their elec-
tion to Congress. Some 23.5 percent of the congressmen from the Mountain 
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region were businessmen, and an equal percentage were in agricultural occu-
pations. The Mountain region led the nation in the proportion of its delegation 
from agriculture.
The congressional delegations also differed in terms of educational back-
ground, another component of biographical status. Although there was only 
a slight difference between Republicans and Democrats on the percentage 
who had not attended college, the Democrats being 1.2 percent higher, there 
were noticeable variations in what kind of college the member had attended. 
Republicans had attended Ivy League colleges at a rate three times greater than 
Democrats. There were also regional differences in college attendance. New 
England had the largest proportion of a delegation that had not attended col-
lege and the largest proportion that had attended an Ivy League college, both 
percentages being 32.1. The Border and the South had the smallest percentage 
of delegations that had not attended college, with 5.1 and 7.8 percent, respec-
tively. Over 43 percent of the southern delegation had attended a state college, 
the largest percentage in the nation. 
The congressional delegations of the two parties exhibited varying levels 
of partisan loyalty, as Table D.5 presents. During the period the 79th Congress 
was in session prior to the election of 1946, the Democratic members had an 
average partisanship score of 0.58 and the Republican members a score of 0.56 
(not shown). However, the scores based on party votes for the entire span of 
the 79th Congress reveal a noticeable change in partisan voting following the 
1946 campaign, with the result being that the Republican delegation’s average 
partisanship score increased to 0.59 and the Democratic membership’s average 
score fell to 0.47.
The sharpest contrast between the two parties, however, was displayed 
by their ideology scores. The Democratic delegation registered an average 
ideology score of 0.44 during the 79th Congress. The Republican member-
ship	scored	an	average	of	−0.57	on	the	same	set	of	roll	calls	identified	by	the	
UDA.	This	finding	substantiated	that	the	ideological	differences	expressed	by	
the party platforms were manifested in congressional voting behavior as well.
The regions also exhibited differences in average ideology scores. The 
most	conservative	region,	the	West	North-Central,	had	a	−0.41	mean	ideology	
score.	The	Pacific	region,	with	a	0.28	average,	fell	at	the	other	end	of	the	spec-
trum. Only one other region had a mean score greater than plus or minus 0.1; 
most	of	the	regions	cluster	near	the	national	average	of	−0.004.	
The regional differences in ideology scores became much sharper when 
the Republicans and Democrats were observed separately (not shown). The 
Democratic regional mean scores ranged from 0.01 in the South to 0.92 in the 
East North-Central. The Republican mean scores, while not varying as widely 
as	 the	Democratic	scores,	spanned	from	−0.72	 in	 the	West	North-Central	 to	
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−0.42	in	the	Pacific.	When	one	looks	at	the	difference	between	the	Democratic	
and Republican scores within a region, one sees that the most divergent region 
was the East North-Central, with average scores ranging from 0.92 for the 
Democrats	to	−0.55	for	the	Republicans.	
Just as ideology varied across regions and parties, so too did partisan-
ship. The South was the least partisan region, averaging a Democratic parti-
sanship score of 0.51. The East North-Central, consistent with its liberal ideol-
ogy score, had the highest mean Democratic partisanship score, 0.68. On the 
Republican side, the Mountain region had a mean partisanship score of 0.70, 
making it the highest. The lowest average Republican partisanship score was 
0.40	in	the	Pacific	region.	
Table D.6  Support for Full Employment, by Regional Delegation
% sponsored H.R. 2202 %	final	roll	call	“yes”
New England 29 43
Mid-Atlantic 34 53
Border 31 52
South   4 28
East North-Central 30 47
West North-Central 12 45
Mountain 38 41
Pacific 64 62
In terms of the constituency measures, there should be differences between 
supporters	 and	opponents	 of	 the	 full	 employment	 bill.	 Specifically,	 districts	
with more foreign-born and African Americans should be more likely to elect 
supporters of the legislation—if these groups are enfranchised—since these 
were groups more likely to be disadvantaged and therefore more likely to have 
supported an activist federal role. Likewise, supporters should be more likely 
to come from districts that have experienced more demographic change and 
are more urbanized, since they might have a greater appreciation for the inter-
dependence of social and economic phenomena and thus have been more apt 
to support economic planning. The districts’ educational attainment may not 
yield differences in support for full employment, because better-educated con-
stituencies, though more equipped to understand the sophisticated logic of full 
employment,	may	also	reflect	more	prosperous	areas	less	sympathetic	to	the	
legislation.
The economic measures should display the sharpest differences between 
supporters and opponents of the legislation. Those who support the full employ-
ment bill should represent districts with higher 1937 rates of unemployment 
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than their opponents, assuming they would least want to repeat the experience. 
Districts with a higher percentage of their population who are working-class, a 
segment of the population vulnerable to unemployment when war production 
ends, should be more likely to have elected supporters of full employment. On 
the other hand, opponents to the full employment bill should represent districts 
that are wealthier according to the adjusted living level, since these might be 
the	areas	most	likely	to	benefit	from	the	status	quo.
At	this	juncture,	it	is	difficult	to	speculate	on	how	electoral	measures	might	
vary between the supporters and opponents. While more junior members of 
Congress might be more likely to support an idea as innovative as full employ-
ment, the support of the Democratic leadership for the bill would balance the 
less tenured members, leading to little variation among Democratic members 
on the tenure variable. Moreover, electoral variables should have little bearing 
in the South, because of its unique political dynamics. If the electoral measures 
have any effect, it may be seen in the New Deal realignment cohort. 
Since the full employment bill was championed by the liberal commu-
nity, those in Congress who have higher liberal scores on the ideology scale 
should be more likely to support the legislation. The opponents, on the other 
hand, should be more pervasive among members with higher status scores on 
the biographical measures than those who advocated full employment legisla-
tion.	This	statement	assumes	that	higher-status	people	are	more	apt	to	benefit	
from less government involvement in maintaining economic well-being and 
that higher-status members are more likely to be associated with business ele-
ments, most of which opposed the full employment bill.
One simple way of approaching the hypotheses discussed above is to see 
if members vary in their support of the legislation according to whether their 
economic, constituent, electoral, ideological, and personal features were above 
or below average. On the basis of each variable’s mean value, the members 
were grouped into a high or low category. By comparing the percentage of the 
members who fell into the high or low categories according to sponsorship, 
some interesting patterns emerge. 
Since sponsors make up 26 percent of all members, a null hypothesis 
would	be	reflected	in	the	sponsors	falling	into	the	high	and	low	categories	in	
approximately the same percentages. Likewise, the 74 percent of the members 
who did not sponsor H.R. 2202 should be distributed evenly in each of the high 
and low categories if the measures of economic, electoral, constituent, ideo-
logical, and personal features did not capture meaningful differences among 
members.
The constituency features of the sponsors’ districts differed from those 
of the nonsponsors in several key ways, as Table D.7 reveals. Sponsors came 
from districts that were much more urban than those who chose not to sponsor 
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the bill. The districts with below-average foreign-born citizens were less likely 
to be represented by sponsors of the legislation. Sponsors were more apt to 
come from districts with a smaller percentage of African Americans.
All three of the economic measures appear to differentiate the sponsors 
from those who did not sponsor the legislation. The percentage of the sponsors 
coming from districts with above-average proportions of working-class people 
was especially noteworthy, as Table D.7 indicates. Not surprisingly, sponsors 
represented districts that had a higher rate of unemployment in 1937 than non-
sponsors. However, the predicted difference between sponsors and nonspon-
sors according to wealth, as measured by the adjusted living level index, is 
challenged by Table D.7.
As hypothesized, members who had higher scores on the biographical sta-
tus measure were less likely to sponsor the bill. Moreover, sponsors of the 
legislation exhibited ideology scores that were much more liberal than those 
who	did	not	endorse	full	employment	officially.	Sponsors	had	average	ideol-
ogy scores of +0.77—i.e., quite liberal—while those not on record averaged a 
−0.28	ideology	score.
Table D.7  Percentage with Selected Features, by Sponsorship
Yes No
High Low High Low                   
Economic
% unemployed, 1937 35.3 18.3 64.7 81.7
% working-class 41.5 8.1 58.5 91.9
Adjusted living level 34.8 12.7 65.2 87.3
Constituency
% foreign-born 45.3 11.5 54.7 88.5
% African American 15.6 30.5 84.4 69.5
% urban 47.7 12.0 52.3 88.0
% population change 32.5 22.9 67.5 77.1
Years in school—male 30.0 21.6 70.0 78.4
Years in school—female 25.0 27.3 75.0 72.7
Electoral
% margin of victory 16.2 31.6 83.8 68.4
Tenure in 79th Congress 23.3 28.1 76.7 71.8
Ideological/personal
Age 24.4 28.1 75.6 75.6
Biographical status 18.1 32.0 81.9 68.0
Ideology 54.4 3.4 45.6 96.6
Total cases 114 319
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Tables D.8 and D.9 reveal that there are partisan underpinnings to this rela-
tionship among these measures as well. Sponsors made up almost 43 percent 
of all Democrats and only 5 percent of all Republicans. For the Democrats, 
all of the constituency measures but district population change appeared to 
distinguish sponsors from nonsponsors. Percentage working class, the adjusted 
living level, ideology score, tenure, and margin of victory all suggested differ-
ences in likelihood of supporting full employment. 
Table D.8  Percentage with Selected Features, by Sponsorship and  
Party: Democrats
Yes No
High Low High Low
Economic
% unemployed, 1937 49.6 34.9 50.4 65.1
% working-class 65.9 14.0 34.1 86.0
Adjusted living level 72.8 16.4 27.2 83.6
Constituency
% foreign-born 77.2  18.4 22.8 81.6
% African American 15.9 66.7 84.1 33.3
% urban 71.8 21.6 28.2 78.4
% population change 46.9 40.3 53.1 59.7
Years in school—male 65.0 27.5 35.0 72.5
Years in school—female 56.8 36.9 43.2 63.1
Ideological/personal
Ideology score 57.2 1.6 42.8 98.4
Age 42.1 43.7 57.9 56.3
Biographical status 39.2 44.6 60.8 55.4
Electoral
Tenure	in	office 33.3 50.0 66.7 50.0
Margin of victory 19.7 64.8 80.3 35.2
Total cases 104 138
Moreover, Democrats who sponsored the bill had an average ideology 
score of 0.86, while the remaining Democrats scored an average of 0.13. 
Although Republican sponsors were more liberal than those Republicans who 
did	not	endorse	the	bill,	scoring	an	average	−0.11	in	contrast	to	an	average	of	
−0.59,	they	were	best	described	as	moderate	rather	than	liberal.
An interesting pattern emerged in terms of the electoral characteristics of 
those who sponsored H.R. 2202. Sponsors on average had less tenure in Con-
gress—specifically	a	mean	of	5.0	years	of	cumulative	service	in	the	House	as	
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Table D.9  Percentage with Selected Features, by Sponsorship and  
Party:  Republicans
Yes Yes
High Low High Low
Economic
% unemployed, 1937 8.5 3.3 91.5 96.7
% working-class 8.9 1.1 91.1 98.9
Adjusted living level 6.5 0.0 93.5 100.0
Constituency
% foreign-born 9.0 2.0 91.0 98.0
% African American 11.1 4.9 88.9 95.1
% urban 12.7 0.8 87.3 99.2
% population change 7.1 4.4 92.9 95.6
Years in school—male 5.6 4.2 94.4 95.8
Years in school—female 4.4 6.5 95.6 93.5
Ideological/personal
Ideology score 20.0 4.0 80.0 96.0
Age 5.1 5.4 94.9 94.6
Biographical status 2.9 8.0 97.1 92.0
Electoral
Tenure	in	office 5.3 5.2 94.7 94.8
Margin of victory 3.2 5.6 96.8 94.4
Total cases                    10 181
compared to 7.6 years for those not on record. The endorsers also happened to 
be	slightly	younger.		These	official	advocates,	moreover,	had	secured	smaller	
margins of victory in their most recent election. Most interestingly, sponsors 
were more likely to have been elected in 1932 or later—i.e., they were part of 
the New Deal realignment.
A further breakdown by region revealed that the South, with its unique 
electoral returns (due to the predominance of the Democratic Party, which 
resulted in competitive primaries and many “no contest” general elections), 
had skewed the electoral data on sponsorship because so few Southerners had 
sponsored the bill. 
THE FINAL VOTE 
The partisan differences exhibited in the sponsorship of H.R. 2202 were 
not	quite	as	sharp	when	compared	with	supporting	the	final	roll	call.	Nonethe-
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less, 77 percent of those voting for the bill were Democrats and 23 percent 
were Republicans. Of all the Democratic members of Congress, 79 percent 
voted	for	the	final	bill.	A	total	of	30	percent	of	the	Republican	members	did	so.
Their respective partisanship scores indicated that the party differences 
had	become	much	more	muted	by	the	final	vote.	Democrats	voting	“yes”	have	
a partisanship measure of 0.50, and Republicans voting “yes” have a measure 
of 0.43. Democrats who voted “no” have an average partisanship measure of 
0.41, while Republican “no” voters have a mean score of 0.69 for partisanship. 
These	figures	suggest	that	support	for	the	legislation	among	the	Democrats	was	
not overwhelmingly related to the strength of partisanship (a 0.09 difference of 
means), but that opposition to the bill among the Republicans was associated 
more closely with strong partisanship (a 0.26 difference of means).
The	ideology	scores	for	the	final	vote	very	much	resembled	the	scores	for	
sponsorship. Those who favored the legislation had a mean score of 0.48, and 
those	who	opposed	had	a	mean	score	of	−0.64.	Democrats	who	voted	for	the	
bill had an average ideology score of 0.79, while Republican supporters had an 
average	score	of	−0.15	on	ideology.
When the opponents were split along party lines, the partisan differences 
were also quite striking. Democrats against the bill had a mean partisanship 
score	of	−0.11,	and	Republican	had	a	mean	partisanship	score	of	−0.64.	A	com-
parison of the ideology scores on sponsorship with the roll call on H.R. 2202 
implies	that	the	final	bill	had	a	broader	base	of	support	among	the	Democrats,	
but	that	both	the	sponsorship	of	the	original	bill	and	final	vote	on	the	compro-
mise bill split the Republicans along sharp ideological lines.
The	members	of	Congress	who	voted	for	the	final	legislation,	like	those	
who initially sponsored it, tended on average to be younger than their col-
leagues on the other side of the fence. Likewise, they had slightly fewer years 
of service in the House. The margin-of-victory measure indicates that support-
ers were more secure electorally than opponents.
An	investigation	of	the	final	vote	by	region	discloses	a	critical	aspect:	the	
compromise legislation had picked up the support of the South. Only a few 
in	this	bloc	of	Democrats	had	endorsed	the	first	version	of	the	bill,	but	a	clear	
majority voted “yes” on the roll call. This regional delegation was noted for 
lower than average partisanship scores as well as more conservative ideology 
scores,	so	its	inclusion	with	the	final	supporters	has	diluted	these	measures	in	a	
way one would have expected from a base-broadening outcome.
Constituency and economic variables presented in Table D.10 reveal the 
effects of broadening the base by way of compromise. Although the initial 
bill’s supporters tended to be from districts that were more urban and had more 
foreign-born, the differences were less pronounced. Now, following the com-
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promise, supporters came from districts that on average had a higher percent-
age of African American residents, completely reversing the previous relation-
ship. Moreover, the supporters represented districts that were poorer according 
to	the	adjusted	living	level	than	those	who	opposed	the	final	bill.	
 The patterns become more intriguing when the data are further analyzed 
according to party, in Tables D.11 and D.12. For the Democrats, the matter of 
whether they fell into the high or low groups on the various measures appeared 
trivial, with the exception of the ideology score. Republican supporters, on the 
other hand, were from districts that were much more working-class, urban, 
African American, and foreign-born than Republican nonsupporters. 
In sum, the typical sponsor was a liberal Democrat elected during the New 
Deal realignment from a district that was more working-class, had experienced 
urbanization	 and	 an	 influx	 of	 immigrants,	 and	 had	 been	 hardest	 hit	 by	 the	
Great	Depression.	The	members	who	voted	for	the	final	measure	were	gener-
ally nondescript in contrast to the sponsors, but they still were characterized 
as Democrats and some Republicans who represented districts that had more 
Table D.10  Percentage with Selected Features, by Final Vote             
Yes No
High     Low High Low
Economic
% unemployed, 1937 65.2 51.5 20.6 35.8
% working-class 62.3 52.8 24.6 33.5
Adjusted living level 52.4 66.9 33.3 21.1
Constituency
% foreign-born 62.6 54.3 23.7 32.5
% African American 73.8 51.8 12.3 35.0
% urban 66.7 52.1 21.3 33.6
% population change 61.0 56.3 24.7 30.8
Years in school, male 53.3 63.7 34.6 21.1
Years in school, female 50.0 64.1 38.3 21.2
Ideological/personal
Ideology score 79.5 40.3 9.2 44.5
Age 53.7 61.8 33.7 24.1
Biographical status 55.4 59.8 32.2 26.2
Electoral
% most recent vote 67.1 53.2 18.8 33.8
% margin of victory 66.2 53.7 18.9 33.7
Tenure in 79th Congress 60.4 56.6 25.2 30.7
Total cases 251 124
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Table D.11  Percentage with Selected Features, by Final Vote and  
Party: Democrats
Yes No
High Low High Low
Economic
% unemployed, 1937 79.7 78.9 6.8 11.0
% working-class 80.7 77.6 6.7 11.2
Adjusted living level 80.7 78.1 7.9 9.4
Constituency
% foreign-born 78.2 80.1 8.9 8.5
% African American 77.9 80.6 9.7 7.8
% urban 82.5 77.0 6.8 10.1
% population change 76.5 81.3 11.2 6.9
Years in school, male 85.0 75.4 6.0 10.6
Years in school, female 82.4 78.0 8.1 8.9
Ideological/personal
Ideology score 82.8 69.4 5.0 19.4
Age 78.5 80.0 8.4 8.9
Biographical status 81.1 78.6 6.8 9.5
Electoral
Margin of victory 76.1 82.4 9.4 8.0
Tenure	in	office 81.4 77.9 5.9 10.7
Total cases 192 21
foreign-born, more African Americans, and more working-class people who 
were more likely to have been unemployed in 1937. 
CLOSING OBSERVATIONS 
An interesting pattern emerged when these regional, ideological, and par-
tisanship data were viewed together. The three highest average Democratic 
partisanship scores and the three highest average Democratic ideology scores 
were in the eastern regions of the country, where the Democrats were in the 
minority. The lowest Democratic partisanship and ideology scores were in 
the South and the Border regions, where the Democrats had an overwhelm-
ing majority. Of the three regions in which the Republicans were the minority 
delegations, two regions had the highest Republican partisanship scores. These 
two regions also had the second and third most extreme ideology scores for the 
Republicans.	Excluding	the	Pacific	region,	which	had	extremely	low	Republi-
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Table D.12  Percentage with Selected Features, by Final Vote and 
Party: Republicans
Yes No
High Low High Low
Economic
% unemployed, 1937 38.0 26.7 46.5 58.3
% working-class 37.6 23.3 48.5 60.0
Adjusted living level 31.4 28.9 52.3 60.5
Constituency
% foreign-born 44.9 18.6 40.4 65.7
% African American 22.2 31.3 44.4 54.4
% urban 43.7 23.3 42.3 60.8
% population change 33.9 29.6 48.2 56.3
Years in school, male 31.5 29.2 54.5 52.1
Years in school, female 28.9 33.8 57.9 48.1
Ideological/personal
Ideology score 40.0 30.1 60.0 53.4
Age 26.5 35.5 61.2 46.2
Biographical status 36.9 23.9 50.5 58.0
Electoral
Margin of victory 29.0 31.3 54.8 53.8
Tenure	in	office 22.8 34.3 59.6 51.5
Total cases 59 103
can partisanship and ideology scores, the three lowest Republican average par-
tisanship and ideology scores were in the eastern regions, where Republicans 
constituted a majority of the congressional delegations. However, the most 
extreme Republican ideology score, as well as one of the highest partisan-
ship scores, was in the West North-Central, the region most dominated by the 
Republicans.	This	last	finding	notwithstanding,	these	data	suggest	that	minor-
ity delegations were less moderate than majority delegations in their overall 
voting behavior.
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Appendix E
A Structural Model Approach
This appendix uses sequential equations to posit structural models for sup-
port of full employment legislation in the House. It is intuitively clear that the 
forces of constituency, economic factors, personal ideology, party, and elec-
toral	security	all	did	not	converge	simultaneously	in	1945	to	influence	the	out-
come of the full employment bill. The economic traits of the district and the 
constituency characteristics already had affected the type of person elected to 
Congress, particularly the question of whether the representative was a Demo-
crat or Republican. These district characteristics may also have a further effect 
on the likelihood that the representative supported the full employment bill, an 
effect that is distinct from the party of the member, as the earlier analysis of 
those who deviated from their party’s position suggests. 
The most appropriate models of support for full employment are those 
that approach it as a sequential process. The traits of the district are used to 
predict the party of the candidate who won the most recent election—i.e., the 
current	member	of	Congress.	In	turn,	the	member’s	party	identification	is	used	
to predict his or her position on full employment. Of course, this set of relation-
ships is more complex than this simple statement implies, and it captures other 
variables	as	well,	 such	as	 the	1937	unemployment	 rate’s	 influence	upon	 the	
party of the person representing the district as well as upon his or her support 
for full employment. 
One way of depicting this set of relationships is presented in Figure E.1. 
This	general	model	assumes	that	the	influence	of	the	district	traits—economic	
and constituency—upon party moves in one direction. That is, the district traits 
affect party, but party does not affect the district traits. Moreover, the general 
model assumes that electoral security measures and biographical status of the 
member do not affect the party of the representative elected by the district. 
Finally, this model assumes that support for the full employment bill does 
not “feed back” on the district, electoral, or personal characteristics. In other 
words,	support	for	full	employment	does	not	influence	the	district,	electoral,	or	
personal characteristics that were measured before the vote.1  
In such models, a long-standing method used in various disciplines 
involves structural equations. Essentially, this approach is based upon a series 
of	multiple	 regression	 equations	 that	 refines	 the	 information	 on	 each	 exog-
enous variable’s direct and indirect effects on the dependent variable.2 Another 
advantage of using structural equations is that the method enables us to address 
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the push for full employment as a sequential process and, thus, to place support 
for full employment in a context that comes a bit closer to the actual dynamics.
As the structural equation model is constructed, party becomes an endog-
enous variable—i.e., one that is dependent on external forces. The multiple 
regression of party upon the districts’ constituency and economic variables 
reveals several interesting relationships. Wealth, as measured by the adjusted 
living level, is strongly and negatively associated with a Democratic repre-
sentative. The percentage of the district’s population that is African American 
and the percentage that is foreign-born are also good predictors of electing a 
Democratic member of Congress. The districts’ percentage of working-class 
citizens	and	percentage	of	urban	change	are	significant	as	well.		
Several	interesting	patterns	emerge	in	the	first	structural	equation	model	
(Model A) when the indirect effects of the district traits through party are com-
pared with these traits’ direct effects on support for full employment (Table 
E.1). Percentage working-class, which has one of the highest simple correla-
tion	coefficients	with	 full	 employment,	 appears	 to	have	more	of	 an	 indirect	
effect through party than a direct effect on the full employment scale. Most of 
the effect of urban change is felt through party, as are the effects of race and 
ethnicity. The unemployment rate, on the other hand, has some direct effect on 
support for full employment over and above its effect on party.
Figure E.1  Basic Model of Support for Full Employment: Model A
Constituency
Economic
Party
Electoral
Personal
% foreign born
% African American
% urban change
median education
% working class
1937 unemployment rate
adjusted living level
tenure in Congress
margin of victory
New Deal realignment
age
biographical status
Full 
employment 
score
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The research of this period maintains that the region of the country has 
an	important	influence	on	legislative	behavior	and	that	there	are	regional	dif-
ferences in party structure and composition. There is consensus, for example, 
that the South was unique in terms of its political culture, and there are sugges-
tions that other regions had distinctly partisan features. One way of analyzing 
the effect of region upon party and, in turn, on support for full employment 
is presented in Figure E.2 as Model B. Results of this second set of structural 
equations (Model B) are presented in Table E.2.3 
The differences between Model A and Model B are generally modest, but 
the regional groupings have altered some of the effects. Party remains the lead-
ing predictor, with foreign-born and working-class exhibiting notable increases 
of direct and indirect effects. The percentage of urban change decreases in 
effect to a trivial level when the regional groupings are included in the analy-
sis. One regional grouping, the Northeast, displays strong negative effects on 
support for the legislation. The South, as one might expect, has a noteworthy 
positive effect on party and a negative effect on support for full employment. 
One of the goals in selecting a model is a balance between explanatory 
power and simplicity. The models presented above are useful in that they 
explain half of the variance in support for full employment. Their size, how-
Table E.1  Modeling Support for Full Employment in the House:  
Model A—Direct and Indirect Effects
  Total Direct Indirect
New Deal realignment 0.00 0.00
Margin of victory −0.06 −0.06
Age −0.04 −0.04
Tenure in Congress −0.02 −0.06
Biographical status −0.02 −0.02
Political party 0.70** 0.70**
% urban change 0.13** 0.00** 0.12**
% foreign-born 0.32** 0.11** 0.21**
% African American 0.20** −0.03** 0.23**
% working-class 0.25 0.08 0.13
Living level index −0.27** 0.07** 0.34**
% unemployed, 1937 0.12** 0.10** 0.02**
Median education 0.10 0.06 0.04
Multiple	correlation	coefficient 0.72
Proportion of explained variance 0.52
NOTE:	**Statistically	significant	at	the	0.05	level.		Blank	indicates	no	indirect	effects	were	cal-
culated. 
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ever,	limits	their	use	because	it	is	difficult	to	unravel	the	relationships	among	
all of the variables. In winnowing the variables for inclusion in a model, a 
standard practice is used: drop out those variables that are not statistically 
significant.
The model presented in Table E.3 as Model C strives for parsimony yet 
still explains just over half of the variance in support for full employment, vir-
tually matching the more complex model’s explanatory power. Party continues 
to dominate the equation. Now, in this model, the percentage foreign-born has 
the second largest total effect, though most of it comes through party. The 
adjusted living level has a noteworthy negative overall effect due to its strong 
inverse relationship with party. The percentage of working class increases in 
its	influence,	both	on	indirect	effects	through	party	and	on	direct	effects	on	the	
full employment score. The unemployment rate remains much as it did in the 
previous models—a modest indirect effect through party coupled with a mod-
est direct effect on support for full employment (Table E.3).
The models of support for full employment were replicated with the ideol-
ogy score made of the 10 roll call votes that the UDA labeled as key liberal 
votes, and the results were found to be quite similar.4
Figure E.2  Support for Full Employment in the House: Model B
Constituency
Economic
Party
Electoral
Personal
% foreign born
% African American
% urban change
median education
% working class
1937 unemployment rate
adjusted living level
tenure in Congress
margin of victory
New Deal realignment
age
biographical status
Full 
employment 
score
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Table E.2  Modeling Support for Full Employment in the House:  
Model B—Regional Groupings, Direct and Indirect Effects
Total Direct Indirect
Margin of victory −0.01 −0.01
Tenure in Congress −0.08 −0.08
Political party 0.69** 0.69**
% urban change 0.00 −0.03 0.02
% foreign-born 0.58** 0.15** 0.43**
% African American 0.19 0.04 0.15
% working-class 0.40** 0.14** 0.26**
Living level index −0.22 −0.02 −0.20
% unemployed, 1937 0.15 0.08 0.07
Age 0.05 0.05
Median education −0.05 0.06 −0.01
Biographical status −0.01 −0.01
New Deal realignment −0.03 −0.03
Northeast −0.59** −0.17** −0.42**
Midwest −0.26 −0.06 −0.20
South 0.11** −0.23** 0.34**
West 0.12 −0.06 0.18
Multiple	correlation	coefficient 0.74
Proportion of explained variance 0.55
NOTE:	**Statistically	significant	at	the	0.05	level.	Blank	indicates	no	indirect	effects	were	cal-
culated.
COMPARING THE MODELS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT  
WITH IDEOLOGY
As stated at the outset of this book, the drive for full employment legisla-
tion	is	a	case	study	in	the	process	of	redefining	the	federal	role	and	responsibil-
ity. The degree to which congressional action on the full employment bill is 
similar to the broader phenomenon may be observed, although the crudeness 
of the measures and limits of the data must be kept continually in mind. The 
ideology	 score	 offers	 a	 plausible	measure	 of	 how	members	 define	 the	 fed-
eral role and responsibility, because the roll calls that make up the liberal- 
conservative scale address other key components of this general issue.
One approach is to compare these models of support for full employment 
with models in which the ideology score is the dependent variable. Essen-
tially, Models A and B are replicated with the ideology score replacing the full 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
198   Wasem
employment score as the dependent variable. The results of this replication, 
presented in Tables E.4 and E.5 as Models D and E, are powerful as well as 
fascinating.5
In general, the models are quite similar; however, the ideology models 
have more explanatory power.6 As before, party remains the most powerful 
Table E.3  Modeling Support For Full Employment in the House:  
Model C—A Simpler Model, Direct and Indirect Effects
Total Direct Indirect
Political party 0.70** 0.70**
% urban change 0.12** 0.00** 0.12**
% working-class 0.24** 0.09** 0.15**
Living level index −0.25** 0.09** −0.34**
% unemployed, 1937 0.16** 0.11** 0.06**
Median education 0.08** 0.07** 0.01**
% foreign-born 0.31** 0.10** 0.21**
% African American 0.16** −0.06** 0.22**
Multiple	correlation	coefficient 0.71
Proportion of explained variance 0.51
NOTE:	**All	variables	are	statistically	significant	at	the	0.05	level.		Blank	indicates	no	indirect	
effects were calculated.
Table E.4  Modeling Support For Ideology: Model D—Direct and 
Indirect Effects
Total Direct Indirect
New Deal realignment −0.02 −0.02
Margin of victory −0.17** −0.17**
Age 0.02 0.02
Tenure in Congress −0.04 −0.04
Biographical status −0.05** −0.05**
Political party 0.87** 0.87**
% urban change 0.16** 0.01** 0.15**
% foreign-born 0.32** 0.08** 0.26**
% African American 0.29** −0.08** 0.29**
% working-class 0.32** 0.15** 0.17**
Living level index −0.30** 0.12** −0.42**
% unemployed, 1937 0.12** 0.09** 0.03**
Median education 0.02 −0.03 0.05
Multiple	correlation	coefficient 0.87
Proportion of explained variance 0.76
NOTE:	**Statistically	significant	at	the	0.05	level.	Blank	indicates	no	indirect	effects	were	cal-
culated.
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Table E.5  Modeling Support for Ideology: Model E—Regional 
Groupings, Direct and Indirect Effects
Total Direct Indirect
Realignment −0.05 −0.05
Margin of victory −0.11 −0.11
Age 0.00 0.00
Tenure in Congress −0.05 −0.05
Status −0.03** −0.03**
Political party 0.89** 0.89**
% urban change 0.03** 0.01** 0.02**
% foreign-born 0.53** 0.10** 0.43**
% African American 0.13** −0.02** 0.15**
% working class 0.46** 0.20** 0.26**
Living level index −0.20** 0.00** −0.20**
% unemployed, 1937 0.15** 0.08** 0.07**
Education −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
Northeast −0.53 −0.11 −0.42
Midwest −0.20 0.00 −0.20
South 0.10 −0.24 0.34
West 0.10 −0.08 0.18
Multiple	correlation	coefficient 0.88
Proportion of explained variance 0.78
NOTE:	**	Statistically	significant	at	the	0.05	level.	Blank	indicates	no	indirect	effects	were	cal-
culated.
predictor. Foreign-born, urban change, working-class, race, and adjusted living 
level all exhibit effects upon ideology much as they do with full employment. 
The most noteworthy differences are the negative direct effects of margin and 
victory and, to a lesser extent, of biographical status. Once again, percentage 
urban change decreases when the regional groupings are included, but the per-
centage working class increases in its total effects.
The similarity of these models lends support to a fundamental assumption 
of this book: the dynamics of support for full employment resemble the forces 
that pushed for a general strengthening of the federal role and responsibility.
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Appendix Notes
 1. Appendix F discusses the statistical issues involving recursive models. 
 2. See Appendix F for a fuller and more technical discussion of the methodology.
 3. See Appendix F for the reason the Border states were dropped from the equation.
	 4.	 The	models	also	yield	coefficients	 that	are	comparable	in	explanatory	power	to	
statistical analyses of other legislative issues considered during other periods by 
Congress. For examples drawing on a range of statistical techniques, see Bartels 
(2005), Clinton (2006), Khan (2005), Nelson (2002), and Sanders (1997). 
 5. One should be extremely circumspect when comparing models with different 
dependent variables. Appendix F discusses the statistical problems inherent in 
such analyses and the strict limitations of the comparisons.
 6. This larger explained variance may be due to the differences in the statistical 
variances of the two dependent variables—full employment score and ideology 
score—and not indicative of theoretical importance.
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Appendix F
Methodology and Research Design
This appendix provides a review of the methodology and research design 
used in this book. It describes the statistics that are employed in this analysis 
and raises concerns pertinent to the application of these techniques. Citations 
of statistical sources are included for reference and for further explanation. 
OVERVIEW OF STATISTICS EMPLOYED
Correlation measures the degree to which two variables are linearly related. 
Unlike	the	covariance,	the	correlation	coefficient	neutralizes	any	differences	in	
scales (e.g., X might be measured in dollars and Y might be measured in per-
cent)	that	might	exist	for	the	two	variables.	The	correlation	coefficient	always	
varies	between	−1.0	and	+1.0,	with	the	extremes	representing	perfectly	linear	
relationships. If X and Y are independent, then the correlation is zero. 
Multiple Regression is a type of linear model that enables us to measure 
the effects of several independent (i.e., exogenous) variables upon a dependent 
variable. By estimating the parameters of the linear model, this technique pro-
vides us with four important pieces of information, including 1) the amount 
of unit change in Y (the dependent variable) attributable to each of the inde-
pendent variables (such as the beta parameters or the amount of variance in 
Y explained by each of the independent variables), 2) the partial correlation 
coefficients,	3)	the	amount	of	variance	in	Y explained by the combined effects 
of	the	independent	variables	(such	as	the	multiple	correlation	coefficient),	and	
4)	the	statistical	significance	of	the	model.
The equation for multiple regression may be expressed as
Y = a + bx + bz + e ,
where a is the intercept (as if plotting a line), bx	is	the	beta	coefficient	of	X (the 
slope of the line of X on Y), bz	is	the	beta	coefficient	of	Z (the slope of the line 
of Z on Y), and e is the random error term. When we standardize the model, we 
set a, alpha, at zero (Wonnacott and Wonnacott 1977, pp. 359–365).
Generally, regression equations require continuous or interval-level vari-
ables in order to measure how unit change in the independent variables affects 
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unit change in the dependent variable. Thus, party and New Deal realignment 
are converted to 0/1 variables, and indices and scores are calculated to gauge 
biographical status and ideology. If one has ordinal or nominal data, then three 
other techniques are more appropriate: 1) analysis of variance techniques, such 
as	Multiple	Classification	Analysis	(MCA);	2)	contingency	table	analysis	tech-
niques, such as chi-squared or Leo Goodman’s ECTA statistics; and 3) logistic 
regression techniques.
Political party is a dichotomous variable that generally should not be used 
as a dependent variable in a regression equation. One option would be to use 
partisanship score, which is a continuous-level variable; however, it is prob-
lematic as a subsequent predictor of the full employment score because both 
are composed of roll call votes. The more statistically sound approach is to use 
LOGIT or PROBIT, which are both regression techniques designed to handle 
dichotomous dependent variables. This solution poses problems, nonetheless, 
with the overall set of structural equations, because they must be parallel—that 
is, they must use identical methods of calculation.
I have run the regression equations predicting political party using LOGIT 
and using ordinary least squares (OLS). The results are quite similar, due 
largely to the fact that the distribution of party is not skewed—in other words, 
there is a fairly even balance of Democrats and Republicans in the 79th Con-
gress. Thus, I am presenting the OLS results for the sake of consistency with 
the overall model.
As is apparent from the equations, regression techniques assume an addi-
tive model, and thus the exogenous variables must be independent of each 
other. Given the nature of social science data and its accompanying problems 
of	measurement,	 it	 is	 sometimes	difficult	 to	have	purely	 independent	 exog-
enous variables. Multicolinearity, which exists when some of the exogenous 
variables are correlated with each other, is not uncommon. Multicolinearity 
may occur in instances where the exogenous variables are not truly causally 
related	and	result	from	definitional	and	measurement	problems.	Or,	the	model	
may	be	misspecified,	such	as	by	omitting	variables.	In	resolving	the	problem	
of multicolinearity, one should bear in mind the following caveat: “If minor 
changes	 in	 the	model	 specification	or	 the	definition	of	 variables	 yield	 large	
changes	in	the	estimated	coefficients,	the	model	should	be	treated	with	some	
caution” (Hanushek and Jackson 1977, pp. 86–96). 
Structural equations are more complex forms of linear models that draw 
on a multiequation approach to represent an underlying behavioral structure. 
One may consider the model as a series of multiple regression equations, in 
some instances simultaneous equations. The model determines or predicts 
the endogenous (i.e., dependent) variables. The exogenous (i.e., independent) 
variables are determined outside of the model. The other predetermined vari-
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ables are lagged endogenous variables that have values established prior to the 
current observation. 
One major advantage of structural equations is that they enable one to 
measure not only the direct effects of the independent variables but also the 
indirect effects of secondary explanatory variables upon the dependent vari-
able through a primary explanatory variable. These indirect effects may rein-
force the direct effects of the primary explanatory variable or negate the direct 
effects.	 Structural	 equations	 help	 us	 measure	 the	 reciprocal	 influences	 that	
may characterize the set of variables at hand (Hanushek and Jackson 1977, 
pp. 217–218). 
Recursive models are those that are both hierarchical and have indepen-
dent error terms across equations. If the error terms are correlated, the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) assumptions are violated, resulting in biased and incon-
sistent parameter estimates. “The decision to use a recursive model should 
not be taken lightly, or simply for the purpose of convenience,” William Berry 
writes. “Unless one is convinced that 1) causation among the factors is strictly 
unidimensional and 2) the factors constituting the error terms in the model 
are fundamentally different for each equation, recursive models should not be 
used” (Berry 1984, p. 15; Hanushek and Jackson 1977, pp. 217–218).
One may argue that the models presented in this chapter are recursive 
because, to paraphrase Otis Dudley Duncan, all causal linkages run one way 
and no two variables feed back on each other. Duncan also warns that “letting 
the data decide which way the causal arrow runs”—for example, opting in 
certain	situations	for	a	nonrecursive	model—leads	to	underidentification,	not	
causal inference (Duncan 1975, pp. 25–50, 81–90).
An important caveat is that the independent stochastic assumption cannot 
be made in the case of these models. An alternative approach to the recur-
sive model would be to draw on instrumental variables with a two-stage least 
squares method. At this point, nonetheless, a recursive model is assumed, with 
the risk that it might lead to overstatement.
DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES
Tests	of	significance	are	not	presented	as	part	of	these	analyses	because	
the data captures the entire population during the span of time under study. The 
question of sampling and the likelihood that these results would be manifested 
by a different sample of cases is germane to this research. The one notable 
exception	 is	 the	 use	 of	 statistical	 significance	 to	winnow	down	 the	 number	
of variables in the model of support for the full employment bill. The latter 
practice	 is	 commonly	done,	but	 in	 this	 instance	 the	 tests	of	 significance	 for	
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each exogenous variable are used as a gauge of the relative importance of their 
relationship in terms of support for the full employment bill. 
The linear models presented in Appendix E are obtained through a series 
of OLS equations. One set of equations consists of congressional district traits 
regressed upon party. The other set regresses party and all exogenous variables 
on	the	full	employment	score.	The	results	of	these	first	equations	are	seen	in	
Model A.
Those	variables	that	are	not	statistically	significant	at	the	0.05	level	with	
either party or the full employment score are then dropped from the analy-
sis. A new set of equations is run again with those variables that are statisti-
cally	significant—Model	C.	The	equations	for	Model	A	are	repeated	with	the	
regional	groupings	included	and	presented	as	Model	B.	All	five	of	the	regional	
groupings cannot be included in the model because they would sum to the 
whole country and result in a singular matrix. The Border region is arbitrarily 
dropped from the analysis. The Model A equations are also used to predict ide-
ology and are seen in Model D and Model E (regional groupings).
One	should	not	strictly	compare	the	regression	coefficients	from	Models	
A and B with Models D and E because the latter models have a new dependent 
variable—ideology. Since the dependent variable in any regression equation 
is the crux of the analysis, changing it alters the relative effects that indepen-
dent or exogenous variables have upon it. The ideology scale has, among other 
unique attributes, a variance and standard deviation that differs from the attri-
butes of the full employment score; attributes such as the dependent variable’s 
variance are essential components in the calculations that produce the regres-
sion	coefficients.	
It is reasonable, nevertheless, to make general observations about the simi-
larity of the two sets of models. The relative importance of exogenous vari-
ables within each of the models may be assessed, and the overall models may 
be compared with that in mind. 
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Table F.1  Models A and B, Estimated Equations for Full Employment 
with Unstandardized Coefficients
Model A  
Y2 = a + b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 + b9 + b10 + b11 + b12 + b13 
Y2	=	−1.11	−	0.00	−	0.01	+	1.02	−	0.00	+	0.01	−	0.00	+	0.00	+	0.00	+	0.01	 
	 −	0.00	+	0.03	−	0.01	−	0.00
Y1 = a + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 + b9 + b11 
Y1	=	0.24	+	0.00	+	0.01	+	0.01	+	0.01	−	0.01	+	0.00	+	0.02	;
Model B  
Y2 = a + b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 + b9 + b10 + b11 + b12 + b13 
  + b14 + b15 + b16 + b17
Y2	=	−0.93	−	0.00	−	0.01	+	1.00	−	0.00	+	0.01	+	0.00	+	0.00	−	0.00	+	0.01	 
	 −	0.00	+	0.03	−	0.00	−	0.05	−	0.28	−	0.10	−	0.41	−	0.15
Y1 = a + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 + b9 + b11 + b14 + b15 + b16 + b17
Y1	=	0.03	+	0.00	+	0.03	+	0.01	+	0.01	−	0.00	+	0.01	−	0.00	−	0.46	−	0.22	 
 + 0.41 + 0.32 ,
where
 Y1 = Political party
 Y2 = Full employment score
 b1 = Margin of victory
 b2 = Tenure in Congress
 b3 = Political party
 b4 = % urban change
 b5 = % foreign-born
 b6 = % African American 
 b7 = % working-class 
b8  = Adjusted living level 
b9  = % unemployed, 1937 
b10 = Age of member 
b11 = Median education
b12 = Biographical status
b13 = New Deal realignment
b14 = Northeast
b15 = Midwest
b16 = South
b17 = West
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Table F.2  Model C, Estimated Equations for Full Employment with 
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model C 
Y2 = a + b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 
Y2	=	−1.52	+	0.102	−	0.00	+	0.00	+	0.00	+	0.02	+	0.03	+	0.01	−	0.00
Y1 = a + b2 + b3 + b4 + b7 + b8 
Y1	=	0.42	+	0.00	+	0.01	−	0.01	+	0.02	+	0.01	,
where
 Y1 = Political party
 Y2 = Full employment score
 b1 = Political party
 b2 = % urban change
 b3 = % working-class
 b4 = Adjusted living level
 b5 = % unemployed, 1937
 b6 = Median education
 b7 = % foreign-born 
 b8 = % African American 
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Table F.3  Models D and E, Estimated Equations for Ideology with 
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model D  
Y2 = a + b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 + b9 + b10 + b11 + b12 + b13 
Y2 = −1.11 − 0.00 − 0.00 + 1.16 + 0.00 + 0.00 − 0.00 + 0.01 + 0.00 + 0.02 +   
 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.02 − 0.04
Y1 = a + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 + b9 + b11 
Y1 = 0.24 + 0.00 + 0.01 + 0.01 + 0.01 − 0.01 + 0.00 + 0.02 ;
Model E  
Y2 = a + b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 + b9 + b10 + b11 + b12 + b13 + b14  
 + b15 + b16 + b17
Y2 = −0.98 − 0.00 − 0.00 + 1.18 + 0.00 + 0.01 − 0.00 + 0.01 + 0.00 + 0.01  
 + 0.00 − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.09 − 0.16 + 0.00 − 0.38 − 0.18
Y1 = a + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 + b9 + b11 + b14 + b15 + b16 + b17
Y1 = 0.03 + 0.00 + 0.03 + 0.01 + 0.01 − 0.00 + 0.01 − 0.00 − 0.46 − 0.22 +   
 0.41 + 0.32 ,
where
 Y1 = Party
 Y2 = Full employment score
 b1 = Margin of victory
 b2 = Tenure in Congress
 b3 = Political party
 b4  = % urban change
 b5 = % foreign-born
 b6 = % African American 
 b7 = % working-class 
 b8 = Adjusted living level
b9  = % unemployed, 1937 
b10 = Age of member 
b11 = Median education
b12 = Biographical status
b13 = New Deal realignment
b14 = Northeast
b15 = Midwest
b16 = South
b17 = West
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
209
References
Ackerman, William C. 1945. “The Dimensions of American Broadcasting.” 
Public Opinion Quarterly 9(1): 1–18. 
Alwin, Duane F., and Robert M. Hauser. 1975. “The Decomposition of Effects 
in Path Analysis.” American Sociological Review 40(1): pp. 37–47. 
Atkinson, Anthony B., Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez. 2011. “Top 
Incomes in the Long Run of History.” Journal of Economic Literature 
49(1): 3–71. 
Atleson, James B. 1998. Labor and the Wartime State: Labor Relations and 
Law during World War II. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Austin, Erik W. 1986. Political Facts of the United States since 1789. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Bailey, Stephen Kemp. 1964. Congress Makes a Law: The Story behind the 
Employment Act of 1946. New York: Vintage. 
Barber, William J. 1987. “The Career of Alvin H. Hansen in the 1920s and 
1930s: A Study in Intellectual Transformation.” History of Political Econ-
omy 19(2): 191–205. 
Bartels, Larry M. 2005. Economic Inequality and Political Representation. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. 
———. 2008. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded 
Age. New York: Russell Sage. 
Berinsky, Adam J. 2006. “American Public Opinion in the 1930s and 1940s: 
The Analysis of Quota-Controlled Sample Survey Data.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 70(4): 499–529. 
Bernanke, Ben S. 2000. Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Bernstein, Barton J., ed. 1968. Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in 
American History. New York: Pantheon. 
Bernstein, Barton J., and Allen J. Matusow, eds. 1966. The Truman Adminis-
tration: A Documentary History. New York: Harper and Row. 
Bernstein, Irving. 1985. A Caring Society: The New Deal, the Worker, and the 
Great Depression: A History of the American Worker, 1933–1941. Boston: 
Houghton	Mifflin.	
Bernstein, Michael A. 2001. A Perilous Progress: Economists and Public Pur-
pose in Twentieth-Century America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Berry, William D. 1984. Nonrecursive Causal Models. Quantitative Applica-
tions in the Social Sciences 37. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
210   Wasem
Beveridge, William Henry, Baron. 1944. Report on Full Employment in a Free 
Society. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Bird, Caroline. 1966. The Invisible Scar: The Great Depression, and What It 
Did to American Life, from Then until Now. New York: David McKay Co. 
Blumberg, Barbara. 1979. The New Deal and the Unemployed: The View from 
New York City. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press. 
Brinkley, Alan. 1996. The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession 
and War. New York: Vintage Books. 
Brownlee, W. Elliot, and Hugh Davis Graham. 2003. The Reagan Presidency: 
Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies. Lawrence, KS: University Press 
of Kansas. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 2012a. National Economic Accounts. 
Washington, DC: Bureau of Economic Analysis. http://www.bea.gov/
national/index.htm#personal (accessed October 8, 2012).
———. 2012b. National Income and Product Accounts Tables. Washing-
ton, DC: Bureau of Economic Analysis. http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable 
.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1 (accessed October 8, 2012).
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2012. Databases, Tables & Calculators by 
Subject. Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/
data (accessed October 8, 2012).
Burns, James MacGregor. 1956. Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox. Vol. 1, 
1882–1940. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. 
Caldwell, Bruce. 2007. “Introduction.” In The Road to Serfdom: Text and Doc-
uments; the Definitive Edition, by F.A. Hayek, edited by Bruce Caldwell. 
Vol. 2, The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, pp. 1–33. First published 1944 by the University of Chicago. 
Cantril, Hadley. 1951. Public Opinion, 1935–1946. With Mildred Strunk. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Chicago Daily Tribune. 1943. “Plan for Post-War Depression.” Editorial, 
August 8, p. 16.
Clausen, Aage R. 1973. How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press. 
Clinton, Joshua D. 2006. “Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll 
Calls in the 106th House.” Journal of Politics 68(2): 397–409. 
Clinton, Joshua D., Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. “The Statisti-
cal	Analysis	of	Legislative	Behavior:	A	Unified	Approach.”	American Polit-
ical Science Review 98(2): 355–370. 
Collins, Robert M. 1982. “American Corporatism: The Committee for Eco-
nomic Development, 1942–1964.” Historian 44(2): 151–173. 
Colm, Gerhard. 1944. Postwar Employment: A Report. Gerhard Colm Papers. 
Independence, MO: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
References   211
———. 1945. “The Problem of Estimating Future Expenditures by Consum-
ers, Business, and State and Local Governments.” Unpublished paper. 
Gerhard Colm Papers. Independence, MO: Harry S. Truman Library and 
Museum. 
———, ed. 1956. The Employment Act, Past and Future: A Tenth Anniversary 
Symposium. NPA Special Report No. 41. Washington, DC: National Plan-
ning Association. 
Congressional	 Budget	 Office	 (CBO).	 2010.	 Public Spending on Transpor-
tation and Water Infrastructure. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget 
Office.	http://www.cbo.gov/publication/21902 (accessed October 8, 2012). 
Congressional Quarterly. 1945. “Full Employment Bill.” Congressional 
Quarterly 1(July–September): 487. 
———. 1946. “Conference Report on Full Employment.” Congressional 
Quarterly 2(January–March): 72.
Congressional Record. 1945a. 79th Cong., 1st sess. Vol. 91, pt. 1. Washington, 
DC:	U.S.	Government	Printing	Office.	
———. 1945b. 79th Cong., 1st sess. Vol. 91, pt. 7. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government	Printing	Office.
———. 1945c. 79th Cong., 1st sess. Vol. 91, pt. 9. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government	Printing	Office.
———. 1946. 79th Cong., 2nd sess. Vol. 92, pt. 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-
ernment	Printing	Office.
Converse, Jean M. 1987. Survey Research in the United States: Roots and 
Emergence, 1890–1960. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Cornell, Saul. 1999. The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting 
Tradition in America, 1788–1828. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press.
Cotton, Felix. 1946. “Chamber Favors Commission to Advise U.S. on Eco-
nomics.” International News Service, Washington Post, January 7, p. 4.
Davis, Christopher M. 2003. “The Speaker of the House and the Committee 
on Rules.” In The Cannon Centenary Conference: The Changing Nature of 
the Speakership, Walter J. Oleszek, ed. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing	Office,	pp.	141–157.	
Degler, Carl. 1970. Out of Our Past. Rev. ed. New York: Harper and Row. First 
published 1959 by Harper and Brothers. 
Deschler, Lewis. 1976. Deschler’s Rules of Order. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Donovan, Robert J. 1977. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. 
Truman, 1945–1948. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Stanley Fischer. 1981. Macro-Economics. 2nd ed. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Duncan, Otis Dudley. 1975. Introduction to Structural Equation Models. New 
York: Academic Press. 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
212   Wasem
Ebenstein, Alan. 2001. Friedrich Hayek: A Biography. New York: Palgrave. 
Elder, Glen H. Jr. 1974. Children of the Great Depression: Social Change in 
Life Experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Engelbourg, Saul. 1980. “The Council of Economic Advisers and the Reces-
sion of 1953–1954.” Business History Review 54(2): 192–214.
Flamm, Michael. 1994. “The National Farmers Union and the Evolution of 
Agrarian Liberalism, 1937–1946.” Agricultural History 68(3): 54–80. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum. 2012. 1944 State of 
the Union Address: FDR’s “Second Bill of Rights” or “Economic Bill of 
Rights” Speech. Hyde Park, NY: Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library 
and Museum. http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/stateoftheunion 
.html (accessed June 26, 2012). 
Freidel, Frank. 1965. The New Deal in Historical Perspective. Service Cen-
ter for Teachers of History, Publication No. 25. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: 
American Historical Association. 
Furniss, Norman, and Timothy Tilton. 1977. The Case for the Welfare State: 
From Social Security to Social Equality. Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univer-
sity Press. 
Gallup, George A. 1944. “Public Pessimistic on Postwar Prospects for Employ-
ment.” Washington Post, December 27, p. 6. 
———. 1945. “Poll Shows Public Split on Employment Issue.” Los Angeles 
Times, September 17, p. 2. 
———. 1972. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–1971. Vol. 1, 1935–
1948. New York: Random House. 
Garraty, John A. 1979. Unemployment in History: Economic Thought and 
Public Policy. New York: Harper and Row. 
General Motors. 1945. The Road to Serfdom in Cartoons. Thought Starter 
Series, No. 118. Detroit: General Motors. Originally published by Look 
magazine. http://mises.org/books/TRTS/ (accessed July 18, 2012). 
Goldin, Claudia, and Robert A. Margo. 1992. “The Great Compression: The 
Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-Century.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 107(1): 1–34. 
Goldman, Eric F. 1952. Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern Ameri-
can Reform. New York: Knopf. 
Graham, Otis L. Sr. 1976. Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to 
Nixon. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hamby, Alonzo L. 1973. Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American 
Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Hansen, Alvin H. 1942. After the War—Full Employment. National Resources 
Planning Board. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Hanushek, Eric A., and John E. Jackson. 1977. Statistical Methods for Social 
Scientists. New York: Academic Press. 
References   213
Hawley, Ellis W. 1966. The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study 
in Economic Ambivalence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hazlitt, Henry. 1944. “An Economist’s View of Planning.” New York Times 
Book Review, September 24, p. 1. 
Heller, Francis H. 1982. Economics and the Truman Administration. Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas.
Hibbs,	Douglas	A.	1982.	“Public	Concern	about	Inflation	and	Unemployment	
in the United States: Trends, Correlates, and Political Implications.” In 
Inflation: Causes and Effects, Robert E. Hall, ed. Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, pp. 211–232. 
Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New 
York: Random House. 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 2012. SOI Tax Stats—Individual Time Series 
Statistical Tables. Washington, DC: Internal Revenue Service. http://www 
.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats---Individual-Time-Series-Statistical-Tables 
(accessed October 8, 2012). 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). 2013a. 
Candidate and Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States, 
1788–1978. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
Social Research. http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/index.jsp 
(accessed January 15, 2013).
———. 2013b. County and City Data Book (United States) Consolidated File, 
1944–1977. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
Social Research. http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/index.jsp 
(accessed January 15, 2013).
———. 2013c. Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The 
United States, 1790–1970. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium 
for Political and Social Research. http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ 
ICPSR/index.jsp (accessed January 15, 2013).
———. 2013d. Roster of the United States Congressional Officeholder and 
Biographical Characteristics of the Members of the United States Con-
gress, 1789–1980. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political 
and Social Research. http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/index 
.jsp (accessed January 15, 2013).
———. 2013e. United States Congressional Roll Call Records. Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. http://www 
.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/index.jsp (accessed January 15, 2013).
Jackson, John E. 1974. Constituencies and Leaders in Congress: Their Effects 
on Senate Voting Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Theda Skocpol, eds. 2005. Inequality and American 
Democracy: What We Know and What We Need to Learn. New York: Rus-
sell Sage. 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
214   Wasem
Jones, Charles O., ed. 1988. The Reagan Legacy: Promise and Performance. 
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. 
Keyssar, Alexander. 1986. Out of Work: The First Century of Unemployment in 
Massachusetts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Khan, Haroon A. 2005. “Determinants of Congressional Support for NAFTA 
and Clinton’s Economic Package.” Journal of Developing Areas 38(2): 
143–154. 
Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. “Economic Discontent and 
Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Eco-
nomic Judgments in Congressional Voting.” American Journal of Political 
Science 23(3): 495–527.
Klein, Lawrence R. 1947. The Keynesian Revolution. New York: Macmillan. 
Knapp, Joseph G. 1979. Edwin G. Nourse: Economist for the People. Danville, 
IL: Interstate Printers and Publishers.
Kriesberg, Martin. 1945. “What Congressmen and Administrators Think of the 
Polls.” Public Opinion Quarterly 9(3): 333–337. 
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and Patricia L. Kendall. 1948. Radio Listening in America: 
The People Look at Radio—Again. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Leuchtenberg, William E. 1963. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal: 
1932–1940. New American Nation Series. New York: Harper and Row. 
Los Angeles Times. 1943. “Postwar Jobs for 58,000,000 Seen as Task Facing 
Nation,” March 12, p. 17. 
Lubell, Samuel. 1965. The Future of American Politics. 3rd ed. New York: 
Harper and Row. First published 1952 by Harper and Brothers. 
MacRae, Duncan. 1958. Dimensions of Congressional Voting. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Markowitz, Norman D. 1973. The Rise and Fall of the People’s Century: Henry 
A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948. New York: Free Press. 
McElvaine, Robert S. 1983. The Great Depression: America, 1929–1941. New 
York: Times Books. 
Miller,	Warren	E.,	 and	Donald	E.	 Stokes.	 1963.	 “Constituency	 Influence	 in	
Congress.” American Political Science Review 57(1): 45–56. 
Moley, Raymond. 1942. “The Gentle Art of Prevision: Planning the Post-War 
Period Is a Major Concern for Busy New Dealers.” Wall Street Journal, 
April 22, p. 6.
Neary, Edward Henry. 1945. Letter to the editor. Wall Street Journal, April 23, 
p. 6.
Nelson, Jon P. 2002. “‘Green’ Voting and Ideology: LCV Scores and Roll-Call 
Voting in the U.S. Senate, 1988–1998.” Review of Economics and Statistics 
84(3): 518–529. 
New Republic. 1946a. “Record of the House.” New Republic 114(6): 211–215.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
References   215
———. 1946b. “Record of the Senate.” New Republic 114(6): 218–220. 
New York Times. 1943. “Industry Accepts Call to Find Jobs.” New York Times, 
August 2, p. 17. 
Newsweek. 1943. “Business Planners Concentrate on Free Enterprise and Turn 
Deaf Ear to Cries for ‘Normalcy.’” Newsweek 21(15): 31–32. 
———. 1945a. “Selling F.E.” Newsweek 26(7): 26.
———. 1945b. “Sort of Leery.” Newsweek 26(15): 36.
Patterson, James T. 1967. Congressional Conservativism and the New Deal. 
Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press. 
———. 1972. Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft. Boston: Hough-
ton	Mifflin.	
Perrett, Geoffrey. 1985. Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph: The American 
People, 1939–1945. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Philips, Kevin. 1993. Boiling Point: Democrats, Republicans, and the Decline 
of Middle-Class Prosperity. New York: Random House. 
Phillips-Fein, Kim. 2009. Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade against 
the New Deal. New York: Norton. 
Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2003. “Income Inequality in the United 
States, 1913–1998.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 1–39.
Riesel, Victor. 1946. “Labor Is Big Business.” Reader’s Digest 48(296): 118–
120. 
Robey, Ralph. 1945a. “Clever Trick Designed Just to Fool You.” Newsweek 
26(July 23): 66.
———. 1945b. “Gambling at a New High, with Your Money: Murray Full 
Employment Bill.” Newsweek 26(July 9): 72.
Romer, Christina D. 1992. “What Ended the Great Depression?” Journal of 
Economic History 52(4): 757–784. 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. 1941a. “Annual Message to the Congress. Janu-
ary 3, 1938.” In The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
1938 vol., The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism: With a Special Introduc-
tion and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt. New York: Macmillan, 
pp. 1–13.
———.	1941b.	“Reaffirming	Policy	of	Full	Participation	in	the	Defense	Pro-
gram by All Persons, Regardless of Race, Creed, Color, or Nation Origin, 
and Directing Certain Action in Furtherance of Said Policy.” Exec. Order 
No. 8802, June 25. Federal Register 6(125): 3109.
———. 1943. “Further Amending Executive Order No. 8802 by Establish-
ing	a	New	Committee	on	Fair	Employment	Practice	and	Defining	Its	Pos-
ers and Duties.” Exec. Order No. 9346, May 27. Federal Register 8(106): 
7183–7184.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
216   Wasem
 ———. 1950. “Unless There Is Security Here at Home, There Cannot Be 
Lasting Peace in the World—Message to the Congress on the State of the 
Union. January 11, 1944.” In The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt. 1944–45 vol., Victory and the Threshold of Peace: Compiled 
with Special Material and Explanatory Notes by Samuel I. Rosenman. New 
York: Harper, pp. 32–44. 
Salmond, John A. 2002. The General Textile Strike of 1934: From Maine to 
Alabama. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press. 
Sanders, Francine. 1997. “Civil Rights Roll-Call Voting in the House of Rep-
resentatives, 1957–1991: A Systematic Analysis.” Political Research Quar-
terly 50(3): 483–502. 
Schneider, Jerrold E. 1979. Ideological Coalitions in Congress. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press. 
Sloan, John W. 1991. Eisenhower and the Management of Prosperity. Studies 
in Government and Public Policy Series. Lawrence, KS: University Press 
of Kansas. 
Smith, Tom W. 1980. “America’s Most Important Problems—A Trend Analy-
sis, 1946–1976.” Public Opinion Quarterly 44(2): 164–180. 
Spritzer, Donald E. 1985. Senator James E. Murray and the Limits of Post-War 
Liberalism. New York: Garland. 
Steinbeck, John. 1939. The Grapes of Wrath. New York: Viking.
Strom, Sara. 2003. “Unemployment and Families: A Review of the Research.” 
Social Service Review 77(3): 399–430. 
Sullivan, Mark. 1945. Editorial column. Washington Post, June 22. 
Sundquist, James. 1968. Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson Years. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Temin, Peter. 1998. “The Causes of American Business Cycles: An Essay in 
Economic Historiography.” NBER Working Paper No. 6692. Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Temporary National Economic Committee. 1941. “Publications of the Tempo-
rary National Economic Committee.” American Economic Review 31(2): 
347–350.
Time. 1932. “Garner v. Wagner v. Hoover.” Time 20(1): 10.
———. 1942. “Farmers: Patton Is Willing. Farmers Union’s Support for the 
President’s	Anti-Inflation	Program.”	Time 40(11): 22.
———. 1943. “Business and Finance.” Time 42(16): 77–82.
———. 1945a. “‘I Object.’” Time 46(7): 19.
———. 1945b. “National Affairs.” Time 46(13): 15–20.
———. 1945c. “National Affairs.” Time 46(14): 19–25.
———. 1945d. “National Affairs.” Time 46(16): 13–18. 
———. 1945e. “National Affairs.” Time 46(22): 19–25.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
References   217
———. 1945f. “Out-dealing the New Deal? First Peacetime Message to Con-
gress.” Time 46(12): 20.
———. 1945g. “Transition: C.E.D. v. Normalcy.” Time 46(17): 82–83.
———. 1945h. “Transition: Sudden Shift.” Time 46(8): 23–24.
Truman, Harry S. 1961a. “The President’s News Conference of August 16, 
1945.” In The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. 
Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the 
President, April 12 to December 31, 1945. Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, p. 225. 
———. 1961b. “The President’s News Conference of May 2, 1945.” In The 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the Presi-
dent, April 12 to December 31, 1945. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, p. 38. 
———. 1961c. “The President’s News Conference of January 3, 1946.” In 
The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the Presi-
dent, January 1 to December 31, 1946. Vol. 2. Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office. 
———. 1961d. “Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and on 
the Budget for 1947.” In The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States: Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and 
Statements of the President, January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946. Vol. 2. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
U.S. Census Bureau. 1940a. 1940 Census of Population and Housing. Six-
teenth Census of the United States: 1940. Population, Vol. I: Number of 
Inhabitants. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/
prod/www/abs/decennial/1940.html (accessed January 15, 2013). 
———. 1940b. 1940 Census of Population and Housing. Sixteenth Cen-
sus of the United States: 1940. Population, Vol. II: Characteristics of the 
Population. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.census 
.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1940.html (accessed January 15, 2013). 
———. 1960. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 
1957: A Statistical Abstract Supplement. Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Census Bureau.
———. 1975. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 
1970: A Statistical Abstract Supplement. Bicentennial Edition. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau. 
U.S. Congress. 1944a. Economic Problems of the Reconversion Period. Fourth 
Report of the House Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and 
218   Wasem
Planning. 78th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-
ing	Office.	
———. 1944b. Post-War Economic Policy and Planning. Fifth Report of the 
House Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning. 
78th	Cong.,	2nd	sess.	Washington,	DC:	U.S.	Government	Printing	Office.	
———. 1944c. Year-End Report. Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Sub-
committee on Military Contracts. 78th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: 
U.S.	Government	Printing	Office.	
———. 1945a. Report to Accompany S. 380. House Committee on Expendi-
tures in Executive Departments. 79th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government	Printing	Office.	
———. 1945b. “Hearings on S. 380.” Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, Subcommittee on Full Employment. 79th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 79–83. 
Washington,	DC:	U.S.	Government	Printing	Office.	
———. 1945c. “Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Exec-
utive Departments.” House of Representatives. 79th Cong., 1st sess. Wash-
ington,	DC:	U.S.	Government	Printing	Office.	
———. 1946. The Employment Act of 1946. P.L. 304. 15 U.S.C. § 1021. 
Washington,	DC:	U.S.	Government	Printing	Office.
———. 2007. “Hearings on the Conduct of Monetary Policy under the Hum-
phrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, July 17.” U.S. 
Congress. House Committee on Financial Services. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government	Printing	Office.
U.S. Department of Commerce. 1943. June, complete issue. Survey of Cur-
rent Business 23(6): 1–32, S-1–S-36. http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/1943/ 
0643cont.pdf (accessed January 16, 2013). 
U.S. Senate. 1944. The Problem of Post-War Employment and the Role of Con-
gress in Solving It. Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and 
Planning. 78th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-
ing	Office.
Wagner, Robert. 1945. History of the Employment Stabilization Act of 1931. 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking and Currency. Report to 
Committee. 79th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Committee Print No. 3, July 30. 
Papers of Sen. Robert Wagner, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.
Walker, Donald Edwin. 1982. “The Congressional Career of Clare E. 
Hoffman, 1935–63.” PhD diss., Michigan State University, East Lansing, 
MI. 
Wall Street Journal. 1942a. “Heavy Government Spending, Taxes Seen in 
Post-War Economy.” Wall Street Journal, January 29, p. 6.
———. 1942b. “Industry Can Make the Plans.” November 25, 1942, p. 8. 
———. 1942c. “Mixed Economist Too.” July 13, p. 4.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
References   219
———. 1944. “U.S. Steel Head Says Industry Has Ability to Reconvert 
Quickly.” December 6, p. 3. 
Wallace, Henry A. 1945. “Jobs for All.” New Republic 112(5): 138–140. 
Warken, Philip W. 1979. A History of the National Resources Planning Board, 
1933–1943. New York: Garland. 
Washington Post. 1945. “Says Wartime Spirit Can Win Peace and Assure Pros-
perity.” January 29, p. 6.
———. 1950. “GOP Offer 5-Point Prosperity Program.” April 6, p. 2. 
Weir, Margaret. 1992. Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment Policy 
in the United States. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Williams, William Appleman. 1961. The Contours of American History. Chi-
cago: Quadrangle Books. 
———. 1972. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: Dell. 
Wonnacott, Thomas H., and Ronald J. Wonnacott. 1977. Introductory Statis-
tics. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
World Top Incomes Database. 2012. The Database. Paris: Paris School of Eco-
nomics. http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/#Database: 
(accessed October 9, 2012). 
Zinn, Howard, ed. 1966. New Deal Thought. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
 
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
221
Author
Ruth Ellen Wasem is a specialist in domestic social policy at the Congres-
sional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress. In that capacity, she has 
researched,	written,	and	testified	before	the	U.S.	Congress	on	immigration	and	
social	welfare	policies.	Congressional	 committees	and	offices	have	 released	
many of her reports, which are widely cited. She is also an adjunct professor of 
public policy at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of 
Texas, where she teaches courses on immigration policy as well as legislative 
policymaking.	Wasem	had	been	a	Public	Health	Service	Fellow	in	the	Office	
of Population Affairs, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, as well 
as a senior research associate at the United Way of America. 
Wasem earned her master’s and doctoral degrees in history from the 
University of Michigan. While at Michigan, she held a graduate research 
assistantship at the Institute for Social Research’s Center for Political Studies 
and a teaching/research fellowship from the American Institutions Program. She 
also directed the G. Mennen Williams and Nancy Quirk Williams Oral History 
Project, 1980–1982, at the Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical 
Library. Wasem received her baccalaureate degree in history, political science, 
and psychology from Muskingum University in New Concord, Ohio.
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
223
Index
The italic letters f, n, and t following a page number indicate that the subject information 
of	the	entry	heading	is	within	a	figure,	note,	or	table,	respectively,	on	that	page.	Double	
letters, e.g., nn, indicate more than one such feature.
Abandonment, Great Depression and, 17
Acheson, Dean, foreign policy and, 5
ADA (Americans for Democratic  
 Action), 94n20
AFL. See American Federation of Labor
African Americans
 government antidiscrimination efforts  
 for, 83, 94n25
 groups of, supported full employment  
 bill, 104, 130
 House standing committee and, 122– 
 123n36
 percentage data about, 185t, 186t,  
 187t, 189t, 190t, 191t
 political parties of, 129, 178t
After the war—full employment  
 (Hansen), 22–24
 demise of NRPB and, 148
 public opinion about, 50–53, 52f, 53f
Agricultural sector, 18, 33–34, 142
 See also Farm workers; National  
 Grange
Agricultural Workers Union, 104
Aiken, Sen. George, 84, 94n27
Alcoholism, Great Depression and, 17
America First Party (1944), presidential  
 candidate, 121n3
American Association of Social Workers,  
 104
American economy
 collapse of, and FDR response, 18–21
 depressions in, 85, 89, 102–103, 105,  
 119, 127, 139
   (see also Great Depression)
 government roles in, 9, 11, 21–22,  
 33–35, 39, 92, 139
 postwar, coverage in print media,  
 46–47, 106
 recessions in, 151, 152, 153–154,  
 154f, 155–157
American Enterprise Association,  
 successor of, 121n11
American Enterprise Institute, 153
American Farm Bureau, 104
American Federation of Labor (AFL),  
 28, 80
 support for full employment bill by,  
 82, 94n21, 104
American Political Science Review  
 (journal), 136n1
Americans for Democratic Action  
 (ADA), predecessor of, 94n20
Anderson, Clinton, in Truman cabinet,  
 104, 106, 109
Anti-Federalist traditions, in American  
 politics, 8, 35, 117–118
Antidiscrimination efforts, 83, 94n25
Area Redevelopment Act (1961), 153
Association of American University  
 Women, 83
Austin, Sen. Warren, 26, 37n8
Australia, Keynesian economics in, 29
Baltimore Sun (newspaper), book  
 reviews in, 58
Bankhead, Rep. William, staff of, 98
Banking sector, New Deal programs for,  
 18
Barkley, Sen. Alben, 87
 as majority leader, 140, 141
 Special Committee service of, 26,  
 37n8
 as vice-presidential candidate, 161n2
Bartels, Larry M., legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
Baruch, Bernard M., House testimony  
 by, 28
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
224   Wasem
Bates, Rep. George, 117, 123n44
Batts, William, House testimony by, 28
Bean, Louis, 32, 93n4
 Bertram Gross and, 71, 78
Bender, Rep. George, 113, 140
 Joint Economic Committee service  
 of, 147, 161n
 as subcommittee member, 108,  
 122n23
Benton, William, 27–28
Bernanke, Ben, 21–22, 36n5
Bernstein, Barton, 6, 36n4
Bethune, Mary McLeod, 83
Beveridge, William Henry, Lord
 British plan and, 6, 29
	 full	employment	definition	by,	4,	61
Biemiller, Rep. Andrew John, 119,  
 123n50
Bilbo, Sen. Theodore, white supremacy 
and, 122nn17–18
Border states, U.S., demographic 
characteristics, 128–129, 173t, 177t,  
 178t, 179t, 180t, 181t, 183t
Bradley, Gen. Omar, testimony by, 104
Bridges, Sen. Styles, Joint Economic  
 Committee service of, 147, 162n7
Britain. See Great Britain
Broadcast media
 coverage of controversial issues in,  
 66–67
 movies, 25, 36n6
 radio, 24, 59, 61, 66–67, 83, 105, 139
 television coverage, 36n6, 68n4
Brown, Millard, loss of freedom feared  
 by, 101, 121n10
Buck, Sen. C. Douglass, 84, 87, 95, 140
Burns, Arthur F., appointments of, 152,  
 162n15
Business
	 confidence	in,	and	full	employment,		
 26, 28, 31, 57f, 88, 102
 corporate practices, 20, 115
 postwar expectations for, 33, 41, 42f,  
 44f, 45, 54
 prevention of monopolies in, 27, 90
 small, and legislation, 104–105
 unemployment and, 48–49, 49ff, 140,  
 141f
 WPB oriented toward, 46, 49–50
Business volunteers, 18
 CED with, 27–28
	 conflict	of	interest	by	civilian,	in		
 WWII, 25–26, 37n7, 50
Butler, Sen. Hugh, 87
Byrd, Sen. Henry, opposition of, 86,  
 95n31
California Chamber of Commerce, 99
Canada, economics of, 11, 29
Cantril, Hadley, 68n10
Capitalism, 47, 100
 driving force of, 88, 103
 national economic policy under, 108,  
 112
 unemployment in, 3–4, 20, 28, 119
Capper, Sen. Arthur, 87
Carter, Pres. Jimmy, capital infrastructure 
 spending and, 156
Carville, Sen. E. P., 87
CEA. See Council of Economic Advisers
CED. See Committee for Economic  
 Development
Celler, Rep. Emanuel, as committee  
 chair, 118, 123n47
Chambers of Commerce
 national groups, 99, 139–140
 state organizations of, 85, 99–100,  
 101, 102
Chicago Daily Tribune (newspaper), 46
Chicago Sun (newspaper), 62
Child labor, FLSA and, 19
Church, Rep. Ralph, 113, 115, 118
CIO. See Congress of Industrial  
 Organizations
Civil Works Administration (1933), 19
Civilian Conservation Corps, 54
Clark, John D., 149
Clausen, Aage, legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
Clerical workers (occupational category)
 distribution of, 12–13, 13f
 postwar expectations of, 41, 42f, 44f
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Wasem   225
Clinton, Joshua D., legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
Cochran, Rep. John, 121n7
 full employment and, 100, 140, 142
 H.R. 2202 and, 108, 113, 117
Cohen, Wilbur, 76
Collective bargaining, right to, 19,  
 162n13
Colm, Gerhard
 agency to administer full employment  
 planning and, 109, 122n28
 American white paper and, 29–31,  
 31t, 33–34, 38nn16–21
 Bertram Gross and, 71, 75, 78
 J. Weldon Jones and, 75, 76–77,  
 93n10
Colmer, Rep. William, 27, 37n10
Committee for Economic Development  
 (CED), 148
 businessmen advisers in, 27–28
 press coverage of, 54, 109
Communism
 full employment and, 101, 143
 innuendos and charges of, 37n8, 80,  
 118
 opposition to, 118–119
 steps leading to, 65–66, 101
Compensatory spending, 8, 115, 141
 as government role, 1, 2, 4, 9, 35, 59,  
 61, 74, 92, 143–144
 as monetary policy, 34, 110, 114, 120
Congregational Christian Churches, 104
Congress makes a law (Bailey), 7–8
Congress of Industrial Organizations  
 (CIO), 80
 full employment legislation and,  
 81–82, 104
Congressional conservatism and the New  
 Deal (Patterson), 136n1
Connecticut Chamber of Commerce, 102
Constituencies and leaders in Congress  
 (Jackson), 136n1
Consumerism, 102, 139
 expansion of, and full employment,  
 31, 88, 110, 144, 159
 postwar action plan and, 33, 35, 144
Corporate practices, FDR’s  
 administration and, 20
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA),  
 22, 151
 as apparatus for national planning, 8,  
 111–112, 114–115, 120
 appointees to, 122n27, 148–149,  
 157–158
 establishment of, 2, 5, 142, 147
Crawford, Frederick C., 28, 46
David, Paul, role in “pink” paper, 32
Dawson, Rep. William, H.R. 2202 and,  
 113, 115, 122–123n36
Debt
	 deficit	spending,	89–91,	102,	103,		
 151
 national, 61, 90, 116
 public, 23, 150
Degler, Carl, 36n4
Delaware, Great Depression income rate  
 in, 14
Democratic Party, 21, 39
 conservatives in, 86, 122n22, 123n41
 differing opinions within, 115, 136n4
 economic and demographic  
 characteristics of, 174t, 175t, 179t
 full employment scores in, 127, 131– 
 132, 133t, 136n4, 136–137n9,  
 175t
 liberal ideology score of, 123n41,  
 129, 181t
 members on Joint Economic  
 Committee, 146–147, 161n6
 presidential candidates, 14, 29
 regional strengths of, 128, 177t
 traits of, 127–128, 129tt, 132–133,  
 133t, 180t, 181t
Deschler, Lewis, 97–98, 120n2
Despres, Emile, 30, 31t
Dewey, Thomas E., 29, 84, 119, 123n49
Dimensions of congressional voting  
 (MacRae), 136n1
Dingell, Rep. John, Sr., antecedent to S.  
 380 and, 69–70, 74
Donnelly, James, 100, 102, 121n8
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
226   Wasem
Douglas, Melvyn, 94n20
Downey, Sen. Sheridan, 87
Earley, Jim, 30, 31t
Eccles, Marriner, role in American White 
Paper, 29–30, 31–32
Economic Bill of Rights (1950), 33
 content of, 25, 34, 78
 newsreel dissemination of, 24, 36n6
Economic inequality and political  
 representation (Bartels), 136n1
Economic Opportunity Act (1964),  
 153–154
Economic planning, 103
 apparatus for, 8, 20, 109, 114–115,  
 120, 142, 144
 Keynesian economics as, policy, 1,  
 29, 155
 national, 2, 4, 9, 35, 74, 92, 110
 postwar proposals for, 52–54, 70–72
 in The road to serfdom, 57–59, 60f
Economic policy, 74
 national planning in, under  
 capitalism, 112, 122n32, 142
 recommendations for, and Joint  
 Economic Committee mandate,  
 145, 161n3
Educational attainment
 full employment bill opinions by, 64,  
 65t, 68n9
 percentages of, 185t, 186t, 187t
 U.S., in 20th century, 12, 178t
Eisenhower, Pres. Dwight D., 5
 appointments of, 38n15, 121n5, 151
 transportation spending under, 156,  
 162n19
Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers  
 of America, 82
Emergency Relief and Construction Act  
 (1932), 18
Employment Act (1946)
 early years of, 150–153
 enactment of, and its dynamics  
 measured, 125–127, 163–164,  
 165t, 166t, 167, 187–191, 189t,  
 190t, 191t, 201–207
	 final	push	for	passage,	139–144
 historical perspective of, 1–10, 153– 
 161
 historiography of, 4–8
 implementation of, 9, 21, 144–150
	 legislative	fight	for	(see Full  
 employment bill; U.S. Congress.  
 House of Representatives; U.S.  
 Congress. Senate)
	 long-term	significance	in,	2,	8–9
 terms used in, 3–4, 10n1, 143
Employment policy
 American white paper, 29–34
 British white paper, 29
 postwar worries about, 40–45
 See also Full employment policy
Employment rights
 absent from postwar action plan, 34,  
 84
 full employment debate and, 24–25,  
 78, 86, 89, 142, 143
 H.R. 2202 and, 100–101, 110, 120,  
 122n31
 in labor law, 2, 4, 19, 101, 121n9,  
 162n9
 S. 380 and, 69, 72, 74, 87, 89, 92–93
Employment Stabilization Act (1931), 18
England, GNP growth rate compared to  
 U.S., 11
Ethnic voters, Democratic coalitions  
 with, 14, 129, 130–131
Executive Expenditures Committee. See  
 under U.S. Bureau of the Budget
Fair Employment Practices Commission  
 (FEPC), 94n25
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA, 1938),  
 19
Family crises, Great Depression and, 17
Farm workers, 13, 13f, 104
 Great Depression and, 15–16, 21
 living levels for, 168–169
 postwar expectations of, 41, 42f, 44f
 small-scale, as liberals, 79–80
 See also Agricultural Workers Union;  
 National Farmers Union
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Wasem   227
Fascism, 139
 opposition to, 118–119
 Rep. Hoffman’s ties to, 98, 121n4
 steps leading to, 58, 59, 60f, 101, 143
 unemployment alternatives in, 3–4
FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance  
 Corporation), 121n5
FDR. See Roosevelt, Pres. Franklin D.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
 (FDIC), appointments to, 121n5
Federal Emergency Relief Act (FERA,  
 1933), 19
Federal government, 21, 59
 commitment to full employment bill  
 by, 9
   (see also Job creation, federal role  
 in)
 investment strategies of, 156, 157f
 mid-20th century change in role of,  
 1–2
 responsibility of, 9, 19, 29, 33, 139,  
 140
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act  
 (1946), 134, 137n11
Federal Reserve, full employment policy  
 and, 29–30, 31–32, 155
Federalist traditions in American politics,  
 8, 35
FEPC (Fair Employment Practices  
 Commission), 94n25
FERA (Federal Emergency Relief Act,  
 1933), 19
Fish, Rep. Hamilton, 27, 37–38n14
Flanders, Sen. Ralph
 appointed as, 121n13, 152–153
 preappointment CED service of, 102,  
 109
Florida, urban growth in, 14
FLSA (Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938),  
 19
Folsom, Marion, 27–28, 38n15
Foreign policy, employment and, 5, 24, 33
Fortune (magazine)
 executive forecast on postwar  
 unemployment in, 47–50, 48f,  
 49ff, 51f
 government role in full employment  
 in, 54, 55f, 140, 141f
 Roper polls in, 40, 41f, 62–64, 63f,  
 64t, 65t
Free Employment Bureau, NYC, 15
Free enterprise system. See Capitalism
Freedom, 101
 government duties in behalf of, 119,  
 143
 prices paid for, 85, 88
Frictional	unemployment,	definition,	3,	4
Fulbright, Sen. J. William, 84, 95n28
 S. 380 amendments and, 87, 89
Full employment, 11
 comprehensive strategy for, 9, 148
 Congress and, 21, 26
	 definition	and	usage,	2,	3–4,	10n1, 27,  
 31, 99
 legislative support for, and statistical  
 measurement, 125–135, 126f,  
 136n2, 167, 201–207
 public discourse about, 50–57, 52f,  
 53f, 55f, 56f, 57ff
 public misunderstanding about, 53,  
 118–119
Full Employment Act (1945), proposed.  
 See Full employment bill
Full Employment and Balanced Growth  
 Act (1978), 155, 162n17
Full employment bill
 central elements in, 7, 9, 69, 92
 debate within the executive branch,  
 74–79
 FDR and, 6, 8–9, 78
 foreign policy and, 5, 24, 33
 as H.R. 2202, 97–115, 120, 139–140,  
 184–187
 opposition to, 84–86, 95nn29–31,  
 98–104
 original introduction of, 2, 5–6
 reaction to, 59, 61–66, 63f, 64t, 65t,  
 66ff, 67
 as S. 380, 69–93, 98, 120, 141
 support for, 104–105, 119–120, 125– 
 135, 126f, 177–191
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
228   Wasem
Full employment bill, cont. 
Truman and, 4–5, 6–7, 8–9, 83, 106,  
 121n15
Full employment in a free society  
 (Beveridge), 29
Full employment policy, 5–6, 20, 28, 73,  
 78, 155, 157
 administration of, 98, 109–110
 post-WWII job creation and, 22,  
 23–24, 39, 54–57, 55f, 56f
 strong feelings voiced about, 67, 83,  
 142
Full employment scores
 congressional rankings by, 128–135,  
 130t, 131t, 133t, 136n3, 165t
 construction of, 125–126, 136nn2–3,  
 163–164, 167, 201–204, 205t,  
 206t, 207t
 political party as dominant in, 131– 
 132, 133t, 136–137n9
 Senate and House comparisons, 126,  
 126f
 senator rankings by, 127–128, 129tt,  
 136nn4–6, 166t
Gallup, George, business, 39
Gallup	(firm)
 commercial opinion polls by, 40,  
 67–68, 68nn5–6
 on government role in full  
 employment, 51, 54–57, 56f, 57ff,  
 65
 on postwar employment, 39, 41–45,  
 43f, 44f, 68n6, 149, 150f
 on postwar problems, 39, 47
Garner-Wagner Bill (1932), 18
GDP. See Gross domestic product
Gellhorn, Martha, 16–17
General theory of employment, interest,  
 and money, The (Keynes), 20
General welfare, 34
 ensuring full employment for, 24, 33,  
 54, 142
 infrastructure spending for, 54, 156,  
 157f
George, Sen. Walter
 postwar demobilization proposals by,  
 32, 70–71, 93n5
 as Special Committee chair, 26, 37n8,  
 69
Germany, GNP growth rate compared to  
 U.S., 11
Gibson, Rep. John, 115, 118
Gilbert, Richard, 30, 31t
Glass, Sen. Carter, 87
GNP (Gross national product), 11
Gordon, Kermit, 158
Goss, Albert S., 103
Gossett, Rep. Edward, 108, 113, 122n22
Government roles, 115
 American economy and, 9, 11, 103,  
 110, 119, 140
 compensatory spending, 1, 2, 4, 8
 job creation, 2, 9, 19, 28, 141f
 public assistance, 19, 117
 regulation, 47, 118, 134, 137n11
Graham, George, 77, 93n13, 93n15
Granger, Rep. Walter, 118, 123n48
Grapes of wrath, The (Steinbeck), 16,  
 36n2
Great Britain
 Keynesian economics in, 29, 61
 See also countries within, e.g.,  
 England
Great Depression, 21
 experiences in, and federal job  
 creation role, 15–18
 full employment policy debates  
 during, 3, 11
 income levels in, 14, 15
 realignment of politics during, 14, 127
 recovery from, 21–22, 56–57, 117,  
 119, 139
 social stability and, 1, 103
 workers coming of age in, 44–45, 44f
Great Society programs, 120n1
Green, William, 28, 61, 82
Gross, Bertram
 S. 380 debate and, 75, 78
 staff positions of, 71, 93n7, 149, 155
 Walter Salant and, 75, 93n9
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Wasem   229
Gross, Murray, 94n20
Gross domestic product (GDP)
 rate of federal infrastructure spending  
 to, 156–157, 157f
 taxes and, 157, 158f
Gross national product (GNP), growth of  
 U.S., 11
Hansen, Alvin H.
 advocacy of, for unemployment  
 alternatives, 3–4, 5, 29, 38n16
 postwar planning draft by, 22–24, 50
 role in American white paper on  
 postwar employment, 29–31, 31t,  
 144, 148, 162nn8–9
Harris, United States v., 137n11
Hart, Rep. Edward, 115, 147, 161n6
Hatch, Sen. Carl, 91
Hawkes, Sen. Albert, 26, 37n8
Hawkins, Rep. Augustus, 155
Hayden, Sen. Carl, 26, 37n8
Hayek, Friedrich, 68n8
 author, 57–59, 60f, 65–66, 101
 cartoon interpretation of, work, 59,  
 60f
Hazlitt, Henry, 101–102
Heller, Walter, 157–158
Hickenlooper, Sen. Bourke, 89
 Full Employment Subcommittee  
 member, 84, 95n28
 S. 380 amendments and, 87, 91–92
Hoffman, Rep. Clare, 100, 123n41, 140
 debates and, 107–108
 minority reports and, 115, 120
 reputation of, 98, 121nn3–4
Hoffman, Paul G., 28
 as CED adviser, 27, 54
Holden, Thomas S., 28
Hoover, Pres. Herbert, Depression  
 policies and, 17–18
Hopkins, Harry L., 30
How congressmen decide (Clausen),  
 136n1
Huber, Rep. Walter, 147, 161n6
Humphrey, George, in Eisenhower  
 cabinet, 152, 162n16
Humphrey, Sen. Hubert, 155
Humphrey-Hawkins Act (1978), 155,  
 162n17
Ideological coalitions in Congress  
 (Schneider), 136n1
Ideology scores, 114, 123nn40–41,  
 190–191
Illinois Manufacturer’s Association  
	 (IMA),	officers,	100,	102
Immigrants
 percentage data about, 185t, 186t,  
 187t, 189t, 190t, 191t
 political parties of, 129, 178t
Income inequality, growth of, 159–161,  
 160f
Income levels, 21, 23
 differences of, by U.S. regions, 128– 
 129
 Great Depression and, 14, 15
 growth of personal disposable, in  
 U.S., 11–12, 36n1, 127, 136n4,  
 156, 159, 160f, 162n18
 opinions on full employment bill by,  
 62–63, 64t
Industrial sector, 102
 avoiding unemployment with, 140,  
 141f
 Great Depression and, 15, 16–17, 21,  
 117
 New Deal programs for, 18, 19
 postwar expectations of, 42f, 50, 51f
 stimulation of, 114, 142, 156
Inflation,	21,	23,	115
 causes of, 88, 102, 154–155
 Phillips curve with, 154, 158
Infrastructure
 See also under General welfare
Infrastructure, federal investment and,  
 54, 156, 157f
Ingram, Mrs. Henry, 104–105
Intellectuals, as liberals and  
 anticommunist, 79, 80
Investments sector, 18, 73, 116
 postwar action plan and, 33, 110
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
230   Wasem
Italy, GNP growth rate compared to U.S.,  
 11
Jackman, Simon, legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
Jackson, John E., legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
Jacoby, Neil H., 152
Jensen, Rep. Benton, 117, 123n43
Job creation, federal role in, 2, 9, 11–38,  
 106, 115
	 anti-inflation	and,	154–155
 Congress and early 1940s options for,  
 26–28
 divergent views by press and public  
 opinion of, 39–68, 140
 Great Depression experiences and,  
 15–18
 New Deal legacy and, 18–22, 119
 postwar full employment policy as,  
 34–35
 reasons against, 65–66
 shaped by U.S. socioeconomic  
 transformation, 11–14, 62–63, 64t,  
 65t
 taxes and, 2, 54, 90–91
 white papers on, 29–34
 WWII accomplishments and, 22–26
Job creation, New Federalism and, 159
Joblessness. See Unemployment
Jobs
 postwar expectations of available,  
 41–45, 41f, 42f, 43f, 44f
 types of, 12–13, 13f
Johnson, Eric A.
 House Special Committee testimony  
 by, 28
 as radio guest, 61
Johnson, Pres. Lyndon B.,  
 administration, 5, 120n1, 153
Jones, J. Weldon
 Gerhard Colm and, 75, 76, 78, 93n10
 role in American white paper on  
 employment policy, 30, 31t,  
 32–33, 38nn18–25
Judd, Rep. Walter, 147
Kendall, Patricia, 67
Kennedy, Pres. John F., administration, 5, 
 153, 157–158
Kentucky,	Great	Depression	coalfields		
 in, 16
Key, Valdimer Orlando, 71, 77, 93n14
 administrative agency for full  
 employment planning and, 109,  
 122n28
Keynes, John Maynard, Lord, 19, 29
 compensatory government spending  
 and, 1, 2, 8, 20, 22, 110
 counterarguments to economics of,  
 58, 101, 152
 FDR and, 20–21
 full employment and, 3–4, 5–6, 7–8,  
 74
Keyserling, Leon, 151
 background of, 109, 122nn27–28,  
 148–149
 Bertram Gross and, 93n7, 155
 full employment and, 4, 10n1, 155,  
 162n11
Kilgore, Sen. Harvey, 70, 93nn2–3
Kilgore-Truman-Murray bill
 postwar economic planning  
 legislation and, 70–71, 74, 80
King, Willard I., 102, 121n12
Kiplinger Washington Letter (newsletter), 
 46
La Follette, Rep. Charles, 100, 121n7
 Federalist tradition and, 115, 117–118
La Follette, Sen. Robert M., Jr., 121n7,  
 147, 162n7
Labor Day, 1945 celebrations, 87–88
Labor force, 101, 105, 118
 employables in, with government  
 assistance, 120, 142
 occupational distribution of, 12–13,  
 13f
 size of, 54, 68n7, 73
   (see also Unemployment)
 surveys of, 43–44, 44f
 See also Working class
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Wasem   231
Labor law, 6, 19, 149
 employment rights in, 2, 4, 121n9,  
 162n13
 Taft-Hartley, 101, 121n9
 veto overrides of, 162n13
Labor unions. See Trade unions
Landon, Alf, 68n2
Langer, Sen. William, 84, 94n27
Lanham, Rep. Frederick Garland 
(“Fritz”), 118, 123n45
Lathrop, Milo, 82, 94n22
Lawsuits, 103, 137n11
Lazarsfeld, Paul, 67
Legislative behavior, major research on,  
 125, 136n1
Leonard, William, 78
Literary Digest (magazine), 39, 68n2
Lobbying and lobbyists
 law and, 134, 137n11
 pressure groups and, 3, 71, 79–80, 85
Loeb, James, 94n20
 mobilization for full employment and,  
 82–83, 94nn23–24, 94n26
 Truman and, 82, 94n21
Longworth, Rep. Nicholas, 120n2
Los Angeles Times (newspaper),  
 contents of, 55–56
Lucas, Sen. Scott, 26, 37n8
MacRae, Duncan, legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
Mallon, Paul, 61
Malnutrition, Great Depression and, 17
Managers (occupational category), 13f
Manasco, Rep. Carter, 102, 116, 123n41
 as a conference committee manager  
 for full employment, 140, 142
 Executive Expenditures Committee  
 chair, 7, 98, 121n3
 pressure on, 106–107, 139, 161n1
Manpower Development and Training  
 Act (1962), 153
Mansfield,	Rep.	Joseph,	pressure	on,		
 106–107, 122nn17–18
Manual workers (occupational category),  
 12–13, 13f
 as blue-collar liberals, 79, 81–82
 distribution of, 12–13, 13f
 postwar expectations of, 41, 42f, 44f,  
 45
Manufacturers associations, 100, 101,  
 102
Martin, Rep. Joseph, 151
Massachusetts, socioeconomics in, 13–14
Matusow, Alan, 6
McCarthy, Sen. Joseph, 37n8, 95n27, 
162n7
McCormack, Rep. John, 115
 Truman and, 107, 119–120, 122n20
McFarland, Sen. Ernest, 87
Merchants and Manufacturers  
 Association, 101
Mid-Atlantic states, U.S., demographic  
 traits of, 129, 171t, 173t, 177t,  
 178t, 179t, 180t, 181t, 183t
Migratory workers, 27, 99
 Great Depression and, 15–16
Miller, Warren E., legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
Millikin, Sen. Eugene, 91
 on funding full employment bill,  
 89–90, 95n33
Mississippi, socioeconomics in, 13–14
Mitchell, Sen. Hugh, 84, 87, 95
Moley, Raymond, 61
Monetary policy
 U.S. and, 22, 34, 121n6, 155
 See also Compensatory spending
Monopolies, prevention of, 27, 90
Morse, Sen. Wayne, S. 380 endorsement  
 by, 84, 88–89, 94–95n27
Mosak, Jacob, 30, 31t
Mountain states, U.S., demographic traits 
 of, 128–129, 171t, 173t, 177t,  
 178t, 179t, 180t, 181t, 183t
Murdock, Sen. Orrice Abram (“Abe”),  
 Jr., 140
 exemptions to S. 380 and, 86–87
 Full Employment Subcommittee  
 member, 84, 95n28
 Joint Economic Committee service  
 of, 146–147
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
232   Wasem
Murdock, Sen. Orrice Abram (“Abe”),  
 Jr., cont. 
S. 380 amendments and debate by,  
 87, 88
Murray, Sen. James E., 148
 arguments of, 86, 88
 Bureau of the Budget and, 74–75
 coproposed legislation by, 61, 70,  
 93n1
 exemptions to S. 380 and, 86–87
 Kilgore-Truman-Murray bill and,  
 70–71, 74, 80
Musgrave, Richard, 30, 31t
Myers, Sen. Francis, 147, 161n6
Nation (magazine), 50, 62
National Association for the  
 Advancement of Colored People  
 (NAACP), 83, 104
National Committee to Uphold  
 Constitutional Government,  
 121n12
National Council of Jewish Women,  
 82–83, 104
National Council of Negro Women, 83
National Farmers Union (NFU)
 full employment bill supported by, 6,  
 71, 79–80, 81, 85, 104
	 officers	of,	61,	70
National Grange, full employment bill  
 opposed by, 85, 103, 104
National Industrial Recovery Act  
 (NIRA), probusiness with  
 workers’ rights, 19, 149
National Labor Relations Act (1935),  
 workers’ rights in, 121n9, 162n13
National Opinion Research Center  
 (NORC). See University of  
 Chicago, National Opinion  
 Research Center
National Recovery Administration  
 (NRA), 19, 20
National Resources Board. See National  
 Resources Planning Board  
 (NRPB)
National Resources Planning Board  
 (NRPB), 115
 as apparatus for economic planning,  
 8, 20
 demise of, 21, 26
National Review (magazine), 153
National Urban League, 83, 104
National Women’s Trade Union League,  
 82
Nazism. See Fascism
Nevada, urban growth in, 14
New Deal, 4
 divergent opinions about, 21, 26, 27,  
 36n4, 98, 115, 121n6
 intervention programs of, 1, 11,  
 18–19
 legacy of, and federal job creation  
 role, 18–22, 34–35
 political realignment and, 14, 129,  
 136n1
New England states, U.S., 136n4
 demographic traits of, 127, 128, 171t,  
 173t, 177t, 178t, 179t, 180t, 181t,  
 183t
New Federalism, 159
New Mexico, socioeconomics in, 14
New Republic (magazine), contents of,  
 50, 59, 62, 80, 114
New York, NY, Great Depression  
 unemployment in, 15
New York Chamber of Commerce, 85,  
 99–100, 101
New York Post (newspaper), 62
New York Times (newspaper), contents  
 of, 46, 58
 hearings testimony by, journalists,  
 101, 102
Newsreels, use of, 25, 36n6
Newsweek (magazine), contents of,  
 46–47, 61–62, 84–85, 86, 106
NFU. See National Farmers Union
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 94n20
NIRA (National Industrial Recovery  
 Act), 19, 149
Nixon, Pres. Richard M., appointments  
 by, 162n15
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Wasem   233
NLRA (National Labor Relations Act,  
 1935), 121n9, 162n13
Nobel Prize for Economics (1974), 68n8
NORC. See University of Chicago,  
 National Opinion Research Center  
 (NORC)
North Carolina, Great Depression income 
 rate in, 14
North-central states, U.S., demographic  
 traits of, 128–129, 171t, 173t,  
 177t, 178t, 179t, 180t, 181t, 183t
North Dakota, working-class population  
 in, 14
Nourse, Edwin, 148, 151
NRA (National Recovery Administration), 
 19, 20
NRPB. See National Resources Planning  
 Board
Olds, Irving S., 46
O’Mahoney, Sen. Joseph
 Joint Economic Committee service  
 of, 145, 146f, 152, 161n4
 S. 380 and, 72, 90–91, 93n8, 95n34,  
 145, 156
 Senate committee service of, 26,  
 37n8, 145
OPOR (Princeton University, Office of  
 Public Opinion Research), 39–40,  
 68n4
Outland, Rep. George, H.R. 2202  
 cosponsor, 97, 118, 119, 120n1
Pacific coast states, U.S., demographic  
 traits of, 127, 128–129, 171t, 173t,  
 177t, 178t, 179t, 180t, 181t, 183t
Parent-Teacher Association, 83–84
Patman, Rep. Wright
 cosponsored H.R. 2202, 97, 118–119,  
 120n1
 support for compromise legislation,  
 142, 152
Patterson, James T., legislative  
 behavioral research, 136n1
Patton, James, 59, 61, 71
Peace, postwar opinion on, 39
Pennsylvania, labor data for, 14
Pepper, Sen. Claude, 26, 37n8
Philadelphia Textile Manufacturers  
 Association, 101
Phillips curve, definition, 154
Political parties
 construction and use of partisanship  
 scores for, 167–168, 181t, 190– 
 191
 legislative influence of, 127, 132, 135
 See also specifics, i.e., America First  
 Party; Democratic Party;  
 Progressive parties; Republican  
 Party
Politics
 conservative, 7, 114, 142, 153
 ideology score in, 114, 123nn40–41
 liberal, and Keynesian policies, 6, 7,  
 8, 79–83
 measurement factors linked to full  
 employment support, 125–135
 traditions of American, 8, 31, 115,  
 134–135
Pope, Col. Allan M., 28
Population growth, in U.S. 20th century,  
 12, 139
Populist traditions, American politics  
 with, 8, 115–116, 151
Poverty alleviation, 19
President’s Council of Economic  
 Advisers. See Council of  
 Economic Advisers (CEA)
Princeton University, Office of Public  
 Opinion Research (OPOR), 39–40, 
 68n4
Print media
 influence of, 134–135
 journals, 136n1
 magazines, 40, 47–47, 50, 58–59,  
 61–62, 84–85, 105–106, 109, 140,  
 153
 newsletters, 46, 81, 82
 newspapers, 39, 40, 43, 46, 52, 55,  
 58, 59, 61, 62, 66, 68n1, 82, 84
 postwar economy coverage in, 46–47,  
 106
234   Wasem
Print media, cont.
 See also specific titles, e.g., Atlanta  
 Constitution (newspaper); Fortune  
 (magazine)
Private sector, 114, 159
 employment shortfall by, balanced  
 by governmental compensatory  
 spending, 4, 9, 92, 119, 139, 142
 ensuring full employment with, 24,  
 54, 56–57, 57ff, 73, 110, 141f
 postwar capabilities of, 46, 102
Professionals (occupational category),  
 13f
 postwar expectations of, 41, 42f, 44f,  
 45
Progressive parties, 121n7, 128, 162n7
Proprietors (occupational category), 13f
Public assistance, 153
 cheaper than full employment, 86, 88
 See also Relief programs
Public opinion
	 commercial	polling	firms	for,	39,		
 67–68
 on the full employment bill, 59,  
 61–66, 63f, 64t, 65t, 66ff, 105,  
 115, 134–135, 140
 mass mailings to assess, 39, 68n2
 post–Employment Act, 149, 150f
 postwar employment worries in,  
 40–45, 85
 quota-controlled vs. random sample  
 techniques in, 68n3
 university-based survey research to  
 assess, 39–40, 68n4
Public welfare. See General welfare
Public Welfare Amendments (1962), 153
Public works, 17, 28
 ensuring full employment with, 24,  
 54, 55f, 56–57, 56f, 110, 114, 115,  
 140, 141f
 under FDR, 19, 27
 taxation for, 89–91, 162n19
Public Works Administration (1933),  
 19, 54
 postwar expectations for, 56–57
Racial minorities, 79, 83
Radcliffe, Sen. George, 140
 Full Employment Subcommittee  
 member, 84, 95n28
 S. 380 amendments and, 87, 91
Railroad Brotherhoods, 82
Randolph, A. Philip, 83, 94n25
Reader’s Digest (magazine), 58–59
Reagan, Pres. Ronald
 infrastructure spending cut under,  
 156–157
 tax cuts under, 158–159
Recessions, 151–154
 Keynesian thinking about, 2, 152
 legislative response to, 153–154
 tools to alleviate, 102, 161
 unemployment during, 153, 154f,  
 156–157
Relief programs
 experience with, 16–17, 84, 119
 law and legislation, 18, 19
Religious leaders, 104–105
Republican Party
 alliances with, 21, 123n42
 bipartisanship and, 84, 92, 105, 136n4
 conservative ideology score of,  
 123n41, 181t
 economic and demographic  
 characteristics of, 174t, 175t, 178t,  
 179t
 full employment scores in, 127,  
 136n4
 members on Joint Economic  
 Committee, 147, 162n7
 presidential candidates, 14, 29, 68n2,  
 84, 119, 121n8, 123n49
 regional strengths of, 128, 177t
 traits of, 175t, 180t, 181t
Resa, Rep. Alexander, 113, 115, 122n36
Rhode Island, socioeconomics in, 14
Rich, Rep. Robert, 100, 115, 121n7, 147
Right to employment. See Employment  
 rights
Rivers, Douglas, legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Wasem   235
Road to serfdom, The (Hayek, 1944), 101
 economic planning and, 57–59, 60f
 federal job creation and, 65–66
Robey, Ralph, 61–62, 84–85
Romer, Christina, 22
Roosevelt, Mrs. Eleanor, 16, 80
 Truman and, 107, 122n21
Roosevelt, Pres. Franklin D. (“FDR”),  
 26, 50, 149
 criticism of, 20, 46
 FEPC and, 94n25
 full employment bill and, 6, 8–9, 78,  
 143
 New Deal programs of, 18–21
 speeches by, 24–26, 36n6
 U.S. Supreme Court and, 121n12
 use of public opinion polls by, 68n10
Roper, Elmo, business of, 39
Roper	(firm)
 commercial opinion polls by, 40,  
 67–68, 68n9
 on full employment bill, 62–64, 63f,  
 64t, 65t
 on postwar employment prospects,  
 40, 41f
Rumely, United States v., 137n11
Rural areas, 103–104
Sabath, Rep. Adolph, 123n42
Salant, Walter
 Bertram Gross and, 71, 75, 93n9
 in postwar employment study group,  
 30, 31t
Sales workers (occupational category),  
 12–13, 13f
Saturday Review of Literature  
 (magazine), 59
Schneider, Jerrold, legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
Schramm, James S., 104, 121n13
Schwellenbach, Lewis, in Truman  
 cabinet, 104, 106, 109
Scoring systems. See Full employment  
 scores; Ideology scores
Second World War. See World War II
Service workers (occupational category),  
 12–13, 13f
Sifton, Paul, 81
Sloan, Alfred P., 47
Small business, 104–105
Smith, Gerald L. K., 121n3
Smith, Harold
 role in American white paper on  
 employment policy, 30, 31–32
 S. 380 debate and, 75, 78
 testimony by, 28, 104
Smith, Russell, 70, 93n4
Smithies, Arthur, 30, 31t
Snyder, John, 104, 140–141
Social programs, advocacy of, 24, 120n1, 
 153–154
Social science, public opinion research  
 as, 39–40, 67
Social Security Act (1935), 149
Social workers, 104–105
Socialism
 abandonment of freedom and  
 individualism leads to, 58, 60f
 innuendos and charges of, 32, 80,  
 118, 151
 Keynesian economics as middle  
 solution between, and capitalism,  
 3–4
 opposition to, 116, 118–119
Socioeconomic factors
 linked to full employment support,  
 125–128, 132, 136–137n9
 U.S. transformation and, 1, 11–14,  
 62–63, 64t, 65t
 wage compression and, 160–161
South Carolina, Great Depression in, 14,  
 16–17
South Dakota, working class in, 14
Southern states, U.S., 136n4
 demographic traits of, 128–129, 171t,  
 173t, 177t, 178t, 179t, 180t, 181t,  
 183t
 full employment scores of electees  
 from, 133, 137n10, 173t, 195, 197t
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
236   Wasem
Spahr, Walter, 100, 101
 full employment questioned by, 99,  
 121n6
Spence, Rep. Brent, 97, 114, 120n1
Starvation, in U.S., 17, 21
Status loss, Great Depression and, 17
Steinbeck, John, 16, 36n2
Stewart, Walter W., 152
Stokes, Donald E., legislative behavioral  
 research, 136n1
Suicide, Great Depression and, 17
Sullivan, Mark, 84
Sweden, Keynesian economics in, 29
Taft, Sen. Robert, 92, 95n35, 140
 allies of, 122n23, 147, 152, 162n16
 Full Employment Subcommittee  
 member, 84, 95n28
 Joint Economic Committee service  
 of, 145–146, 146f, 161n5
 S. 380 amendments and, 87, 91, 146
 Senate committee service of, 26,  
 37n8, 145–146
 taxation and, 90, 157
Taft-Hartley Act (1946), rollback of  
 workers’ rights in, 101, 121n9,  
 162n13
Tax credits, job creation and, 2, 54
Tax cuts
	 justification	for,	2,	157–159
 veto overrides of, 150–151, 162n13
Tax Reform Act (1986), 158–159
Tax structure, 23, 158f
 ensuring full employment with, 24,  
 90, 115, 157
 highway trust fund and, 162n19
 private sector limited by, 46–47, 116
Taylor, Sen. Glen, 87, 140
 Full Employment Subcommittee  
 member, 84, 95n28
Thomas, Sen. Elbert, 72, 93n8
Thomas, Sen. John, 87
Thompson, Samuel, 78
Time (magazine), contents of, 47, 105– 
 106, 109
Tobey, Sen. Charles, 87, 140
 endorsed S. 380, 84, 95n27
Tobin, James, 158
Totalitarianism, 117, 139
 conditions leading to, 101–102
 See also specific types of, e.g.,  
 Fascism
Trade Adjustment Assistance Act (1962),  
 153
Trade barriers, prevention of, 27
Trade unions, 103
 collective bargaining rights and, 19,  
 162n13
 critics of, 98, 101
 full employment bill supported by,  
 104–105
 letter-writing campaigns by, 83–84
 mobilization of, for S. 380, 79–80,  
 81–82
 reemployment of veterans by private  
 sector limited by, 46–47
 strikers in, 89, 100–101, 121n10
 See also specifics, e.g., American  
 Federation of Labor
Transportation, plan for, 34, 156
Truman, Pres. Harry S., 7, 94n25, 143
 administration of, 105–107, 108–110,  
 121n16
 appointees of, 148–149, 151
 full employment bill and, 4–5, 6–7,  
 8–9, 61, 78–79, 85, 94nn18–19,  
 94n21, 97, 105–107, 108,  
 109, 119–120, 121n15, 139, 140,  
 141
 radio speeches of, 83, 105, 139
 vetoes by, 121n9, 151, 162n13
Truman, Sen. Harry S., 50
 Kilgore-Truman-Murray bill and,  
 70–71, 74, 80, 93n3
Truman, Vice Pres. Harry S., 61, 78
Tucker, Rufus, 85–86, 95n30
Tunnel, Sen. James, 147, 161n6
UDA. See Union for Democratic Action
Unemployment, 3, 21, 144
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Wasem   237
Unemployment, cont. 
alleviation of, 2, 9, 17–18, 47–49,  
 49ff, 50, 51f, 54, 139, 161
 expectations of, 149, 150f
 federal responsibility for, 19, 20,  
 49ff, 107, 109, 119
 Great Depression and, 15, 16f, 40,  
 156
 as national issue, 27, 28, 40, 50, 51f,  
 61, 85, 86
 Phillips curve with, 154, 158
 rates of, 4, 89, 129, 129tt, 156, 157f
 state, statistics in Great Depression,  
 14, 136n4
Union for Democratic Action (UDA),  
 94n20
 full employment mobilization by, 6,  
 80–81
 liberal-conservative ideology score  
 constructed by, 114, 123nn40–41,  
 168
United Auto Workers, 82
 strikes by, and Hoffman reaction,  
 100–101
United Mine Workers, 82, 104
United States
 bicameral government in, 7–8
 budgets of, 21, 73, 92, 109–110, 112
 mid-20th century socioeconomic  
 transformation of, 1, 11–14
 regional differences within, 127,  
 136n4, 173–174, 173t, 174t, 175t
   (see also specifics, e.g., New  
 England states, U.S.)
U.S. Bureau of the Budget
 control issues in, 77–78, 93n15,  
 94nn16–17
 debates in, 74–79
 under House Committee on Executive  
 Expenditures, 97–98, 108, 122n24
 meeting minutes, 76–77, 79, 93n12
 staff in, 30, 31t, 77, 93n13
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 139–140
U.S. Congress, 19
 debates in, 9, 115–120
	 filibusters	in,	94n25, 97
	 influences	on,	21,	109,	127,	135,		
 136n1
 options for, in early 1940s job  
 creation role, 26–28
 sessions of, 69, 98, 121n9, 128, 152,  
 161n4
U.S. Congress. Joint committees
 on budget, 73, 92, 110, 150
 on economics, 2, 110–111, 113, 120,  
 142, 145–147, 151–152, 161nn3–5
 on full employment, 140–142
U.S. Dept. of Commerce
 appointees in, 30, 59, 79
 CED within, 27–28
U.S.	Executive	Office	of	the	President,		
 20
U.S. House of Representatives
 committees, 7, 97–98, 107–108, 108,  
 113–114, 115–116, 119, 120,  
 122n35, 122–123n36, 123n42
 compromise in, 107–112, 113
 elections to, 120n1, 121n3, 121n7,  
 122n17, 122n23, 122n36, 123n45,  
 123n48, 123n50, 150–151, 161n2,  
 162n7
 full employment scores in, 126f,  
 129–135, 130t, 131t, 133t, 193– 
 200
 hearings held by, 98–105
 H.R. 2202 of, 97–115
 ideology scores and, 114, 123nn40– 
 41
 S. 380 in, 97, 107, 113, 115–118, 119,  
 120
 subcommittees, 108, 110–111, 112,  
 113, 122nn30–31
U.S. House of Representatives. Special  
 Committee on Postwar Economic  
 Policy and Planning, 27, 28, 37n9
U.S. law and legislation, 19, 32, 97, 101,  
 123n47, 149
 behavioral research pertaining to,  
 125, 136n1
 full employment in, 2, 6, 9, 149, 155– 
 156, 162n17
   (see also Employment Act [1946])
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
238   Wasem
U.S. law and legislation, cont.
 lobbying, 134, 137n11
 policy formation and, 7, 158–159
 as recession responses, 153–154
 vetoed, 18, 121n9, 150–151, 162n13
U.S. Senate
 Acts passed by, 71, 93n6, 105
 committees in, 69, 70, 83–88
 compromise in, 87, 91, 110
 debates in, 69, 88–93, 98
 elections to, 93n8, 94–95n27, 95n28,  
 95nn32–33, 150–151, 161n2,  
 161n6, 162n7
 full employment scores in, 126f,  
 127–128, 129tt, 136nn4–6
 staff roles in, 7, 78
 subcommittees of, 69, 70, 71, 83, 84,  
 87
U.S. Senate. Special Committee on  
 Postwar Economic Policy and  
 Planning, 26–27, 28, 69, 70–71
U.S. Supreme Court, 121n12, 137n11
University of Chicago, National Opinion  
 Research Center (NORC), 40,  
 68n4
 data on full employment feasibility  
 and timing by, 51–53, 52f, 53f
 opinions on full employment bill  
 found by, 64–66, 66ff
Urban areas, 34, 169
 rise of, 12, 13–14, 136n4
Utah, Great Depression income rate in,  
 14
Vandenberg, Sen. Arthur, 26, 37n8
Vinson, Fred
 John Snyder and, 140–141
 Rep. Whittington and, 108, 112,  
 122nn33–34
 in Truman cabinet, 104, 106, 108,  
 109, 122nn25–26, 122n29
Volunteerism, as Depression solution,  
 17–18
Voorhuis, Rep. Jerry, 119, 123n50
Wages, 15, 19, 103
 compression of, by socioeconomic  
 factors, 160–161
Wagner, Sen. Robert, 140
 coproposed legislation by, 18, 36n3,  
 70, 93n4
 Full Employment Subcommittee  
 chair, 75–76, 84
 Harold Smith and, 75–77, 93n11
 letter-writing campaigns to, 83–84,  
 85–86, 139, 161n1
 S. 380 amendments and debate, 87,  
 88
 staff of, 122n27, 148–149
Wall Street Journal (newspaper),  
 contents of, 46, 52, 59
Wallace, Henry
 on full employment, 59, 61, 78, 79,  
 92
 in Truman cabinet, 104, 106, 109
War production, 46
 contracts for, 70–71
 mobilization of, 49–50
War Productions Board (WPB), business  
 orientation of, 46, 49–50
Washington Post (newspaper), contents  
 of, 43, 84
Wendzel, Julius, role in “pink” paper, 32
West Virginia Chamber of Commerce, 99
Wheeler, Sen. Burton, 89, 95n32
Wherry, Sen. Kenneth, 89, 95n32
White paper on employment policy  
 (Great Britain), 29
Whittington, Rep. William, 109
 as a conference committee manager  
 for full employment, 140, 141,  
 142
 debate tactics of, 116–117
 Fred Vinson and, 108, 112, 122nn33– 
 34
 liberal ideology score of, 123n41
 pressure on, 106–107, 122nn17–19
 substitute bill and, 111–112, 113,  
 114–115, 122n35
Williams, Kenneth, 30, 31t
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
Wasem   239
Williams, William Appleman, 5
Wilson, Charles E., 28
Wisconsin Progressive Party, 162n7
Wolcott, Rep. Jesse, 98, 121n5, 152
Women workers, 89
 postwar expectations of, 43–44, 44f
Women’s groups, 79, 82–83
Working class, 74
	 definition,	12,	170
 Democratic coalitions with, 14, 129
 percentage data about, 12–13, 13f,  
 185t, 186t, 187t, 189t, 190t, 191t
 proportion of, in states and U.S.  
 regions, 14, 129
 regional distribution of, 179t
 See also Women workers
Works Progress Administration (1935),  
 19, 56–57
World trade
 postwar employment to support, 33
World War II (WWII)
 accomplishments of, and federal job  
 creation role, 22–26
 civilian businessmen as volunteers in,  
 25–26, 37n7
 federal spending for, 1, 8, 11, 21
 media coverage of, 16, 67
 post–, and America’s future, 5, 22,  
 23–24, 33–35
 veterans of, and reemployment, 28,  
 46, 50, 51f, 88, 106
WPB (War Productions Board), 46,  
 49–50
WWII. See World War II
Young Women’s Christian Association  
 (YWCA), 82, 104–105
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked 
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Rep-
resentative if you have questions about finding the option.
Job Name: -- /347091t
About the Institute
The	W.E.	Upjohn	Institute	for	Employment	Research	is	a	nonprofit	research	
organization	 devoted	 to	 finding	 and	 promoting	 solutions	 to	 employment- 
related problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the 
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in 
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn 
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during 
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemploy-
ment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications. 
Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research pro-
gram conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 2) a com-
petitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal research 
program	by	providing	financial	support	to	researchers	outside	the	Institute;	3)	a	
publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the 
research	of	staff	and	grantees,	as	well	as	other	selected	works	in	the	field;	and	
4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the 
publicly funded employment and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication pro-
grams are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public 
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge 
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions 
to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, conse-
quences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income 
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements; 
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic devel-
opment and local labor markets.
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